Why economic growth has been weak in Arab countries : the role of exogenous shocks, economic policy failure and institutional deficiencies.

n.a.Wirtschaftswachstum; Wirtschaftsreform; Staatsversagen; Institutionalismus; Arabische Staaten;

Do institutions matter for FDI? A comparative analysis for the MENA countries

The paper analyses the underpinning factors of foreign direct investments towards the MENA countries. Our main interpretative hypothesis is based on the significant role of the quality of institutions to attract FDI. In MENA experience the growth of FDI flows proved to be notably inferior to that recorded in the EU or in Asian economies, such as China and India. Our research, firstly, stresses three major factors for such a poor performance: i) the small size of local markets and the lack of real economic integration; ii) the changes in the scenario of international competition; iii) economic and trading reforms in the MENA have been slow and mostly insufficient. Using the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) governance indicators, we examine the role of “institutional quality” on FDI trough a regression analysis. Our analysis show as institutions play an important role in the relative performances of countries in attracting FDI. At last, data on institutional quality and business climate show the relative disvantages of MENA. Our paper suggests as MENA countries require deep institutional reforms in order to improve the attractiveness in terms of FDI.FDI; Institutions; MENA Countries

Why economic growth has been weak in Arab countries: The role of exogenous shocks, economic policy failure and institutional deficiencies

The gap between the per capita income of most Arab countries and that of advanced industrial countries has widened since the early 1990s. The economic growth performance of the Arab world has been weak by developing country standards, too. Yet, the diversity of growth patterns within this group defies easy generalizations on the reasons underlying the disappointing performance. In some cases, country-specific shocks played a role, notably for relatively high growth in Sudan (discovery of oil) and the poor performance of Jordan (embargo on neighboring Iraq). On the whole, however, influences beyond the immediate control of Arab policymakers contribute surprisingly little to the explanation of growth patterns. The relation between terms-of-trade developments and economic growth turns out to be extremely weak. Moreover, the IMF and the World Bank are hardly to blame for imposing ineffective policy conditionality on Arab countries, if only because the leverage of international financial institutions has remained limited in the region. Economic policy failure in Arab countries appears to be a more important reason for poor growth. Even though the region has partly fallen into line with the Washington Consensus, various Arab countries lag behind other developing countries when it comes to trimming the interventionist role of the state and integrating themselves into the global division of labor through trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Nevertheless, the relation between macroeconomic conditions, factor accumulation as well as trade and FDI liberalization on the one hand and economic growth on the other hand remains elusive. This may be because reforms have not gone far enough and have remained fragmentary even in Arab countries with a relatively favorable growth performance. It can neither be ruled out, however, that some elements of the Washington Consensus have been less effective than widely expected in promoting growth. For example, the enclave character of FDI in some Arab countries is rather unlikely to spur per capita income growth. This implies that country-specific conditions deserve close attention when designing economic policy reforms. In Arab countries with low per capita income, domestic resource mobilization appears to be more important than attracting FDI. Even in more advanced countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, continued efforts towards human capital formation are key to sustainable growth. Furthermore, policy-related variables and economic growth depend on more deeply rooted institutional deficiencies. Institutions in many Arab countries are less advanced than their income level would suggest. The experience of several oil exporters in the region supports the proposition that the abundance of oil encourages rent-seeking and exerts a negative impact on economic growth via its deleterious impact on institutional development. As a consequence, economic policy reforms along the lines of the Washington Consensus are not sufficient to improve the growth prospects of Arab countries. The call for institutional reforms mainly applies to resource-rich countries such as Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, notwithstanding their different growth performance in the past. It may prove difficult for these countries to overcome the natural resource curse, but the successful transformation of a country like Mexico from an oildependent to a highly diversified economy with more advanced institutions may show Arab countries the way. --

Economic Policy, Institutional Development, and Income Growth: How Arab Countries Compare with Other Developing Countries

Similar to most other developing countries, almost all Arab countries failed to catch up economically with advanced industrial countries. This paper discusses three possible explanations of the disappointing growth performance: (i) an insufficient reformmindedness of developing country governments, (ii) counterproductive policy recipes of the Washington Consensus and (iii) more deeply rooted barriers to growth related to institutional deficiencies prevailing in various developing countries. The empirical evidence for Arab countries and other developing countries provides little support to the first two hypotheses. By contrast, institutional development is shown to have a significant impact on policy-related variables and the growth performance of developing countries. For Arab countries as a group, institutional development is more advanced than for the control group of other developing countries. Yet, serious institutional deficiencies tend to constrain future growth in several Arab countries. These findings have important implications for national policymakers and the international community.Washington Consensus, implementation deficits, effectiveness of reforms, institutional growth determinants

