The Dictators’ Digital Dilemma: When Do States Disconnect Their Digital Networks?

When do governments decide to interfere with the Internet, and why? While many observers celebrate the creative use of digital media by activists and civil society leaders, there are a significant number of incidents involving government-led Internet shutdowns. Governments have offered a range of reasons for interfering with digital networks, employed many tactics, and experienced both costs and benefits in doing so.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/117569/1/2011_Howard-Agarwal-Hussain_Brookings.pd

Political and security dimensions of social networks usage in modern information environment

Zbog snažnog razvoja informacijskih tehnologija informacijske operacije više nisu predmet isključivo vojne terminologije ratovanja, već se pod pojmom informacijskih operacija mogu opisati i djelovanja koja se manifestiraju i unutar civilnog informacijskog prostora. U tom kontekstu suvremeni informacijski prostor u sve većoj mjeri obilježavaju društvene mreže koje su formirale jednu nereguliranu virtualnu okolinu čime se pogoduje širenju ekstremnih stavova, namjernih protuobavijesti i stvaranju obmana. Društvene mreže koriste se za radikalizaciju, regrutaciju, popularizaciju i oblikovanje javne percepcije djelovanja terorističkih, anarhističkih, radikalnih i ekstremnih društvenih grupacija koje ih koriste za agitiranje, nametanje ideoloških koncepata ili za nametanje interesno određenih narativa. Njihovo korištenje u manipulativnom kontekstu sve je izraženija i u političkoj komunikaciji čime pridonose polarizaciji društva. Predstavljaju pogodan alat i za upravljanje percepcijom kako bi se utjecalo na emocije, motive, promišljanje i odluke interesno određene skupine. Uz pomoć softverskih robota mogu se koristiti i za vođenje operacija utjecaja, informacijskih, medijskih i psiholoških operacija, bez obzira da li ih poduzimaju državni ili nedržavni akteri, manjiske i nasilne grupacije ili da se radi o korporativnom, marketinškom, političkom ili znanstvenom djelovanju. Meta takvog djelovanja mogu biti izvještajni sustavi i politički čelnici u cilju da donesu krive zaključke, procjene i odluke (u pravilu su to odluke od interesa provoditelja navedenih operacija). Plasiranje protuobavijesti i širenje interesno određenih narativa, nisu novost, međutim suvremene tehnologije omogućavaju nove metode manipulacije čiji su razmjeri sve zamagljeniji i teže raspoznatljivi, poglavito u društvenom djelovanju. Teoretičari informacijskih znanosti stoga se suočavaju s problemom vrednovanja takvih informacija. U tu svrhu teorijski je opisano korištenje društvenih mreža u političkom i sigurnosnom kontkestu, koji su potencijalni nositelji takvog djelovanja te su problematizirani i analizirani najsuvremeniji mehanizmi i tehnološki alati, korištenje tzv. softverskih robota.Due to the substantial development of information technologies, information operations are no longer solely part of military warfare vocabulary; the term ‘information operations’ can now be used to describe actions manifested within the civilian information environment. In his context, the modern information environment is increasingly characterised by social networks, which have formed an unregulated virtual environment conducive to spreading extreme views and deliberate counter-information, as well as creating deceptions. Social networks are being used to radicalize, recruit, popularise and shape public perception of the actions of terrorist, anarchical, radical and extreme social groups, which use the networks to agitate, to impose ideological concepts and to impose interest-based narratives. The usage of social networks in the manipulative context is more and more expressed in the political communication, thus contributing to polarisation of society. It represents a useful tool for managing perception in order to influence emotions, motivation, thinking and decisions of an interest-based group. With the help of software robots, they can be used to conduct influence operations, as well as information, media and psychological operations, regardless of whether the operations are being undertaken by state on non-state actors, minority or violent groups, or if it is corporate, marketing, political or scientific action. Such action can target information broadcast systems or political leaders, leading them to make inaccurate conclusions, estimates and decisions (as a rule, the decisions of interest to those undertaking the operations). Releasing disinformation and spreading interest-based narratives are not new concepts. However, modern technologies enable new methods of manipulation, whose scope is growingly vague and harder to identify, especially in social activity. Information science theorists are therefore facing the challenge of evaluating such information. This article describes the usage of social networks in a political and security context, which are potential carriers of such activity. It also analyses the cutting-edge mechanisms and technological tools, the usage of the so-called software robots

From Everyday Information Behaviours to Clickable Solidarity

Digital social media has, in many ways, transformed the way people create, maintain, and sustain their social information networks, and has also influenced their information-related behaviours such as searching, seeking, finding and use of information. This is especially true in technologically-mediated environments. In many ways, social media is the contemporary incarnation of the Internet itself. It is a complex information-and-communication environment, very much analogous to physical environments, but consisting of symbolic matter rather than physical matter. All social situations are information environments and social media is no different. This paper is an inter-disciplinary literature-review essay that examines the social media phenomenon using the lens of selected theories in information science and allied disciplines such as communication and media ecology with a specific focus toward its possible role in civil society using the conceptual framework of spatial metaphors drawn from the study of traditional physical environments. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v5i3.348

When Do States Disconnect Their Digital Networks? Regime Responses to the Political Uses of Social Media

