6,003 research outputs found

    Extending P4 in-band telemetry to user equipment for latency-and localization-aware autonomous networking with AI forecasting

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    In beyond-5G networks, detailed end-to-end monitoring of specific application traffic will be required along with the access-backhaul-cloud continuum to enable low latency service due to local edge steering. Current monitoring solutions are confined to specific network segments. In-band network telemetry (INT) technologies for software defined network (SDN) programmable data planes based on the P4 language are effective in the backhaul network segment, although limited to inter-switch latency; therefore, link latencies including wireless and optical segments are excluded from INT monitoring. Moreover, information such as user equipment (UE) geolocation would allow detailed mobility monitoring and improved cloud-edge steering policies. However, the synchronization between latency and location information, typically provided by different platforms, is hard to achieve with current monitoring systems. In this paper, P4-based INT is proposed to be thoroughly extended involving UE. The INT mechanism is designed to provide synchronized and accurate end-to-end latency and geolocation information, enabling decentralized steering policies, i.e., involving UE and selected switches, without SDN controller intervention. The proposal also includes an artificial-intelligence-assisted forecast system able to predict latency and geolocation in advance and trigger faster edge steering

    Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation

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    Software-defined networking is considered a promising new paradigm, enabling more reliable and formally verifiable communication networks. However, this paper shows that the separation of the control plane from the data plane, which lies at the heart of Software-Defined Networks (SDNs), introduces a new vulnerability which we call \emph{teleportation}. An attacker (e.g., a malicious switch in the data plane or a host connected to the network) can use teleportation to transmit information via the control plane and bypass critical network functions in the data plane (e.g., a firewall), and to violate security policies as well as logical and even physical separations. This paper characterizes the design space for teleportation attacks theoretically, and then identifies four different teleportation techniques. We demonstrate and discuss how these techniques can be exploited for different attacks (e.g., exfiltrating confidential data at high rates), and also initiate the discussion of possible countermeasures. Generally, and given today's trend toward more intent-based networking, we believe that our findings are relevant beyond the use cases considered in this paper.Comment: Accepted in EuroSP'1

    Know Your Enemy: Stealth Configuration-Information Gathering in SDN

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    Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a network architecture that aims at providing high flexibility through the separation of the network logic from the forwarding functions. The industry has already widely adopted SDN and researchers thoroughly analyzed its vulnerabilities, proposing solutions to improve its security. However, we believe important security aspects of SDN are still left uninvestigated. In this paper, we raise the concern of the possibility for an attacker to obtain knowledge about an SDN network. In particular, we introduce a novel attack, named Know Your Enemy (KYE), by means of which an attacker can gather vital information about the configuration of the network. This information ranges from the configuration of security tools, such as attack detection thresholds for network scanning, to general network policies like QoS and network virtualization. Additionally, we show that an attacker can perform a KYE attack in a stealthy fashion, i.e., without the risk of being detected. We underline that the vulnerability exploited by the KYE attack is proper of SDN and is not present in legacy networks. To address the KYE attack, we also propose an active defense countermeasure based on network flows obfuscation, which considerably increases the complexity for a successful attack. Our solution offers provable security guarantees that can be tailored to the needs of the specific network under consideratio
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