Automated Dynamic Offset Applied to Cell Association

In this paper, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian game framework for automated dynamic offset selection. Users compete to maximize their throughput by picking the best locally serving radio access network (RAN) with respect to their own measurement, their demand and a partial statistical channel state information (CSI) of other users. In particular, we investigate the properties of a Stackelberg game, in which the base station is a player on its own. We derive analytically the utilities related to the channel quality perceived by users to obtain the equilibria. We study the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of such system, where the PoA is the ratio of the social welfare attained when a network planner chooses policies to maximize social welfare versus the social welfare attained in Nash/Stackeleberg equilibrium when users choose their policies strategically. We show by means of a Stackelberg formulation, how the operator, by sending appropriate information about the state of the channel, can configure a dynamic offset that optimizes its global utility while users maximize their individual utilities. The proposed hierarchical decision approach for wireless networks can reach a good trade-off between the global network performance at the equilibrium and the requested amount of signaling. Typically, it is shown that when the network goal is orthogonal to user's goal, this can lead the users to a misleading association problem.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figures, technical report. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1002.3931, arXiv:0903.2966 by other author

An Automated Dynamic Offset for Network Selection in Heterogeneous Networks

IEEE Early Access ArticlesInternational audience—Complementing traditional cellular networks with the option of integrated small cells and WiFi access points can be used to further boost the overall traffic capacity and service level. Small cells along with WiFi access points are projected to carry over 60% of all the global data traffic by 2015. With the integration of small cells on the radio access network levels, there is a focus on providing operators with more control over small cell selection while reducing the feedback burden. Altogether, these issues motivate the need for innovative distributed and autonomous association policies that operate on each user under the network operator's control, utilizing only partial information, yet achieving near-optimal solutions for the network. In this paper, we propose a load-aware network selection approach applied to automated dynamic offset in heterogeneous networks (HetNets). In particular, we investigate the properties of a hierarchical (Stackelberg) Bayesian game framework, in which the macro cell dynamically chooses the offset about the state of the channel in order to guide users to perform intelligent network selection decisions between macro cell and small cell networks. We derive analytically the utility related to the channel quality perceived by users to obtain the equilibria, and compare it to the fully centralized (optimal), the full channel state information and the non-cooperative (autonomous) models. Building upon these results, we effectively address the problem of how to intelligently configure a dynamic offset which optimizes network's global utility while users maximize their individual utilities. One of the technical contributions of the paper lies in obtaining explicit characterizations of the dynamic offset at the equilibrium and the related performances in terms of the price of anarchy. Interestingly, it turns out that the complexity of the algorithm for finding the dynamic offset of the Stackelberg model is O(n 4) (where n is the number of users). It is shown that the proposed hierarchical mechanism keeps the price of anarchy almost equal to 1 even for a low number of users, and remains bounded above by the non-cooperative model

The association problem with misleading partial channel state information

International audience—It has been known that the throughput of the 802.11 WLAN is much smaller than the nominal bit rate offered when attempting to connect to an access point. A user may discover the quality of service offered by an access point only after taking the decision of which of the access points to connect to. In fact, the actual throughput of a user is a function of not only his channel state but also of that of the other connected users. This could likely lead to congestion and overload conditions in the Access Point (AP) in question (which offers the best signal strength) and all users would lose. The information available to users attempting to connect to an AP is thus misleading. In this paper, we develop a Nash-Bayesian game framework where users compete to maximize their throughput by picking the best locally serving radio access network (RAN) with respect to their own measurement, their demand and a partial statistical channel state information (CSI) of other users. We derive analytically the utilities perceived by users to obtain the equilibria. In particular, it is shown that equilibria strongly depend on the channel quality indicator