Although there have been many studies of the different ways regimes censor the use of social media by their citizens, shut- ting off social media altogether is something that rarely happens. However, it happens at the most politically sensitive times and has widespread—if not global—consequences for political, eco- nomic and cultural life. When do states disconnect their digital networks, and why? To answer this question, the authors build an event history database of incidents in which a regime went beyond mere censorship of particular websites or users. The authors draw from multiple sources, including major news media, specialized news services, and international experts, to construct an event log database of 566 incidents. This rich, original dataset allows for a nuanced analysis of the conditions for state action, and the authors offer some assessment of the effect of such desperate action. Comparative analysis indicates that both democratic and author- itarian regimes disable social media networks for citing concerns about national security, protecting authority figures, and preserv- ing cultural and religious morals. Whereas democracies disable social media with the goal of protecting children, authoritarian regimes also attempt to eliminate what they perceive as propa- ganda on social media. The authors cover the period 1995–2011 and build a grounded typology on the basis of regime type, what states actually did to interfere with digital networks, why they did it, and who was affected.Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/150688/1/2011 - Howard, Agarwal, Hussain (2).pdfDescription of 2011 - Howard, Agarwal, Hussain (2).pdf : main articl

Channeled Beneath International Law:Mapping Infrastructure and Regulatory Capture as Israeli–American Hegemonic Reinforcers in Palestine

The United States is the most influential actor in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; its intelligence agencies cooperate with Israel on most “counterterrorism” dossiers impacting Palestinians’ life, with a significant number thereof pertaining to Internet policing in Gaza and the West Bank. Meanwhile, Israel controls some of the key Internet service providers (ISPs) that serve Palestinians, and it is thus endowed with the capability to compel those ISPs to filter information so as to perform as American propaganda reinforcers. Moreover, the United States may unaccountably assert jurisdiction over data from and to Palestine because American cables are where most of the Internet transits through, exercising surveillance without judicial oversight. Verified instances of censorship directed by government-tied U.S. corporations, especially during confrontational seasons, are indeed numerous. Palestinian authorities themselves contribute to creating information clusters and identity bubbles, with infrastructural deficiencies as well as executive and court orders undermining freedom of expression online under arbitrary “public morals” or “security” concerns. The combined effect of technical advantage and regulatory capture supports the convergence of interests between Palestinian and Israeli authorities in restricting Palestinians’ digital rights, and assists the United States in reiterating its “security” hegemony in the region. This warrants a debunking of the limits of the law in constraining private actors and readjusting states’ jurisdiction over Internet infrastructure and data packets transiting through it

Channeled Beneath International Law:Mapping Infrastructure and Regulatory Capture as Israeli–American Hegemonic Reinforcers in Palestine

The United States is the most influential actor in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; its intelligence agencies cooperate with Israel on most “counterterrorism” dossiers impacting Palestinians’ life, with a significant number thereof pertaining to Internet policing in Gaza and the West Bank. Meanwhile, Israel controls some of the key Internet service providers (ISPs) that serve Palestinians, and it is thus endowed with the capability to compel those ISPs to filter information so as to perform as American propaganda reinforcers. Moreover, the United States may unaccountably assert jurisdiction over data from and to Palestine because American cables are where most of the Internet transits through, exercising surveillance without judicial oversight. Verified instances of censorship directed by government-tied U.S. corporations, especially during confrontational seasons, are indeed numerous. Palestinian authorities themselves contribute to creating information clusters and identity bubbles, with infrastructural deficiencies as well as executive and court orders undermining freedom of expression online under arbitrary “public morals” or “security” concerns. The combined effect of technical advantage and regulatory capture supports the convergence of interests between Palestinian and Israeli authorities in restricting Palestinians’ digital rights, and assists the United States in reiterating its “security” hegemony in the region. This warrants a debunking of the limits of the law in constraining private actors and readjusting states’ jurisdiction over Internet infrastructure and data packets transiting through it

The use of the Internet for political action by non-state dissident actors in the Middle East

This paper examines how non-state dissident actors in the Middle East use the Internet for political action in the face of state-imposed constraints on Internet access. Non-state dissident actors have revisionist goals and the Internet offers certain advantages for accomplishing these political objectives. States seek to limit the effectiveness of these dissident objectives and can use various methods, such as limiting Internet infrastructure or imposing censorship constraints, in efforts to oppose Internet-based dissidence. In response, dedicated dissidents can find ways to overcome these state-imposed constraints and continue with their dissident activities. Based on this understanding, this paper develops a dynamic model for Internet-based dissidence and then applies it to three different case studies: The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA). All three case study groups used the Internet in a surprisingly competent and sophisticated manner, overcoming the various state-imposed constraints on their activities. That non-state dissidents in the Middle East have successfully used the Internet for political dissidence may have important implications for the political landscape in the region

The use of the Internet for political action by non-state dissident actors in the Middle East (originally published in November 2003)

The use of the Internet for political action by non-state dissident actors in the Middle East by W. Sean McLaughlin This paper examines how non-state dissident actors in the Middle East use the Internet for political action in the face of state-imposed constraints on Internet access. Non-state dissident actors have revisionist goals and the Internet offers certain advantages for accomplishing these political objectives. States seek to limit the effectiveness of these dissident objectives and can use various methods, such as limiting Internet infrastructure or imposing censorship constraints, in efforts to oppose Internet-based dissidence. In response, dedicated dissidents can find ways to overcome these state-imposed constraints and continue with their dissident activities. Based on this understanding, this paper develops a dynamic model for Internet-based dissidence and then applies it to three different case studies: The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA). All three case study groups used the Internet in a surprisingly competent and sophisticated manner, overcoming the various state-imposed constraints on their activities. That non-state dissidents in the Middle East have successfully used the Internet for political dissidence may have important implications for the political landscape in the region