Blow-up analysis of conformal metrics of the disk with prescribed Gaussian and geodesic curvatures

This paper is concerned with the compactness of metrics of the disk with prescribed Gaussian and geodesic curvatures. We consider a blowing-up sequence of metrics and give a precise description of its asymptotic behavior. In particular, the metrics blow-up at a unique point on the boundary and we are able to give necessary conditions on its location. It turns out that such conditions depend locally on the Gaussian curvatures but they depend on the geodesic curvatures in a nonlocal way. This is a novelty with respect to the classical Nirenberg problem where the blow-up conditions are local, and this new aspect is driven by the boundary condition.Comment: 31 pages, 1 figur

Interacting two-state Markov chains on undirected networks

It is shown that irreducible two-state continuous-time Markov chains interacting on a network in a bilinear fashion have a unique stable steady state. The proof is elementary and uses the relative entropy function.Comment: 9 pages; minor typos correcte

Zonotopes and four-dimensional superconformal field theories

The a-maximization technique proposed by Intriligator and Wecht allows us to determine the exact R-charges and scaling dimensions of the chiral operators of four-dimensional superconformal field theories. The problem of existence and uniqueness of the solution, however, has not been addressed in general setting. In this paper, it is shown that the a-function has always a unique critical point which is also a global maximum for a large class of quiver gauge theories specified by toric diagrams. Our proof is based on the observation that the a-function is given by the volume of a three dimensional polytope called "zonotope", and the uniqueness essentially follows from Brunn-Minkowski inequality for the volume of convex bodies. We also show a universal upper bound for the exact R-charges, and the monotonicity of a-function in the sense that a-function decreases whenever the toric diagram shrinks. The relationship between a-maximization and volume-minimization is also discussed.Comment: 29 pages, 15 figures, reference added, typos corrected, version published in JHE

Grilliot's trick in Nonstandard Analysis

The technique known as Grilliot's trick constitutes a template for explicitly defining the Turing jump functional $(\exists^2)$ in terms of a given effectively discontinuous type two functional. In this paper, we discuss the standard extensionality trick: a technique similar to Grilliot's trick in Nonstandard Analysis. This nonstandard trick proceeds by deriving from the existence of certain nonstandard discontinuous functionals, the Transfer principle from Nonstandard analysis limited to $\Pi_1^0$-formulas; from this (generally ineffective) implication, we obtain an effective implication expressing the Turing jump functional in terms of a discontinuous functional (and no longer involving Nonstandard Analysis). The advantage of our nonstandard approach is that one obtains effective content without paying attention to effective content. We also discuss a new class of functionals which all seem to fall outside the established categories. These functionals directly derive from the Standard Part axiom of Nonstandard Analysis.Comment: 21 page

Strategic Interaction and Networks

This paper brings a general network analysis to a wide class of economic games. A network, or interaction matrix, tells who directly interacts with whom. A major challenge is determining how network structure shapes overall outcomes. We have a striking result. Equilibrium conditions depend on a single number: the lowest eigenvalue of a network matrix. Combining tools from potential games, optimization, and spectral graph theory, we study games with linear best replies and characterize the Nash and stable equilibria for any graph and for any impact of players’ actions. When the graph is sufficiently absorptive (as measured by this eigenvalue), there is a unique equilibrium. When it is less absorptive, stable equilibria always involve extreme play where some agents take no actions at all. This paper is the first to show the importance of this measure to social and economic outcomes, and we relate it to different network link patterns.Networks, potential games, lowest eigenvalue, stable equilibria, asymmetric equilibria