Temporalized logics and automata for time granularity

Suitable extensions of the monadic second-order theory of k successors have been proposed in the literature to capture the notion of time granularity. In this paper, we provide the monadic second-order theories of downward unbounded layered structures, which are infinitely refinable structures consisting of a coarsest domain and an infinite number of finer and finer domains, and of upward unbounded layered structures, which consist of a finest domain and an infinite number of coarser and coarser domains, with expressively complete and elementarily decidable temporal logic counterparts. We obtain such a result in two steps. First, we define a new class of combined automata, called temporalized automata, which can be proved to be the automata-theoretic counterpart of temporalized logics, and show that relevant properties, such as closure under Boolean operations, decidability, and expressive equivalence with respect to temporal logics, transfer from component automata to temporalized ones. Then, we exploit the correspondence between temporalized logics and automata to reduce the task of finding the temporal logic counterparts of the given theories of time granularity to the easier one of finding temporalized automata counterparts of them.Comment: Journal: Theory and Practice of Logic Programming Journal Acronym: TPLP Category: Paper for Special Issue (Verification and Computational Logic) Submitted: 18 March 2002, revised: 14 Januari 2003, accepted: 5 September 200

Constitutionalizing Connectivity: The Constitutional Grid of World Society

Global law settings are characterized by a structural pre-eminence of connectivity norms, a type of norm which differs from coherency or possibility norms. The centrality of connectivity norms emerges from the function of global law, which is to increase the probability of transfers of condensed social components, such as economic capital and products, religious doctrines, and scientific knowledge, from one legally structured context to another within world society. This was the case from colonialism and colonial law to contemporary global supply chains and human rights. Both colonial law and human rights can be understood as serving a constitutionalizing function aimed at stabiliz- ing and facilitating connectivity. This allows for an understanding of colonialism and contemporary global governance as functional, but not as normative, equivalents

Inefficiencies in bargaining - departing from Akerlof and Myerson-Satterthwaite

We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to outside options. The size of the pie is commonly known and each party privately knows the realization of her outside option. Parties are assumed to have a veto right, which allows them to obtain at least their outside option payoff in any event. Besides, agents can receive no subsidy ex post. We show that inefficiencies are inevitable for virtually all distributions of outside options, as long as the size of the surplus generated by the agreement is uncertain and may be arbitrarily small for all realizations of either party’s outside option. Our inefficiency result holds true whatever the degree of correlation between the distributions of outside options, and even if it is known for sure that an agreement is beneficial. The same insights apply to the bargaining between a buyer and a seller privately informed of their valuations and to public good problems among agents privately informed of their willingness to pay

The Role of Deontic Logic in the Specification of Information Systems

In this paper we discuss the role that deontic logic plays in the specification of information systems, either because constraints on the systems directly concern norms or, and even more importantly, system constraints are considered ideal but violable (so-called `soft¿ constraints).\ud To overcome the traditional problems with deontic logic (the so-called paradoxes), we first state the importance of distinguishing between ought-to-be and ought-to-do constraints and next focus on the most severe paradox, the so-called Chisholm paradox, involving contrary-to-duty norms. We present a multi-modal extension of standard deontic logic (SDL) to represent the ought-to-be version of the Chisholm set properly. For the ought-to-do variant we employ a reduction to dynamic logic, and show how the Chisholm set can be treated adequately in this setting. Finally we discuss a way of integrating both ought-to-be and ought-to-do reasoning, enabling one to draw conclusions from ought-to-be constraints to ought-to-do ones, and show by an example the use(fulness) of this

The Combination of Paradoxical, Uncertain, and Imprecise Sources of Information based on DSmT and Neutro-Fuzzy Inference

The management and combination of uncertain, imprecise, fuzzy and even paradoxical or high conflicting sources of information has always been, and still remains today, of primal importance for the development of reliable modern information systems involving artificial reasoning. In this chapter, we present a survey of our recent theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning, known as Dezert-Smarandache Theory (DSmT) in the literature, developed for dealing with imprecise, uncertain and paradoxical sources of information. We focus our presentation here rather on the foundations of DSmT, and on the two important new rules of combination, than on browsing specific applications of DSmT available in literature. Several simple examples are given throughout the presentation to show the efficiency and the generality of this new approach. The last part of this chapter concerns the presentation of the neutrosophic logic, the neutro-fuzzy inference and its connection with DSmT. Fuzzy logic and neutrosophic logic are useful tools in decision making after fusioning the information using the DSm hybrid rule of combination of masses.Comment: 20 page

An Introduction to Mechanized Reasoning

Mechanized reasoning uses computers to verify proofs and to help discover new theorems. Computer scientists have applied mechanized reasoning to economic problems but -- to date -- this work has not yet been properly presented in economics journals. We introduce mechanized reasoning to economists in three ways. First, we introduce mechanized reasoning in general, describing both the techniques and their successful applications. Second, we explain how mechanized reasoning has been applied to economic problems, concentrating on the two domains that have attracted the most attention: social choice theory and auction theory. Finally, we present a detailed example of mechanized reasoning in practice by means of a proof of Vickrey's familiar theorem on second-price auctions