The equivalence of Bell's inequality and the Nash inequality in a quantum game-theoretic setting

The interaction of competing agents is described by classical game theory. It is now well known that this can be extended to the quantum domain, where agents obey the rules of quantum mechanics. This is of emerging interest for exploring quantum foundations, quantum protocols, quantum auctions, quantum cryptography, and the dynamics of quantum cryptocurrency, for example. In this paper, we investigate two-player games in which a strategy pair can exist as a Nash equilibrium when the games obey the rules of quantum mechanics. Using a generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) setting for two-player quantum games, and considering a particular strategy pair, we identify sets of games for which the pair can exist as a Nash equilibrium only when Bell's inequality is violated. We thus determine specific games for which the Nash inequality becomes equivalent to Bell's inequality for the considered strategy pair.Comment: 18 pages, revise

Belief-Invariant and Quantum Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information

Drawing on ideas from game theory and quantum physics, we investigate nonlocal correlations from the point of view of equilibria in games of incomplete information. These equilibria can be classified in decreasing power as general communication equilibria, belief-invariant equilibria and correlated equilibria, all of which contain the familiar Nash equilibria. The notion of belief-invariant equilibrium has appeared in game theory before, in the 1990s. However, the class of non-signalling correlations associated to belief-invariance arose naturally already in the 1980s in the foundations of quantum mechanics. Here, we explain and unify these two origins of the idea and study the above classes of equilibria, and furthermore quantum correlated equilibria, using tools from quantum information but the language of game theory. We present a general framework of belief-invariant communication equilibria, which contains (quantum) correlated equilibria as special cases. It also contains the theory of Bell inequalities, a question of intense interest in quantum mechanics, and quantum games where players have conflicting interests, a recent topic in physics. We then use our framework to show new results related to social welfare. Namely, we exhibit a game where belief-invariance is socially better than correlated equilibria, and one where all non-belief-invariant equilibria are socially suboptimal. Then, we show that in some cases optimal social welfare is achieved by quantum correlations, which do not need an informed mediator to be implemented. Furthermore, we illustrate potential practical applications: for instance, situations where competing companies can correlate without exposing their trade secrets, or where privacy-preserving advice reduces congestion in a network. Along the way, we highlight open questions on the interplay between quantum information, cryptography, and game theory