Event-based Compositional Reasoning of Information-Flow Security for Concurrent Systems

High assurance of information-flow security (IFS) for concurrent systems is challenging. A promising way for formal verification of concurrent systems is the rely-guarantee method. However, existing compositional reasoning approaches for IFS concentrate on language-based IFS. It is often not applicable for system-level security, such as multicore operating system kernels, in which secrecy of actions should also be considered. On the other hand, existing studies on the rely-guarantee method are basically built on concurrent programming languages, by which semantics of concurrent systems cannot be completely captured in a straightforward way. In order to formally verify state-action based IFS for concurrent systems, we propose a rely-guarantee-based compositional reasoning approach for IFS in this paper. We first design a language by incorporating ``Event'' into concurrent languages and give the IFS semantics of the language. As a primitive element, events offer an extremely neat framework for modeling system and are not necessarily atomic in our language. For compositional reasoning of IFS, we use rely-guarantee specification to define new forms of unwinding conditions (UCs) on events, i.e., event UCs. By a rely-guarantee proof system of the language and the soundness of event UCs, we have that event UCs imply IFS of concurrent systems. In such a way, we relax the atomicity constraint of actions in traditional UCs and provide a compositional reasoning way for IFS in which security proof of systems can be discharged by independent security proof on individual events. Finally, we mechanize the approach in Isabelle/HOL and develop a formal specification and its IFS proof for multicore separation kernels as a study case according to an industrial standard -- ARINC 653

Proving full-system security properties under multiple attacker models on capability machines

International audienceAssembly-level protection mechanisms (virtual memory, trusted execution environments, virtualization) make it possible to guarantee security properties of a full system in the presence of arbitrary attacker provided code. However, they typically only support a single trust boundary: code is either trusted or untrusted, and protection cannot be nested. Capability machines provide protection mechanisms that are more fine-grained and that do support arbitrary nesting of protection. We show in this paper how this enables the formal verification of full-system security properties under multiple attacker models: different security objectives of the full system can be verified under a different choice of trust boundary (i.e. under a different attacker model). The verification approach we propose is modular, and is robust: code outside the trust boundary for a given security objective can be arbitrary, unverified attacker-provided code. It is based on the use of universal contracts for untrusted adversarial code: sound, conservative contracts which can be combined with manual verification of trusted components in a compositional program logic. Compositionality of the program logic also allows us to reuse common parts in the analyses for different attacker models. We instantiate the approach concretely by extending an existing capability machine model with support for memory-mapped I/O and we obtain full system, machine-verified security properties about external effect traces while limiting the manual verification effort to a small trusted computing base relevant for the specific property under study

Modal Abstractions for Virtualizing Memory Addresses

Operating system kernels employ virtual memory management (VMM) subsystems to virtualize the addresses of memory regions in order to to isolate untrusted processes, ensure process isolation and implement demand-paging and copy-on-write behaviors for performance and resource controls. Bugs in these systems can lead to kernel crashes. VMM code is a critical piece of general-purpose OS kernels, but their verification is challenging due to the hardware interface (mappings are updated via writes to memory locations, using addresses which are themselves virtualized). Prior work on VMM verification has either only handled a single address space, trusted significant pieces of assembly code, or resorted to direct reasoning over machine semantics rather than exposing a clean logical interface. In this paper, we introduce a modal abstraction to describe the truth of assertions relative to a specific virtual address space, allowing different address spaces to refer to each other, and enabling verification of instruction sequences manipulating multiple address spaces. Using them effectively requires working with other assertions, such as points-to assertions in our separation logic, as relative to a given address space. We therefore define virtual points-to assertions, which mimic hardware address translation, relative to a page table root. We demonstrate our approach with challenging fragments of VMM code showing that our approach handles examples beyond what prior work can address, including reasoning about a sequence of instructions as it changes address spaces. All definitions and theorems mentioned in this paper including the operational model of a RISC-like fragment of supervisor-mode x86-64, and a logic as an instantiation of the Iris framework, are mechanized inside Coq

