Unlocking the potential of the smart metering technology: How can regulation level the playing-field for new services in smart grids?

By integrating a communications system with the existing power grid, smart grids provide end-to-end connectivity. This enables all entities and components integrated in the electricity supply system to exchange information without knowing the network's structure. New services and applications such as demand response or virtual power plants that will aid to improve and optimize the use of electricity depend on the availability of a smart grid communication network. End-to-end communication networks require that the missing communications gap between consumers' premises and the remaining energy network is bridged by deploying an Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI). Given the current liberalized electricity markets' structure incumbent distribution system operators (DSOs) will control the AMI and the meter data. This gives rise to concerns about anti-competitiveness. We argue that leveraging the AMI in a social welfare maximizing way requires non-discriminatory access for all entitled parties to the (1) AMI and the (2) meter data through (3) interoperable standards. We discuss possible regulatory remedies to ensure a level playing-field for innovative services in smart grids and consider implications for research and regulation. --Regulation,Smart Grid,Smart Meter,Antitrust

User Acceptance of Mobile Broadband in Nigeria

Broadband access has been identified as a fundamental part of any thriving economy because it contributes to GDP.  Besides, mobile broadband has been seen as the means for which developing countries can leapfrog into the post-industrial era. According to the figure released by Nigerian Communications Commission in April, 2014, the number of mobile internet subscribers had dropped from 64.5 to 63 million as at February, 2014 and steadily rose to 87 million in April, 2015. Considering those figures and comparing it with the national population figure of about 178 million, and the mobile telephone subscription figure of about 145 million in Nigeria, the rate of acceptance of mobile broadband is not an appreciable penetration rate to substantially drive the adoption of other e-services like mobile commerce, mobile payment services throughout the entire country, except for few cities. To bridge this gap and foster faster rate of acceptance of mobile internet, this paper sought to investigate the factors that could stimulate the intention of users to use mobile broadband in Nigeria by empirically validating an integrated research model, adopted from the unified theory of acceptance and use technology (UTUAT) model by integrating mobile broadband motivation, government support and perceived price value constructs. Online survey data was collected from 376 respondents and analyzed using partial least square (SmartPLS) technique. Result shows that mobile broadband motivation, government support, perceived price value, social influence’ and facilitating conditions are significant determinants of intention behavior to use mobile broadband in Nigeria. The findings of this research are vital to telecoms and broadband service providers in understanding the factors that stimulate people’s behavior for subscribing to mobile internet and for deploying infrastructures and services; it will also help government and telecoms regulators to streamline their policy towards meeting these factors. To the academia, this integrated research model presents an extended view of the UTAUT model for investigating the determinants of broadband acceptance in developing countries. Keywords: mobile broadband, motivation, government support, Nigeri

The Strategic Use of Download Limits by a Monopoly Platform

We consider a heretofore unexplored explanation for why platforms, such as Internet service providers, might impose download limits on content consumers: doing so increases the degree to which those consumers view content providers’ products as substitutes. This, in turn, intensifies competition among providers, generating greater surplus for consumers. A platform, in turn, can capture this increased surplus by charging consumers higher access fees. Even accounting for congestion externalities, we show that a platform will tend to set the download limit at a lower level than would be welfare-maximizing; indeed, in some instances, so low that no download limit is welfare superior to the limit the platform would set. Somewhat paradoxically, we show that a platform will install more bandwidth when allowed to impose a download limit than when prevented from doing so. Other related phenomena are explored

Genisbant internet hizmetleri piyasasinda düzenleme, rekabet ve düzenleyici kurum politikalarinin deðerlendirilmesi

Genisbant internet hizmetleri, bilgi ekonomisinin en önemli altyapilarindan birini olusturmakta ve hem sosyal hem de iktisadi pek çok alanda yeni dönüsümlere sebep olmaktadir. Bu baðlamda, ülkelerin rekabet avantajlarini kaybetmemeleri için ülke birey ve kurumlarinin söz konusu hizmetlere olan erisim olanaklarinin artirilmasi önem tasimaktadir. Söz konusu hedef doðrultusunda hemen her ülke çesitli politikalar gelistirip uygulamaktadir. Bu politikalar kendi içerisinde arz ve talep yönlü olarak iki kategoride incelenebilmektedir. Makale kapsaminda bu hedefin gerçeklestirilmesi sürecinde rol oynayan ve arz yönlü düzenleme içerisinde bulunan platform eksenli (içi) ve platformlararasi rekabet politikalarina ve bunlarin etkinliklerine deðinilmektedir. Bu çerçevede, ilk bölümde genisbant internet erisimi ve hizmetlerinin faydalari genel hatlariyla incelenmektedir. Ýkinci ve üçüncü bölümlerde genisbant tanimi, ilgili piyasayi olusturan teknolojiler ve düzenleyici yaklasimlar ele alinmaktadir. Müteakiben bazi ülke örnekleri incelenmekte ve son bölümde ise Türkiye genisbant internet hizmetleri piyasasi çesitli açilardan deðerlendirilmektedir. Burada, öncelikle sabit telekomünikasyon sebekesi ve genisbant internet hizmetleri piyasasi, pazar paylari ve kullanilan teknolojiler gibi faktörler ele alinarak deðerlendirilmistir. Söz konusu hususlarin incelenmesini müteakip, özellikle Bilgi Teknolojileri ve Iletisim Kurulu ve Rekabet Kurulu Kararlari göz önüne alinarak, iki Kurumun yaklasimlari ortaya konulmaya çalisilmaktadir. Ayrica, Kablo TV sebekesindeki düzenleme tecrübesi ve yeni nesil sebekelerle ilgili mevcut durum deðerlendirilmesi yapilarak, bazi politika önerilerine yer verilmektedir. Son olarak, Bilgi Toplumu ve Eylem Plani Stratejisi'nde ortaya konulan bazi hedefler ve bunlarin gerçeklestirilme derecesi irdelenmektedir. Makalede sonuç olarak özellikle sebekelerarasi rekabetin gelistirilmesi ihtiyacina vurgu yapilarak; bu hususta sadece düzenleyici kurumlarin deðil, ilgili tüm aktörler arasinda etkin isbirliði saðlanmasinin önemi belirtilmektedir.Genisbant internet, altyapi ve hizmete dayali rekabet, alternatif platformlar, yeni nesil sebekeler, ex ante ve ex post düzenleme

Regulation of international mobile roaming in the Southern African Development Community

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) experiences high levels of cross border human traffic due to trade, cultural and language links across the fifteen countries. Technological advances and increased domestic competition have contributed to lower domestic retail tariffs for mobile cellular services. Unfortunately, this has not extended to international mobile roaming (IMR) retail tariffs which remain unacceptably high. These high tariffs have attracted harsh criticism from commentators and prompted calls for regulatory intervention. This study investigates the level of international mobile roaming (IMR) retail tariffs, usage and demand elasticity. It further considers whether competition or regulation play a greater role in reducing these tariffs and whether regulatory intervention is likely to reduce competition. The research took the form of a quantitative study and used an online survey questionnaire as the data collection tool. The results of the study confirmed that international mobile roaming (IMR) retail tariffs are indeed high, resulting in poor uptake by cost conscious travellers who pay for their own cellular usage. The finding that competition plays a greater role than regulation in reducing IMR retail tariffs is not significant. It was concluded that neither competition nor regulation are sufficient on their own to provide increased social welfare. The best result is obtained when competition is allowed to flourish, underpinned by an enabling regulatory framework. CopyrightDissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2010.Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)unrestricte