Imperfect competition and the pricing of interbank payment services

Payment systems ; Competition ; Banks and banking

Degree of Competition and Export-Production Relative Prices when the Exchange Rate Changes: Evidence from a Panel of Czech Exporting Companies

In this paper we show the relevance of the degree of competition for inferences about changes in export-production relative prices when the nominal exchange rate changes. We devise a model for tradable goods that combines the market competition and the pricing-tomarket literature and we empirically document the contrast between perfectly and imperfectly competitive markets for the export-production relative price responses to exchange rate changes. When the macroeconomic view is taken, a change in the degree of competition in exports (a change in the average mark-up on exported products) alternates the reaction in relative prices and quantity exported and thus requires careful policy-related consideration.Degree of competition, exchange rate, pricing-to-market.

Old controversy revisited: pricing, market structure, and competition

In this essay, I examine the connection between pricing, profit mark ups, competition, and economic activity from a heterodox perspective. These issues are examined utilizing a two-industry Burchardt-Kaleckian production model and a labor-based mark up pricing model; the conclusion reached is that market structure and competition have no fundamental role in affecting pricing, profit mark ups, or economic activity. However, it is generally perceived in heterodox economics that competition does play an important role in the economy. This theme is discussed in conjunction with the going business enterprise

Pricing Decisions and Competitive Conduct Across Manufacturing Sectors: Evidence from 19 European Union Manufacturing Industries

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019This paper investigates the pricing decisions across the manufacturing sectors of 19 EU countries over 1995–2014. The markup formulation of De Loecker and Warzynski (Am Econ Rev 102(6):2437–2471, 2012) is employed in order to estimate the price–cost margin of 10 2-digit NACE Rev.2 level manufacturing sectors and conclude whether the selling price of the final product exceeds the marginal cost of production. Subsequently, the pricing decisions of the constituent industries are tested with respect to (i) liquidity constraints, (ii) export orientation and (iii) the level of productivity when the factors of market regulation and industrial value are controlled for. A panel VAR framework is employed to take into account the presence of cross-section dependency and stationarity emerging in the panel sample. The findings suggest the presence of imperfect competitive conduct across every manufacturing industry through overpricing decisions. Moreover, higher markup ratios are charged by those sectors with access to credit, higher export orientation and higher levels of productivity.Peer reviewe

A Rationale for Repealing the 1987 Groceries Order

A ban on pricing below cost was implemented under the 1987 Groceries Order based on the premise that loss leading used in multi-product retail pricing distorts competition and exploits consumers in the short run, while driving a more concentrated structure and reducing welfare in the long run. Loss leading is examined for multi-product retailers selling in imperfectly competitive market niches with imperfect consumer information. We develop a theoretical argument in a simple two-stage framework that illustrates how loss leading on a subset of products is an equilibrium outcome of price competition that leaves overall welfare equal to that observed under laissez faire.

Review of the literature on reference pricing

This paper reviews the literature on reference pricing (RP) in pharmaceutical markets. The RP strategy for cost containment of expenditure on drugs is analyzed as part of the procurement mechanism. We review the existing literature and the state-of-the-art regarding RP by focusing on its economic effects. In particular, we consider: (1) the institutional context and problem-related factors which appear to underline the need to implement an RP strategy; i.e., its nature, characteristics and the sort of health care problems commonly addressed; (2) how RP operates in practice; that is, how third party-payers (the insurers/buyers) have established the RP systems existing on the international scene (i.e., information methods, monitoring procedures and legislative provisions); (3) the range of effects resulting from particular RP strategies (including effects on choice of appropriate pharmaceuticals, insurer savings, total drug expenditures, prices of referenced and non-referenced products and dynamic efficiency; (4) the market failures which an RP policy is supposed to address and the main advantages and drawbacks which emerge from an analysis of its effects. Results suggest that RP systems achieve better their postulated goals (1) if cost inflation in pharmaceuticals is due to high prices rather than to the excess of prescription rates, (2) when the larger is the existing difference in prices among equivalent drugs, and (3) more important is the actual market for generics.Reference pricing, pharmaceutical expenditure, generic drugs, drug patents

Regulation and deregulation in industrial countries : some lessons for LDCs

The United States'experience with antitrust and with directive regulation in the rail, trucking, airline, and telephone sectors offers useful lessons for developing countries. The experience highlights the realities both of market failure and of the difficulties of implementing regulation to control it - and reveals that imperfect regulation may be no better than imperfect competition. Antitrust measures to regulate price fixing and to require approval for mergers above some threshold level of industrial concentration are straightforward to implement and have provided some gains in economic welfare. The regulation of price discrimination, restrictive vertical practices, and predatory pricing is administratively more difficult, and the potential gains are less clearly evident. In many situations, import competition can be an efficient alternative. Direct regulation of rail, trucking, airline, and telephone was frequently inefficient, the regulatory apparatus often lost sight of its original objectives, and the regulators were captured by the regulated. For rail and trucking regulation, the regulatory outcome probably was worse than it would have been under laissez-faire.Administrative&Regulatory Law,Economic Theory&Research,National Governance,Knowledge Economy,Environmental Economics&Policies

Three alternative (?) stories on the late 20th-century rise of game theory

The paper presents three different reconstructions of the 1980s boom of game theory and its rise to the present status of indispensable tool-box for modern economics. The first story focuses on the Nash refinements literature and on the development of Bayesian games. The second emphasizes the role of antitrust case law, and in particular of the rehabilitation, via game theory, of some traditional antitrust prohibitions and limitations which had been challenged by the Chicago approach. The third story centers on the wealth of issues classifiable under the general headline of "mechanism design" and on the game theoretical tools and methods which have been applied to tackle them. The bottom lines are, first, that the three stories need not be viewed as conflicting, but rather as complementary, and, second, that in all stories a central role has been played by John Harsanyi and Bayesian decision theory.game theory; mechanism design; refinements of Nash equilibrium; antitrust law; John Harsanyi

Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-Based Regulation

Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return regulation with a “used and useful” criterion.

Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case

Detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude, and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion. The Sugar Institute did not fix prices or output. Prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to make price cutting more transparent. Meetings were used to interpret and adapt the agreement, coordinate on jointly profitable actions, ensure unilateral actions were not misconstrued as cheating, and determine whether cheating had occurred. In contrast to established theories, cheating did occur, but sparked only limited retaliation, partly due to the contractual relations with selling agents.