Governance Redux: The Empirical Challenge

Building from the 2002/03 contribution to the Global Competitiveness Report ("Governance Crossroads"), this paper argues that governance continues to be at a crossroad, its underperformance being evident in most regions and across many countries. This ('governance policy gap') contrasts with the strides that have been made in many countries in improving the content of macro-economic policies for well over a decade. Firms from emerging economies single out corruption and excessive bureaucracy among the top constraints to their business operations, while excessive bureaucracy and the tax regime are identified as top constraints by the respondent firms from the OECD. Neither inflation nor the exchange rate regime are rated as important constraints. Many countries currently have levels of governance that are insufficient to support their income levels and/or growth path, namely they experience a 'governance deficit', which we suggest it can be quantified. We also review work analyzing the deeper determinants of governance, and find that in lower income countries the origins of a country's legal system may not matter significantly. Further, we empirically evaluate political dimensions of governance, such as the extent of 'capture' and undue influence by some politically connected powerful firms in shaping the regulations, laws and policies in a country. Unequal influence is closely associated with poor public and financial governance performance. Finally, this firm-level dataset permits the construction of a governance database at the city level, and initial results of an empirical exploration of determinants of city-level governance are presented. A key implication of this chapter refers to the focus on policies aimed at the nexus between corporate strategies and public governance—-emphasizing prevention, external accountability and transparency mechanisms—and challenges the value of traditional measures within the public sector (such as passing laws by fiat or creating new Anti-Corruption Commissions).

Economic policy, institutional development, and income growth: How Arab countries compare with other developing countries

Similar to most other developing countries, almost all Arab countries failed to catch up economically with advanced industrial countries. This paper discusses three possible explanations of the disappointing growth performance: (i) an insufficient reformmindedness of developing country governments, (ii) counterproductive policy recipes of the Washington Consensus and (iii) more deeply rooted barriers to growth related to institutional deficiencies prevailing in various developing countries. The empirical evidence for Arab countries and other developing countries provides little support to the first two hypotheses. By contrast, institutional development is shown to have a significant impact on policy-related variables and the growth performance of developing countries. For Arab countries as a group, institutional development is more advanced than for the control group of other developing countries. Yet, serious institutional deficiencies tend to constrain future growth in several Arab countries. These findings have important implications for national policymakers and the international community

Profit Sharing Between Governments and Multinationals in Natural Resource Extraction: Evidence From a Firm-Level Panel

The "fairness" of negotiations between countries and resource extracting firms is subject to many accusations and counter-accusations and may be argued, in many instances, to impact the subsequent economic benefit to a host country from extraction. This paper examines the role of host country governance on the share of government take from extraction revenue. We attempt to disentangle a number of competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between governance and government take using panel data for US resource extracting multinational corporations (MNCs) operating abroad from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of Commerce over 1982-1999. Using fixed effects regression, we find a statistically significant positive impact of institutional quality on government take. The nature of this relationship -- whether this represents the result of a "corruption premium" paid by US MNCs or the exploitation of poor governance in negotiating government take -- is not completely clear. The evidence presented does, however, indicate that potential forms of bargaining power other than institutional quality (e.g., outside options to the deal) do increase government take, indicating that bargaining power may nonetheless be an important factor.

Governance Redux: The Empirircal Challenge

This paper is based on the governance chapter contribution to the 2003/04 Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). Building from the 2002/03 contribution to the GCR, it argues that governance continues to be at a crossroad, its underperformance being evident worldwide in most regions and across many countries. This ('governance policy gap') contrasts with the strides that have been made in many countries in improving macro- economic policies for well over a decade. Based on a worldwide survey of enterprises carried out for the GCR, we find that firms from emerging economies single out corruption and excessive bureaucracy among the top constraints to their business operations, while excessive bureaucracy and the tax regime are identified as top constraints by the respondent firms from the OECD. Many countries currently have levels of governance that are insufficient to support their income levels and/or growth path, namely they experience a 'governance deficit', which can be quantified. We also carry out a simple empirical exploration challenging the validity of legal-historical origins in determining governance performance in emerging economies nowadays, and provide a brief synthesis of the empirical importance of inequality of influence (by vested interests), as well as of governance at the city level.Governance Competitiveness, Corruption, Business Survey, Influence

Developing economies and international investors : do investment promotion agencies bring them together ?

Many countries spend significant resources on investment promotion agencies in the hope of attracting inflows of foreign direct investment. Despite the importance of this question for public policy choices, little is known about the effectiveness of investment promotion efforts. This study uses newly collected data on national investment promotion agencies in 109 countries to examine the effects of investment promotion on foreign direct investment inflows. The empirical analysis follows two approaches. First, it tests whether sectors explicitly targeted by investment promotion agencies receive more foreign direct investment in the post-targeting period relative to the pre-targeting period and non-targeted sectors. Second, it examines whether the existence of an investment promotion agency is correlated with higher foreign direct investment inflows. Results fromboth approaches point to the same conclusion. Investment promotion efforts appear to increase foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries. Moreover, agency characteristics, such as the agency's legal status and reporting structure, affect the effectiveness of investment promotion. There is also evidence of diversion of foreign direct investment due to investment incentives offered by other countries in the same geographic region.Investment and Investment Climate,Foreign Direct Investment,Debt Markets,Emerging Markets,