Timed Analysis of Security Protocols

We propose a method for engineering security protocols that are aware of timing aspects. We study a simplified version of the well-known Needham Schroeder protocol and the complete Yahalom protocol, where timing information allows the study of different attack scenarios. We model check the protocols using UPPAAL. Further, a taxonomy is obtained by studying and categorising protocols from the well known Clark Jacob library and the Security Protocol Open Repository (SPORE) library. Finally, we present some new challenges and threats that arise when considering time in the analysis, by providing a novel protocol that uses time challenges and exposing a timing attack over an implementation of an existing security protocol

Security against Timing Analysis Attack

Timing attack is the type of side-channel attack involves the time taken to complete critical operations. Securing crypto processor from timing attack is critical issue. This paper implements the Bernstein’s Timing Attack and timing attack based on hamming weight. The countermeasures of Bernstein’s Timing attack are implemented in our experimental test bed and their performance is compared.  This paper also proposes the key recovery method based on timing attack using hamming weight of the key

On Modelling Real-time and Security properties of Distributed Systems

We discuss a simplified version of the timing attack to illustrate a connection between security and real-time properties of distributed systems. We suggest several avenues for further research on this and similar connections