A Strategic Analysis of Information Sharing Among Cyber Attackers

One firm invests in security to defend against cyber attacks by two hackers. Each hacker chooses an optimal attack, and they share information with each other about the firm's vulnerabilities. Each hacker prefers to receive information, but delivering gives competitive advantage to the other hacker. We find that each hacker's attack and information sharing are strategic complements while one hacker's attack and the other hacker's information sharing are strategic substitutes. The attack is inverse U-shaped in the firm's unit defense cost, and reaches zero, while the firm's defense and profit decrease, and the hackers' information sharing and profit increase. The firm's profit increases in the hackers' unit cost of attack, while the hackers' information sharing and profit decrease. Our analysis also reveals the interesting result that the cumulative attack level of the hackers is not affected by the effectiveness of information sharing between them and moreover, is also unaffected by the intensity of joint information sharing. We also find that as the effectiveness of information sharing between hackers increases relative to the investment in attack, the firm's investment in cyber security defense and profit are constant, the hackers' investments in attacks decrease, and information sharing levels and hacker profits increase. In contrast, as the intensity of joint information sharing increases, while the firm's investment in cyber security defense and profit remain constant, the hackers' investments in attacks increase, and the hackers' information sharing levels and profits decrease. Increasing the firm's asset causes all the variables to increase linearly, except information sharing which is constant. We extend our analysis to endogenize the firm's asset and this analysis largely confirms the preceding analysis with a fixed asset.Information Systems Working Papers Serie

A Strategic Analysis of Information Sharing Among Cyber Attackers

One firm invests in security to defend against cyber attacks by two hackers. Each hacker chooses an optimal attack, and they share information with each other about the firm's vulnerabilities. Each hacker prefers to receive information, but delivering gives competitive advantage to the other hacker. We find that each hacker's attack and information sharing are strategic complements while one hacker's attack and the other hacker's information sharing are strategic substitutes. The attack is inverse U-shaped in the firm's unit defense cost, and reaches zero, while the firm's defense and profit decrease, and the hackers' information sharing and profit increase. The firm's profit increases in the hackers' unit cost of attack, while the hackers' information sharing and profit decrease. Our analysis also reveals the interesting result that the cumulative attack level of the hackers is not affected by the effectiveness of information sharing between them and moreover, is also unaffected by the intensity of joint information sharing. We also find that as the effectiveness of information sharing between hackers increases relative to the investment in attack, the firm's investment in cyber security defense and profit are constant, the hackers' investments in attacks decrease, and information sharing levels and hacker profits increase. In contrast, as the intensity of joint information sharing increases, while the firm's investment in cyber security defense and profit remain constant, the hackers' investments in attacks increase, and the hackers' information sharing levels and profits decrease. Increasing the firm's asset causes all the variables to increase linearly, except information sharing which is constant. We extend our analysis to endogenize the firm's asset and this analysis largely confirms the preceding analysis with a fixed asset.Information Systems Working Papers Serie

Information technology as an agent of post-modernism

Society is in a tumultuous state. Today’s Western society is characterized by disillusionment, doubt, irony, fragmentation and plurality. With the failure of Modernism and the rise to prominence of Nihilism, Post-Humanism, Post-Structuralism and Individualism, society has entered a thoroughly Post-Modern era. Over the past couple of decades humanity has increasingly turned to Information Technology as the great enabler. Through the capabilities that Information Technology offers, undreamed heights of scientific and technological progress have been reached in an amazingly short span of time. However, rather than uplifting and emancipating society, the wholesale implementation of Information Technology has brought with it a host of unintended and unforeseen consequences. As with the promises of Modernism, Information Technology has not brought society the Utopia that it imagined. Information Technology rather has acted to create a universe characterized by virtuality, constant change, indeterminacy, and an information orientated perspective on the world. Technological progress has not been accompanied by social progress. Through a comprehensive literature review and an examination of both Post-Modernism and Information Technology, it is proposed that the influences of Information Technology have acted and continued to act to promote Post-Modernism. These influences amongst others include its displacement of space and time, its promotion of the Information Society, its ability to create digital hyperrealities, its destructive influence on tradition and culture, and most of all its catastrophic/revolutionary impact on the identity. Through these influences this paper seeks to prove that Information Technology acts an agent of Post-Modernism.Dissertation (MCom (Informatics))--University of Pretoria, 2008.Informaticsunrestricte

Organizational adoption of open source software: An empirical Investigation of the human capital, Institutional pressures and social capital perspectives

Ph.DDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPH