Envy Freedom and Prior-free Mechanism Design

We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching markets. When the agents' values are drawn from a distribution, the Bayesian optimal mechanism is given by Myerson (1981) as a virtual-surplus optimizer. We develop a framework for prior-free mechanism design and analysis. A good mechanism in our framework approximates the optimal mechanism for the distribution if there is a distribution; moreover, when there is no distribution this mechanism still performs well. We define and characterize optimal envy-free outcomes in symmetric single-dimensional environments. Our characterization mirrors Myerson's theory. Furthermore, unlike in mechanism design where there is no point-wise optimal mechanism, there is always a point-wise optimal envy-free outcome. Envy-free outcomes and incentive-compatible mechanisms are similar in structure and performance. We therefore use the optimal envy-free revenue as a benchmark for measuring the performance of a prior-free mechanism. A good mechanism is one that approximates the envy free benchmark on any profile of agent values. We show that good mechanisms exist, and in particular, a natural generalization of the random sampling auction of Goldberg et al. (2001) is a constant approximation

Product Multicommodity Flow in Wireless Networks

We provide a tight approximate characterization of the $n$-dimensional product multicommodity flow (PMF) region for a wireless network of $n$ nodes. Separate characterizations in terms of the spectral properties of appropriate network graphs are obtained in both an information theoretic sense and for a combinatorial interference model (e.g., Protocol model). These provide an inner approximation to the $n^2$ dimensional capacity region. These results answer the following questions which arise naturally from previous work: (a) What is the significance of $1/\sqrt{n}$ in the scaling laws for the Protocol interference model obtained by Gupta and Kumar (2000)? (b) Can we obtain a tight approximation to the "maximum supportable flow" for node distributions more general than the geometric random distribution, traffic models other than randomly chosen source-destination pairs, and under very general assumptions on the channel fading model? We first establish that the random source-destination model is essentially a one-dimensional approximation to the capacity region, and a special case of product multi-commodity flow. Building on previous results, for a combinatorial interference model given by a network and a conflict graph, we relate the product multicommodity flow to the spectral properties of the underlying graphs resulting in computational upper and lower bounds. For the more interesting random fading model with additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), we show that the scaling laws for PMF can again be tightly characterized by the spectral properties of appropriately defined graphs. As an implication, we obtain computationally efficient upper and lower bounds on the PMF for any wireless network with a guaranteed approximation factor.Comment: Revised version of "Capacity-Delay Scaling in Arbitrary Wireless Networks" submitted to the IEEE Transactions on Information Theory. Part of this work appeared in the Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Monticello, IL, 2005, and the Internation Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 200

Statics and dynamics of selfish interactions in distributed service systems

We study a class of games which model the competition among agents to access some service provided by distributed service units and which exhibit congestion and frustration phenomena when service units have limited capacity. We propose a technique, based on the cavity method of statistical physics, to characterize the full spectrum of Nash equilibria of the game. The analysis reveals a large variety of equilibria, with very different statistical properties. Natural selfish dynamics, such as best-response, usually tend to large-utility equilibria, even though those of smaller utility are exponentially more numerous. Interestingly, the latter actually can be reached by selecting the initial conditions of the best-response dynamics close to the saturation limit of the service unit capacities. We also study a more realistic stochastic variant of the game by means of a simple and effective approximation of the average over the random parameters, showing that the properties of the average-case Nash equilibria are qualitatively similar to the deterministic ones.Comment: 30 pages, 10 figure