Diffusion of shared goods in consumer coalitions. An agent-based model

This paper focuses on the process of coalition formation conditioning the common decision to adopt a shared good, which cannot be afforded by an average single consumer and whose use cannot be exhausted by any single consumer. An agent based model is developed to study the interplay between these two processes: coalition formation and diffusion of shared goods. Coalition formation is modelled in an evolutionary game theoretic setting, while adoption uses elements from both the Bass and the threshold models. Coalitions formation sets the conditions for adoption, while diffusion influences the consequent formation of coalitions. Results show that both coalitions and diffusion are subject to network effects and have an impact on the information flow though the population of consumers. Large coalitions are preferred over small ones since individual cost is lower, although it increases if higher quantities are purchased collectively. The paper concludes by connecting the model conceptualisation to the on-going discussion of diffusion of sustainable goods, discussing related policy implications

Coalition Formation and Combinatorial Auctions; Applications to Self-organization and Self-management in Utility Computing

In this paper we propose a two-stage protocol for resource management in a hierarchically organized cloud. The first stage exploits spatial locality for the formation of coalitions of supply agents; the second stage, a combinatorial auction, is based on a modified proxy-based clock algorithm and has two phases, a clock phase and a proxy phase. The clock phase supports price discovery; in the second phase a proxy conducts multiple rounds of a combinatorial auction for the package of services requested by each client. The protocol strikes a balance between low-cost services for cloud clients and a decent profit for the service providers. We also report the results of an empirical investigation of the combinatorial auction stage of the protocol.Comment: 14 page

Common Representation of Information Flows for Dynamic Coalitions

We propose a formal foundation for reasoning about access control policies within a Dynamic Coalition, defining an abstraction over existing access control models and providing mechanisms for translation of those models into information-flow domain. The abstracted information-flow domain model, called a Common Representation, can then be used for defining a way to control the evolution of Dynamic Coalitions with respect to information flow

An Economic Approach to Voluntary Association

We develop an economic model of association based on voluntary contributions. Different equilibria corresponding to the different modes of formation of associations are analyzed and the results are compared with the existing empirical literature. The main contribution consists in analyzing voluntary associations as a means of providing collective consumption goods or services while allowing for some heterogeneity of preferences concerning the quality of these goods or services. Thus we introduce the concept of subjective quality as a possible incentive for volunteering. The model stresses the importance of non-pecuniary rewards and of accepted differentiation for the well-functioning of voluntary organizations.Voluntary Association; Public Good; Volunteering

The Semantic Grid: A future e-Science infrastructure

e-Science offers a promising vision of how computer and communication technology can support and enhance the scientific process. It does this by enabling scientists to generate, analyse, share and discuss their insights, experiments and results in an effective manner. The underlying computer infrastructure that provides these facilities is commonly referred to as the Grid. At this time, there are a number of grid applications being developed and there is a whole raft of computer technologies that provide fragments of the necessary functionality. However there is currently a major gap between these endeavours and the vision of e-Science in which there is a high degree of easy-to-use and seamless automation and in which there are flexible collaborations and computations on a global scale. To bridge this practice–aspiration divide, this paper presents a research agenda whose aim is to move from the current state of the art in e-Science infrastructure, to the future infrastructure that is needed to support the full richness of the e-Science vision. Here the future e-Science research infrastructure is termed the Semantic Grid (Semantic Grid to Grid is meant to connote a similar relationship to the one that exists between the Semantic Web and the Web). In particular, we present a conceptual architecture for the Semantic Grid. This architecture adopts a service-oriented perspective in which distinct stakeholders in the scientific process, represented as software agents, provide services to one another, under various service level agreements, in various forms of marketplace. We then focus predominantly on the issues concerned with the way that knowledge is acquired and used in such environments since we believe this is the key differentiator between current grid endeavours and those envisioned for the Semantic Grid

Maximizing Profit in Green Cellular Networks through Collaborative Games

In this paper, we deal with the problem of maximizing the profit of Network Operators (NOs) of green cellular networks in situations where Quality-of-Service (QoS) guarantees must be ensured to users, and Base Stations (BSs) can be shared among different operators. We show that if NOs cooperate among them, by mutually sharing their users and BSs, then each one of them can improve its net profit. By using a game-theoretic framework, we study the problem of forming stable coalitions among NOs. Furthermore, we propose a mathematical optimization model to allocate users to a set of BSs, in order to reduce costs and, at the same time, to meet user QoS for NOs inside the same coalition. Based on this, we propose an algorithm, based on cooperative game theory, that enables each operator to decide with whom to cooperate in order to maximize its profit. This algorithms adopts a distributed approach in which each NO autonomously makes its own decisions, and where the best solution arises without the need to synchronize them or to resort to a trusted third party. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated through a thorough experimental evaluation considering real-world traffic traces, and a set of realistic scenarios. The results we obtain indicate that our algorithm allows a population of NOs to significantly improve their profits thanks to the combination of energy reduction and satisfaction of QoS requirements.Comment: Added publisher info and citation notic

AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION

We develop an economic model of association based on voluntary contributions. Different equilibria corresponding to the different modes of formation of associations are analyzed and the results are compared with existing empirical literature. The main contribution consists in formalizing the voluntary association as a means of providing collectiveconsumption goods or services. We introduce the concept of the subjective quality as a possible incentive for volunteering. The model stresses the importance of non-pecuniary rewards and of accepted differentiation for well-functioning of voluntary organizations.Voluntary Association, Public Good, Volunteering

The Egalitarian Sharing Rule in Provision of Public Projects

In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two principles, egalitarianism, that requires the equalization of the total cost for all agents in the same jurisdiction, and efficiency, that implies the minimization of the aggregate total cost within jurisdiction. We show that these two principles always yield a core-stable partition but a Nash stable partition may fail to exist.Jurisdictions, Stable partitions, Public projects, Egalitarianism