Collective dynamics of belief evolution under cognitive coherence and social conformity

Human history has been marked by social instability and conflict, often driven by the irreconcilability of opposing sets of beliefs, ideologies, and religious dogmas. The dynamics of belief systems has been studied mainly from two distinct perspectives, namely how cognitive biases lead to individual belief rigidity and how social influence leads to social conformity. Here we propose a unifying framework that connects cognitive and social forces together in order to study the dynamics of societal belief evolution. Each individual is endowed with a network of interacting beliefs that evolves through interaction with other individuals in a social network. The adoption of beliefs is affected by both internal coherence and social conformity. Our framework explains how social instabilities can arise in otherwise homogeneous populations, how small numbers of zealots with highly coherent beliefs can overturn societal consensus, and how belief rigidity protects fringe groups and cults against invasion from mainstream beliefs, allowing them to persist and even thrive in larger societies. Our results suggest that strong consensus may be insufficient to guarantee social stability, that the cognitive coherence of belief-systems is vital in determining their ability to spread, and that coherent belief-systems may pose a serious problem for resolving social polarization, due to their ability to prevent consensus even under high levels of social exposure. We therefore argue that the inclusion of cognitive factors into a social model is crucial in providing a more complete picture of collective human dynamics

Cross-inhibition leads to group consensus despite the presence of strongly opinionated minorities and asocial behaviour

Strongly opinionated minorities can have a dramatic impact on the opinion dynamics of a large population. Two factions of inflexible minorities, polarised into two competing opinions, could lead the entire population to persistent indecision. Equivalently, populations can remain undecided when individuals sporadically change their opinion based on individual information rather than social information. Our analysis compares the cross-inhibition model with the voter model for decisions between equally good alternatives, and with the weighted voter model for decisions among alternatives characterised by different qualities. Here we show that cross-inhibition, differently from the other two models, is a simple mechanism, ubiquitous in collective biological systems, that allows the population to reach a stable majority for one alternative even in the presence of asocial behaviour. The results predicted by the mean-field models are confirmed by experiments with swarms of 100 locally interacting robots. This work suggests an answer to the longstanding question of why inhibitory signals are widespread in natural systems of collective decision making, and, at the same time, it proposes an efficient mechanism for designing resilient swarms of minimalistic robots

Evolution of opinions on social networks in the presence of competing committed groups

Public opinion is often affected by the presence of committed groups of individuals dedicated to competing points of view. Using a model of pairwise social influence, we study how the presence of such groups within social networks affects the outcome and the speed of evolution of the overall opinion on the network. Earlier work indicated that a single committed group within a dense social network can cause the entire network to quickly adopt the group's opinion (in times scaling logarithmically with the network size), so long as the committed group constitutes more than about 10% of the population (with the findings being qualitatively similar for sparse networks as well). Here we study the more general case of opinion evolution when two groups committed to distinct, competing opinions $A$ and $B$, and constituting fractions $p_A$ and $p_B$ of the total population respectively, are present in the network. We show for stylized social networks (including Erd\H{o}s-R\'enyi random graphs and Barab\'asi-Albert scale-free networks) that the phase diagram of this system in parameter space $(p_A,p_B)$ consists of two regions, one where two stable steady-states coexist, and the remaining where only a single stable steady-state exists. These two regions are separated by two fold-bifurcation (spinodal) lines which meet tangentially and terminate at a cusp (critical point). We provide further insights to the phase diagram and to the nature of the underlying phase transitions by investigating the model on infinite (mean-field limit), finite complete graphs and finite sparse networks. For the latter case, we also derive the scaling exponent associated with the exponential growth of switching times as a function of the distance from the critical point.Comment: 23 pages: 15 pages + 7 figures (main text), 8 pages + 1 figure + 1 table (supplementary info

Threshold-limited spreading in social networks with multiple initiators

A classical model for social-influence-driven opinion change is the threshold model. Here we study cascades of opinion change driven by threshold model dynamics in the case where multiple {\it initiators} trigger the cascade, and where all nodes possess the same adoption threshold $\phi$. Specifically, using empirical and stylized models of social networks, we study cascade size as a function of the initiator fraction $p$. We find that even for arbitrarily high value of $\phi$, there exists a critical initiator fraction $p_c(\phi)$ beyond which the cascade becomes global. Network structure, in particular clustering, plays a significant role in this scenario. Similarly to the case of single-node or single-clique initiators studied previously, we observe that community structure within the network facilitates opinion spread to a larger extent than a homogeneous random network. Finally, we study the efficacy of different initiator selection strategies on the size of the cascade and the cascade window

Social Influence of Competing Groups and Leaders in Opinion Dynamics

Publication history: Accepted - 11 September 2020; Published online - 19 September 2020.This paper explores the infuence of two competing stubborn agent groups on the opinion dynamics of normal agents. Computer simulations are used to investigate the parameter space systematically in order to determine the impact of group size and extremeness on the dynamics and identify optimal strategies for maximizing numbers of followers and social infuence. Results show that (a) there are many cases where a group that is neither too large nor too small and neither too extreme nor too central achieves the best outcome, (b) stubborn groups can have a moderating, rather than polarizing, efect on the society in a range of circumstances, and (c) small changes in parameters can lead to transitions from a state where one stubborn group attracts all the normal agents to a state where the other group does so. We also explore how these fndings can be interpreted in terms of opinion leaders, truth, and campaign

Robot swarm democracy: the importance of informed individuals against zealots

Abstract: In this paper we study a generalized case of best-of-n model, which considers three kind of agents: zealots, individuals who remain stubborn and do not change their opinion; informed agents, individuals that can change their opinion, are able to assess the quality of the different options; and uninformed agents, individuals that can change their opinion but are not able to assess the quality of the different opinions. We study the consensus in different regimes: we vary the quality of the options, the percentage of zealots and the percentage of informed versus uninformed agents. We also consider two decision mechanisms: the voter and majority rule. We study this problem using numerical simulations and mathematical models, and we validate our findings on physical kilobot experiments. We find that (1) if the number of zealots for the lowest quality option is not too high, the decision-making process is driven toward the highest quality option; (2) this effect can be improved increasing the number of informed agents that can counteract the effect of adverse zealots; (3) when the two options have very similar qualities, in order to keep high consensus to the best quality it is necessary to have higher proportions of informed agents

A General Model of Dynamics on Networks with Graph Automorphism Lumping

In this paper we introduce a general Markov chain model of dynamical processes on networks. In this model, nodes in the network can adopt a finite number of states and transitions can occur that involve multiple nodes changing state at once. The rules that govern transitions only depend on measures related to the state and structure of the network and not on the particular nodes involved. We prove that symmetries of the network can be used to lump equivalent states in state-space. We illustrate how several examples of well-known dynamical processes on networks correspond to particular cases of our general model. This work connects a wide range of models specified in terms of node-based dynamical rules to their exact continuous-time Markov chain formulation