Domestic Bank Regulation and Financial Crises: Theory and Empirical Evidence from East Asia

A model of the domestic financial intermediation of foreign capital inflows based on agency costs is developed for studying financial crises in emerging markets. In equilibrium for the model economy, the banking system becomes progressively more fragile under imperfect prudential regulation and public sector loan guarantees until a crisis occurs with an expected reversal of capital flows. The crisis in this model evolves endogenously as the banking system becomes increasingly vulnerable through the renegotiation of firm debts. Firm revenues are subject to idiosyncratic firm-specific technology shocks, but there are no aggregate shocks. The model generates dynamic relationships between foreign capital inflows, domestic investment, firm debt and the value of firm and bank equity in an endogenous growth model. Prior to crisis, foreign capital inflows and bank debt rise relative to investment and domestic production. The aggregate portfolio of the banking sector deteriorates and the total value of bank equities declines in proportion to that for goods producers progressively. The model's assumptions and implications for the behavior of the economy before and after crisis are compared to the experience of five East Asian countries. The case studies compare three or near-crisis countries non-crisis economies, Taiwan and Singapore, and lend support to the model.

Financial intermediation, agency and collateral and the dynamics of banking crises: theory and evidence for the Japanese banking crisis

We outline a model of an endogenously evolving banking crisis in a growing economy subject to either idiosyncratic or aggregate productivity shocks. The model incorporates agency problems at two levels: between firms and their banks and between banks and the banks’ depositors and deposit insurers. In equilibrium, banks have an incentive to renegotiate loans to insolvent firms, leading to an increasing contingent liability of the government with deposit insurance and regulatory forbearance. The growth rate of output is endogenous, and we explain how the agency problems affect the qualitative dynamics of the economy in this framework. We find that the dynamics predicted by our model fit the recent behavior of the Japanese economy well. As Japan was hit by a succession of adverse aggregate shocks in the 1990s, bank portfolios continued to deteriorate, and the market value of collateral (land) collapsed. The decline in collateral values led to a fall in bank lending, a decline in physical investment, and finally, a fall in GDP.

Financial intermediation, agency, and collateral and the dynamics of banking crises: theory and evidence for the Japanese banking crisis

We outline a model of an endogenously evolving banking crisis in a growing economy subject to either idiosyncratic or aggregate productivity shocks. The model incorporates agency problems at two levels: between firms and their banks and between banks and the banks' depositors and deposit insurers. In equilibrium, banks have an incentive to renegotiate loans to insolvent firms, leading to an increasing contingent liability of the government with deposit insurance and regulatory forbearance. The growth rate of output is endogenous, and we explain how the agency problems affect the qualitative dynamics of the economy in this framework. We find that the dynamics predicted by our model fit the recent behavior of the Japanese economy well. As Japan was hit by a succession of adverse aggregate shocks in the 1990s, bank portfolios continued to deteriorate and the market value of collateral (land) collapsed. The decline in collateral values led to a fall in bank lending, a decline in physical investment, and finally, a fall in GDP.

Composition of International Capital Flows: A Survey

We survey several key mechanisms that explain the composition of international capital flows: foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio investment and debt flows (bank loans and bonds). In particular, we focus on the following market frictions: asymmetric information in capital markets and exposure to liquidity shocks. We show that the information asymmetry between foreign and domestic investors leads to inefficient investment allocation and borrowing in a country that finances its domestic investment through foreign debt or foreign equity. Exposure to liquidity shocks due to the mismatch of debt maturity may induce banking crises and cause sudden reversals of short-term capital flows. When there is asymmetric information between sellers and buyers in the capital market, then due to the adverse selection foreign direct investment is associated with higher liquidation costs than portfolio investment. The difference in exposure to liquidity shocks (in addition to asymmetric information) can explain the composition of equity flows between developed and emerging countries, and the patterns of foreign direct investments during financial crises.International topics

Financial Intermediation

The savings/investment process in capitalist economies is organized around financial intermediation, making them a central institution of economic growth. Financial intermediaries are firms that borrow from consumer/savers and lend to companies that need resources for investment. In contrast, in capital markets investors contract directly with firms, creating marketable securities. The prices of these securities are observable, while financial intermediaries are opaque. Why do financial intermediaries exist? What are their roles? Are they inherently unstable? Must the government regulate them? Why is financial intermediation so pervasive? How is it changing? In this paper we survey the last fifteen years' of theoretical and empirical research on financial intermediation. We focus on the role of bank-like intermediaries in the savings-investment process. We also investigate the literature on bank instability and the role of the government.