Rely-guarantee Reasoning about Concurrent Reactive Systems: The PiCore Framework, Languages Integration and Applications

The rely-guarantee approach is a promising way for compositional verification of concurrent reactive systems (CRSs), e.g. concurrent operating systems, interrupt-driven control systems and business process systems. However, specifications using heterogeneous reaction patterns, different abstraction levels, and the complexity of real-world CRSs are still challenging the rely-guarantee approach. This article proposes PiCore, a rely-guarantee reasoning framework for formal specification and verification of CRSs. We design an event specification language supporting complex reaction structures and its rely-guarantee proof system to detach the specification and logic of reactive aspects of CRSs from event behaviours. PiCore parametrizes the language and its rely-guarantee system for event behaviour using a rely-guarantee interface and allows to easily integrate 3rd-party languages via rely-guarantee adapters. By this design, we have successfully integrated two existing languages and their rely-guarantee proof systems without any change of their specification and proofs. PiCore has been applied to two real-world case studies, i.e. formal verification of concurrent memory management in Zephyr RTOS and a verified translation for a standardized Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) to PiCore.Comment: Submission to ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems in 202

Layered and Object-Based Game Semantics *

International audienceLarge-scale software verification relies critically on the use of compositional languages, semantic models, specifications, and verification techniques. Recent work on certified abstraction layers synthesizes game semantics, the refinement calculus, and algebraic effects to enable the composition of heterogeneous components into larger certified systems. However, in existing models of certified abstraction layers, compositionality is restricted by the lack of encapsulation of state. In this paper, we present a novel game model for certified abstraction layers where the semantics of layer interfaces and implementations are defined solely based on their observable behaviors. Our key idea is to leverage Reddy's pioneer work on modeling the semantics of imperative languages not as functions on global states but as objects with their observable behaviors. We show that a layer interface can be modeled as an object type (i.e., a layer signature) plus an object strategy. A layer implementation is then essentially a regular map, in the sense of Reddy, from an object with the underlay signature to that with the overlay signature. A layer implementation is certified when its composition with the underlay object strategy implements the overlay object strategy. We also describe an extension that allows for non-determinism in layer interfaces. After formulating layer implementations as regular maps between object spaces, we move to concurrency and design a notion of concurrent object space, where sequential traces may be identified modulo permutation of independent operations. We show how to express protected shared object concurrency, and a ticket lock implementation, in a simple model based on regular maps between concurrent object spaces

Towards A Practical High-Assurance Systems Programming Language

Writing correct and performant low-level systems code is a notoriously demanding job, even for experienced developers. To make the matter worse, formally reasoning about their correctness properties introduces yet another level of complexity to the task. It requires considerable expertise in both systems programming and formal verification. The development can be extremely costly due to the sheer complexity of the systems and the nuances in them, if not assisted with appropriate tools that provide abstraction and automation. Cogent is designed to alleviate the burden on developers when writing and verifying systems code. It is a high-level functional language with a certifying compiler, which automatically proves the correctness of the compiled code and also provides a purely functional abstraction of the low-level program to the developer. Equational reasoning techniques can then be used to prove functional correctness properties of the program on top of this abstract semantics, which is notably less laborious than directly verifying the C code. To make Cogent a more approachable and effective tool for developing real-world systems, we further strengthen the framework by extending the core language and its ecosystem. Specifically, we enrich the language to allow users to control the memory representation of algebraic data types, while retaining the automatic proof with a data layout refinement calculus. We repurpose existing tools in a novel way and develop an intuitive foreign function interface, which provides users a seamless experience when using Cogent in conjunction with native C. We augment the Cogent ecosystem with a property-based testing framework, which helps developers better understand the impact formal verification has on their programs and enables a progressive approach to producing high-assurance systems. Finally we explore refinement type systems, which we plan to incorporate into Cogent for more expressiveness and better integration of systems programmers with the verification process