189,641 research outputs found
An early assessment of national allocation plans for phase 2 of EU emission trading
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EU Emission trading â better job second time around?
The EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for CO2-emissions from energy and industry installations reflects a paradigm shift towards market-based instruments
for environmental policy in the EU. The centerpieces of the EU ETS are National Allocation Plans (NAPs), which individual Member States (MS) design for each phase. NAPs state the total quantity of allowances available in
each period (ET-budget) and determine how MS allocate allowances to individual installations. The NAPs thus govern investments and innovation in energy efficient technologies and the energy sector. In terms of distribution, they predetermine winners and losers.
In this paper we analyze and evaluate 25 NAPs submitted to the European Commission (EC) for phase 2 (2008-2012) of the EU ETS. At the macro level,we assess whether the submitted ET-budgets are stringent, and whether they
imply a cost-efficient split of the required emission reductions between the EU ETS sectors (energy and industry) and the remaining sectors (transportation,
tertiary and households). Comparing the submitted ET-budgets with those already approved by the EC suggests that the ECâs decisions significantly improved
the effectiveness and economic efficiency of the EU ETS. But given the high share of Kyoto Mechanisms companies are allowed to use, the EU ETS is unlikely to require substantial emission reductions within the EU.
At the micro level, we assess (across countries and phases) the allocation methods for existing and new installations, for closures and for clean technologies.
A comparison of the NAPs for the second phase and the first phase (2005-2007) provides insights into the (limited) adaptability and flexibility of the
scheme. The findings provide guidance for the future design of the EU ETS and applications to other sectors and regions
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Long-Run Equilibrium Modeling of Alternative Emissions Allowance Allocation Systems in Electric Power Markets
A question in the design of carbon dioxide trading systems is how allowances are to be initially allocated: by auction, by giving away fixed amounts, or by allocating based on output, fuel, or other decisions. The latter system can bias investment, operations, and pricing decisions, and increase costs relative to other systems. A nonlinear complementarity model is used to investigate long-run equilibria that would result under alternative systems for power markets characterized by time varying demand and multiple generation technologies. Existence of equilibria is shown under mild conditions. Solutions show that allocating allowances to new capacity based on fuel use or generator type can distort generation mixes, invert the operating order of power plants, and inflate consumer costs. The distortions can be smaller for tighter CO2 restrictions, and are somewhat mitigated if there are also electricity capacity markets or minimum-run restrictions on coal plants
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Large Scale Deployment of Renewables for Electricity Generation
Comparisons of resource assessments suggest resource constraints are not an obstacle to the large-scale deployment of renewable energy technologies. Economic analysis identifies barriers to the adoption of renewable energy sources resulting from market structure, competition in an uneven playing field and various non-market place barriers. However, even if these barriers are removed, the problem of âtechnology lock-outâ remains. The key policy response is strategic deployment coupled with increased R&D support to accelerate the pace of improvement through market experience. The paper suggests significant contributions from various technologies, but does not assess their optimal or maximal market share
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The New South Wales energy reform strategy: a critique
A critique of proposals put forward by the New South Wales (Australia) government to reform the electricity sector in the state
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Generation Adequacy and Investment Incentives in Britain: from the Pool to NETA
Three years after the controversial change of the British market design from compulsory Pool with capacity payments to decentralised energy-only New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) market framework, we compare the two designs in terms of investment incentives. We review the biases of the Pool capacity payments design, the drought of investment following the introduction of NETA, and the reaction of the market during the first âstress-testâ of NETA during the winter 2003. In an energy-only market such as NETA, it is essential that price signals are right and the system operator has a crucial role in contracting ahead for reserve. We recommend that NETA adopt a single marginal imbalance price as dual imbalance pricing distorts price signals in times of scarcity. The lack of long-term contracting that causes hedging and financing difficulties for power projects can becompensated by vertical and horizontal reintegration at a cost of increased market power
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