112 research outputs found
An Incentive Compatible Multi-Armed-Bandit Crowdsourcing Mechanism with Quality Assurance
Consider a requester who wishes to crowdsource a series of identical binary
labeling tasks to a pool of workers so as to achieve an assured accuracy for
each task, in a cost optimal way. The workers are heterogeneous with unknown
but fixed qualities and their costs are private. The problem is to select for
each task an optimal subset of workers so that the outcome obtained from the
selected workers guarantees a target accuracy level. The problem is a
challenging one even in a non strategic setting since the accuracy of
aggregated label depends on unknown qualities. We develop a novel multi-armed
bandit (MAB) mechanism for solving this problem. First, we propose a framework,
Assured Accuracy Bandit (AAB), which leads to an MAB algorithm, Constrained
Confidence Bound for a Non Strategic setting (CCB-NS). We derive an upper bound
on the number of time steps the algorithm chooses a sub-optimal set that
depends on the target accuracy level and true qualities. A more challenging
situation arises when the requester not only has to learn the qualities of the
workers but also elicit their true costs. We modify the CCB-NS algorithm to
obtain an adaptive exploration separated algorithm which we call { \em
Constrained Confidence Bound for a Strategic setting (CCB-S)}. CCB-S algorithm
produces an ex-post monotone allocation rule and thus can be transformed into
an ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mechanism
that learns the qualities of the workers and guarantees a given target accuracy
level in a cost optimal way. We provide a lower bound on the number of times
any algorithm should select a sub-optimal set and we see that the lower bound
matches our upper bound upto a constant factor. We provide insights on the
practical implementation of this framework through an illustrative example and
we show the efficacy of our algorithms through simulations
Optimum Statistical Estimation with Strategic Data Sources
We propose an optimum mechanism for providing monetary incentives to the data
sources of a statistical estimator such as linear regression, so that high
quality data is provided at low cost, in the sense that the sum of payments and
estimation error is minimized. The mechanism applies to a broad range of
estimators, including linear and polynomial regression, kernel regression, and,
under some additional assumptions, ridge regression. It also generalizes to
several objectives, including minimizing estimation error subject to budget
constraints. Besides our concrete results for regression problems, we
contribute a mechanism design framework through which to design and analyze
statistical estimators whose examples are supplied by workers with cost for
labeling said examples
Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal-Agent Problems
Crowdsourcing markets have emerged as a popular platform for matching
available workers with tasks to complete. The payment for a particular task is
typically set by the task's requester, and may be adjusted based on the quality
of the completed work, for example, through the use of "bonus" payments. In
this paper, we study the requester's problem of dynamically adjusting
quality-contingent payments for tasks. We consider a multi-round version of the
well-known principal-agent model, whereby in each round a worker makes a
strategic choice of the effort level which is not directly observable by the
requester. In particular, our formulation significantly generalizes the
budget-free online task pricing problems studied in prior work.
We treat this problem as a multi-armed bandit problem, with each "arm"
representing a potential contract. To cope with the large (and in fact,
infinite) number of arms, we propose a new algorithm, AgnosticZooming, which
discretizes the contract space into a finite number of regions, effectively
treating each region as a single arm. This discretization is adaptively
refined, so that more promising regions of the contract space are eventually
discretized more finely. We analyze this algorithm, showing that it achieves
regret sublinear in the time horizon and substantially improves over
non-adaptive discretization (which is the only competing approach in the
literature).
Our results advance the state of art on several different topics: the theory
of crowdsourcing markets, principal-agent problems, multi-armed bandits, and
dynamic pricing.Comment: This is the full version of a paper in the ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), 201
A Semi-supervised Sensing Rate Learning based CMAB Scheme to Combat COVID-19 by Trustful Data Collection in the Crowd
Mobile CrowdSensing (MCS), through employing considerable workers to sense
and collect data in a participatory manner, has been recognized as a promising
paradigm for building many large-scale applications in a cost-effective way,
such as combating COVID-19. The recruitment of trustworthy and high-quality
workers is an important research issue for MCS. Previous studies assume that
the qualities of workers are known in advance, or the platform knows the
qualities of workers once it receives their collected data. In reality, to
reduce their costs and thus maximize revenue, many strategic workers do not
perform their sensing tasks honestly and report fake data to the platform. So,
it is very hard for the platform to evaluate the authenticity of the received
data. In this paper, an incentive mechanism named Semi-supervision based
Combinatorial Multi-Armed Bandit reverse Auction (SCMABA) is proposed to solve
the recruitment problem of multiple unknown and strategic workers in MCS.
First, we model the worker recruitment as a multi-armed bandit reverse auction
problem, and design an UCB-based algorithm to separate the exploration and
exploitation, considering the Sensing Rates (SRs) of recruited workers as the
gain of the bandit. Next, a Semi-supervised Sensing Rate Learning (SSRL)
approach is proposed to quickly and accurately obtain the workers' SRs, which
consists of two phases, supervision and self-supervision. Last, SCMABA is
designed organically combining the SRs acquisition mechanism with multi-armed
bandit reverse auction, where supervised SR learning is used in the
exploration, and the self-supervised one is used in the exploitation. We prove
that our SCMABA achieves truthfulness and individual rationality. Additionally,
we exhibit outstanding performances of the SCMABA mechanism through in-depth
simulations of real-world data traces.Comment: 18 pages, 14 figure
Low-Cost Learning via Active Data Procurement
We design mechanisms for online procurement of data held by strategic agents
for machine learning tasks. The challenge is to use past data to actively price
future data and give learning guarantees even when an agent's cost for
revealing her data may depend arbitrarily on the data itself. We achieve this
goal by showing how to convert a large class of no-regret algorithms into
online posted-price and learning mechanisms. Our results in a sense parallel
classic sample complexity guarantees, but with the key resource being money
rather than quantity of data: With a budget constraint , we give robust risk
(predictive error) bounds on the order of . Because we use an
active approach, we can often guarantee to do significantly better by
leveraging correlations between costs and data.
Our algorithms and analysis go through a model of no-regret learning with
arriving pairs (cost, data) and a budget constraint of . Our regret bounds
for this model are on the order of and we give lower bounds on the
same order.Comment: Full version of EC 2015 paper. Color recommended for figures but
nonessential. 36 pages, of which 12 appendi
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