Platform Rules: Multi-Sided Platforms as Regulators

This paper provides a basic conceptual framework for interpreting non-price instruments used by multi-sided platforms (MSPs) by analogizing MSPs as "private regulators" who regulate access to and interactions around the platform. We present evidence on Facebook, TopCoder, Roppongi Hills and Harvard Business School to document the "regulatory" role played by MSPs. We find MSPs use nuanced combinations of legal, technological, informational and other instruments (including price-setting) to implement desired outcomes. Non-price instruments were very much at the core of MSP strategies.Platforms, regulation, network effects, distributed innovation

Plataforma y metodología de capacitación para la empresa Montran Ecuador

In order to be admitted to “Montran Ecuador”, it is compulsory to pass the training offered by the “Fundación Montran Ecuador”. This training allows the prospective employee to obtain the tools and knowledge required to carry out maintenance procedures and to create new components for Montran products. The company needs an evaluation system for the candidate since it is very important to keep reusable and maintainable code with high quality standards. This Thesis is defined as a project to systematize the training platform and methodology for the “Fundación Montran Ecuador” interns, as well as their ongoing evaluation. With this being said, the project’s objectives are: - To centralize and update didactic tools and material for the interns - To provide a training curriculum and methodology - To provide the supervisors with the tools to visualize the intern’s progress. As a result from the project we will have two main advantages: to minimize the time invested in training potential staff and the emphasis in the process for an autodidact and personalized teaching for the intern. The Project is organized as follows: Chapter one introduces the Company and the current problems it faces with training newcomers. Chapter two presents a training curriculum and the methodology proposed for the training. Chapter three explains the platform solution that has been implemented, and how it accommodates to the training needs. Chapter four shows the resulting effects the platform has had in the Company since its implementation. Finally, Chapter five states the conclusions and recommendations arising from personal observation and colleagues’ review of the implemented processes.Para ingresar a la empresa “Montran Ecuador” es necesario aprobar la capacitación brindada a través de la “Fundación Montran Ecuador”. Esta capacitación le permite al futuro empleado tener las herramientas y el conocimiento necesarios para realizar mantenimiento y crear nuevos componentes para los productos Montran. La compañía requiere de un sistema de evaluación para el candidato ya que es de gran importancia mantener los códigos reusables y sostenibles con altos estándares de calidad. Esta Tesis se define como un proyecto para sistematizar la plataforma y metodología de capacitación para los becarios de la “Fundación Montran Ecuador”, así como su evaluación permanente. Teniendo lo anterior como base, los objetivos del proyecto son los siguientes: - Centralizar y actualizar herramientas y material didáctico para los becarios - Proveer un pensum y metodología de capacitación - Brindarles a los supervisores herramientas para visualizar el progreso del becario. Como resultado del proyecto se obtendrán dos importantes ventajas, minimizar el tiempo invertido por los funcionarios de la empresa en la capacitación de los futuros empleados y el énfasis en el proceso de enseñanza autodidacta y personalizada del becario. Este trabajo de Tesis inicia con el diagnóstico situacional que permite sustentar el diseño teórico, las especificaciones y alcance de las propuestas sobre aplicaciones prácticas. A partir de lo anterior se plantea una metodología de capacitación. En las soluciones sugeridas se incluye la discusión sobre el desarrollo e implementación interna frente al uso de software de terceros. Se definen las funciones de usuarios, becarios y supervisores, y se finaliza con las conclusiones y recomendaciones derivadas de la observación personal y de colegas de los procesos puestos en práctica

Cumulative Innovation & Open Disclosure of Intermediate Results: Evidence from a Policy Experiment in Bioinformatics

Recent calls for greater openness in our private and public innovation systems have particularly urged for more open disclosure and granting of access to intermediate works–early results, algorithms, materials, data and techniques–with the goals of enhancing overall research and development productivity and enhancing cumulative innovation. To make progress towards understanding implications of such policy changes we devised a large-scale field experiment in which 733 subjects were divided into matched independent subgroups to address a bioinformatics problem under either a regime of open disclosure of intermediate results or, alternatively, one of closed secrecy around intermediate solutions. We observe the cumulative innovation process in each regime with fine-grained measures and are able to derive inferences with a series of cross-sectional comparisons. Open disclosures led to lower participation and lower effort but nonetheless led to higher average problem-solving performance by concentrating these lesser efforts on the most performant technical approaches. Closed secrecy produced higher participation and higher effort, while producing less correlated choices of technical approaches that participants pursued, resulting in greater individual and collective experimentation and greater dispersion of performance. We discuss the implications of such changes to the ongoing theory, evidence and policy considerations with regards to cumulative innovation

Field Evidence on Individual Behavior & Performance in Rank-Order Tournaments

Economic analysis of rank-order tournaments has shown that intensified competition leads to declining performance. Empirical research demonstrates that individuals in tournament-type contests perform less well on average in the presence of larger number of competitors in total and superstars. Particularly in field settings, studies often lack direct evidence about the underlying mechanisms, such as the amount of effort, that might account for these results. Here we exploit a novel dataset on algorithmic programming contests that contains data on individual effort, risk taking, and cognitive errors that may underlie tournament performance outcomes. We find that competitors on average react negatively to an increase in the total number of competitors, and react more negatively to an increase in the number of superstars than non-superstars. We also find that the most negative reactions come from a particular subgroup of competitors: those that are highly skilled, but whose abilities put them near to the top of the ability distribution. For these competitors, we find no evidence that the decline in performance outcomes stems from reduced effort or increased risk taking. Instead, errors in logic lead to a decline in performance, which suggests a cognitive explanation for the negative response to increased competition. We also find that a small group of competitors, who are at the very top of the ability distribution (non-superstars), react positively to increased competition from superstars. For them, we find some evidence of increased effort and no increase in errors of logic, consistent with both economic and psychological explanations