4 research outputs found

    Traffic Control for Network Protection Against Spreading Processes

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    Epidemic outbreaks in human populations are facilitated by the underlying transportation network. We consider strategies for containing a viral spreading process by optimally allocating a limited budget to three types of protection resources: (i) Traffic control resources, (ii), preventative resources and (iii) corrective resources. Traffic control resources are employed to impose restrictions on the traffic flowing across directed edges in the transportation network. Preventative resources are allocated to nodes to reduce the probability of infection at that node (e.g. vaccines), and corrective resources are allocated to nodes to increase the recovery rate at that node (e.g. antidotes). We assume these resources have monetary costs associated with them, from which we formalize an optimal budget allocation problem which maximizes containment of the infection. We present a polynomial time solution to the optimal budget allocation problem using Geometric Programming (GP) for an arbitrary weighted and directed contact network and a large class of resource cost functions. We illustrate our approach by designing optimal traffic control strategies to contain an epidemic outbreak that propagates through a real-world air transportation network.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1309.627

    Decentralized Protection Strategies against SIS Epidemics in Networks

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    Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal protection strategies when a virus is propagating over a network through a SIS epidemic process. We assume that each node in the network can fully protect itself from infection at a constant cost, or the node can use recovery software, once it is infected. We model our system using a game theoretic framework and find pure, mixed equilibria, and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) in several network topologies. Further, we propose both a decentralized algorithm and an iterative procedure to compute a pure equilibrium in the general case of a multiple communities network. Finally, we evaluate the algorithms and give numerical illustrations of all our results.Comment: accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network System
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