Essays on International Economics

The three chapters of my dissertation study the macroeconomics and firm dynamics under financial frictions and institutional frictions. They contain both theoretical and empirical analysis with a special emphasis on the scope of the open economy and the implications on policy. Chapter 1 presents a theoretical framework to study the debt portfolio choice and optimal capital control policy in an open economy with financial frictions. I extend the model of international borrowing with collateral constraint to allow for multiple debt maturities. As in the single-maturity version of the model, the equilibrium exhibits overborrowing because, due to a pecuniary externality, private agents undervalue the cost of financial liabilities that demand repayment in future constrained states. I show that in the multiple-maturity model overborrowing in short-term debt is especially severe because the repayment of short-term liabilities is larger than that of long-term liabilities in future constrained states, resulting in greater cost undervaluation of short-term financial obligations. To counteract these inefficiencies, the model justifies a set of maturity-dependent capital controls. The model predicts a tightening of capital controls tilted toward short maturities during financial crises. When calibrated to Argentine data, the model reproduces the observed dynamics of debt portfolios, and the short-term targeting of capital controls during crises. The optimal capital-control policy reduces the frequency of crises by half and generates sizable welfare improvements. Motivated by the policy implications of Chapter 1, the second chapter of my dissertation presents an empirical study of how capital control policies are implemented in financial crises. I construct a novel measure of capital control stringency and establish three stylized facts about the capital control changes around banking crisis. First, capital control policies do not show significant changes until the onset of financial crisis (procyclicality). Second, not only outflow controls but also inflow controls are strengthened upon the arrival of financial crisis (dual tightening). Third, inflow controls show strong emphasis towards curbing short-term flows, while outflow controls are generally enhanced with respect to a wide range of flows regardless of their maturities (short-term maturity targeting). These patterns are robust to countries with different economy stances, external indebtedness, exchange-rate regimes and capital control levels. Besides the financial frictions, the institutional frictions also play important roles in the external finance. Therefore, the third chapter of my dissertation examines the role of public governance quality in determining the composition of a country's external liabilities and the capital structure of firms. In this joint work with Shang-Jin Wei, we first build a model with firm heterogeneity to show that better institutional quality tends to promote a higher share of foreign direct investment and equity investment in total foreign liabilities, and a higher share of long-term debt within the debt/loan category. Similar prediction holds for the capital structure of firms. We then conduct extensive empirical investigation by exploring both firm-level data and country-level data and find supportive evidence for these predictions

Theoretical Aspects to the Finnish Credit Cycle

The paper discusses the possibility that the workings of the financial system contributed the boom-bust cycle in the Finnish credit market since the mid-1980s. We begin with a review of the most prominent theoretical arguments about the role of "financial factors". Also the main findings of a vast empirical literature are summed up. This is followed by a description of the salient features of the Finnish credit cycle and the associated banking crisis. The evolution of credit stocks and interest rates are then analyzed on a relatively high level of aggregation from the perspective of the theoretical arguments discussed. The main conclusions are: First, changes in the balance sheets of firms and households very likely contributed to both the rapid growth of credit in the late 1980s and its subsequent steep contraction. Second, the observations are also consistent with the conjecture that supply of bank credit very likely increased in the late 1980s and contracted in the early 1990 relative to other sources of credit. Third, some differences observed in the behaviour of different bank groups suggest that moral hazard related to underpriced bank liabilities may have contributed to the growth of lending in the boom period, and problems with capital adequacy may have constrained bank lending in the early 1990s. Stylized facts are consistent with these conjectures. However, to reliably infer about these moral hazard and credit crunch hypotheses, in-depth analysis of bank behaviour with micro data is required. Similarly, ascertaining the role of borrower balance sheets requires analysis of borrowers of different characteristics.credit cycle; financial factors; lending policies; moral hazard; credit crunch