9 research outputs found
The Sum Can Be Weaker Than Each Part
In this paper we study the security of summing the outputs of two
independent hash functions, in an effort to increase the security of the
resulting design, or to hedge against the failure of one of the hash
functions. The exclusive-or (XOR) combiner H1(M)+H2(M) is one of the
two most classical combiners, together with the concatenation combiner
H1(M)||H2(M). While the security of the concatenation of two hash
functions is well understood since Joux\u27s seminal work on
multicollisions, the security of the sum of two hash functions has been
much less studied.
The XOR combiner is well known as a good PRF and MAC combiner, and is
used in practice in TLS versions 1.0 and 1.1. In a hash function
setting, Hoch and Shamir have shown that if the compression functions
are modeled as random oracles, or even weak random oracles (i.e. they
can easily be inverted -- in particular H1 and H2 offer no security),
H1+H2 is indifferentiable from a random oracle up to the birthday bound.
In this work, we focus on the preimage resistance of the sum of two
narrow-pipe n-bit hash functions, following the Merkle-Damgård or HAIFA
structure (the internal state size and the output size are both n bits).
We show a rather surprising result: the sum of two such hash functions,
e.g. SHA-512+Whirlpool, can never provide n-bit security for preimage
resistance. More precisely, we present a generic preimage attack with a
complexity of O(2^5n/6). While it is already known that the XOR
combiner is not preserving for preimage resistance (i.e. there might be
some instantiations where the hash functions are secure but the sum is
not), our result is much stronger: for any narrow-pipe functions, the
sum is not preimage resistant.
Besides, we also provide concrete preimage attacks on the XOR combiner
(and the concatenation combiner) when one or both of the compression
functions are weak; this complements Hoch and Shamir\u27s proof by showing
its tightness for preimage resistance.
Of independent interests, one of our main technical contributions is a
novel structure to control simultaneously the behavior of independent
hash computations which share the same input message. We hope that
breaking the pairwise relationship between their internal states will
have applications in related settings
The Sum Can Be Weaker Than Each Part
International audienceIn this paper we study the security of summing the outputs of two independent hash functions, in an effort to increase the security of the resulting design, or to hedge against the failure of one of the hash functions. The exclusive-or (XOR) combiner H1(M)⊕H2(M) is one of the two most classical combiners, together with the concatenation combiner H1(M) H2(M). While the security of the concatenation of two hash functions is well understood since Joux's seminal work on multicollisions, the security of the sum of two hash functions has been much less studied. The XOR combiner is well known as a good PRF and MAC combiner, and is used in practice in TLS versions 1.0 and 1.1. In a hash function setting, Hoch and Shamir have shown that if the compression functions are modeled as random oracles, or even weak random oracles (i.e. they can easily be inverted – in particular H1 and H2 offer no security), H1 ⊕ H2 is indifferentiable from a random oracle up to the birthday bound. In this work, we focus on the preimage resistance of the sum of two narrow-pipe n-bit hash functions, following the Merkle-Damgård or HAIFA structure (the internal state size and the output size are both n bits). We show a rather surprising result: the sum of two such hash functions, e.g. SHA-512 ⊕ Whirlpool, can never provide n-bit security for preimage resistance. More precisely, we present a generic preimage attack with a complexity of O(2 5n/6). While it is already known that the XOR combiner is not preserving for preimage resistance (i.e. there might be some instantiations where the hash functions are secure but the sum is not), our result is much stronger: for any narrow-pipe functions, the sum is not preimage resistant. Besides, we also provide concrete preimage attacks on the XOR combiner (and the concatenation combiner) when one or both of the compression functions are weak; this complements Hoch and Shamir's proof by showing its tightness for preimage resistance. Of independent interests, one of our main technical contributions is a novel structure to control simultaneously the behavior of independent hash computations which share the same input message. We hope that breaking the pairwise relationship between their internal states will have applications in related settings
Some Cryptanalytic Results on Zipper Hash and Concatenated Hash
At SAC 2006, Liskov proposed the zipper hash, a technique for constructing secure (indifferentiable from random oracles) hash functions based on weak (invertible) compression functions. Zipper hash is a two pass scheme, which makes it unfit for practical consideration. But, from the theoretical point of view it seemed to be secure, as it had resisted standard attacks for long. Recently, Andreeva {\em et al.} gave a forced-suffix herding attack on the zipper hash, and Chen and Jin showed a second preimage attack provided is strong invertible. In this paper, we analyse the construction under the random oracle model as well as when the underlying compression functions have some weakness. We show (second) preimage, and herding attacks on an -bit zipper hash and its relaxed variant with , all of which require less than online computations.
Hoch and Shamir have shown that the concatenated hash offers only -bits security when both the underlying compression functions are strong invertible. We show that the bound is tight even when only one of the underlying compression functions is strong invertible
Evaluating the Security of Merkle-Damgård Hash Functions and Combiners in Quantum Settings
In this work, we evaluate the security of Merkle-Damgård (MD) hash functions and their combiners (XOR and concatenation combiners) in quantum settings. Two main quantum scenarios are considered, including the scenario where a substantial amount of cheap quantum random access memory (qRAM) is available and where qRAM is limited and expensive to access. We present generic quantum attacks on the MD hash functions and hash combiners, and carefully analyze the complexities under both quantum scenarios. The considered securities are fundamental requirements for hash functions, including the resistance against collision and (second-)preimage. The results are consistent with the conclusions in the classical setting, that is, the considered resistances of the MD hash functions and their combiners are far less than ideal, despite the significant differences in the expected security bounds between the classical and quantum settings. Particularly, the generic attacks can be improved significantly using quantum computers under both scenarios. These results serve as an indication that classical hash constructions require careful security re-evaluation before being deployed to the post-quantum cryptography schemes
Functional Graph Revisited: Updates on (Second) Preimage Attacks on Hash Combiners
This paper studies functional-graph-based (second) preimage attacks against hash combiners. By exploiting more properties of cyclic nodes of functional graph, we find an improved preimage attack against the XOR combiner with a complexity of , while the previous best-known complexity is . Moreover, we find the first generic second-preimage attack on Zipper hash with an optimal complexity of
New Attacks on the Concatenation and XOR Hash Combiners
We study the security of the concatenation combiner for two independent iterated hash functions with -bit outputs that are built using the Merkle-Damgård construction. In 2004 Joux showed that the concatenation combiner of hash functions with an -bit internal state does not offer better collision and preimage resistance compared to a single strong -bit hash function. On the other hand, the problem of devising second preimage attacks faster than against this combiner has remained open since 2005 when Kelsey and Schneier showed that a single Merkle-Damgård hash function does not offer optimal second preimage resistance for long messages.
In this paper, we develop new algorithms for cryptanalysis of hash combiners and use them to devise the first second preimage attack on the concatenation combiner. The attack finds second preimages faster than for messages longer than and has optimal complexity of . This shows that the concatenation of two Merkle-Damgård hash functions is not as strong a single ideal hash function.
Our methods are also applicable to other well-studied combiners, and we use them to devise a new preimage attack with complexity of on the XOR combiner of two Merkle-Damgård hash functions. This improves upon the attack by Leurent and Wang (presented at Eurocrypt 2015) whose complexity is (but unlike our attack is also applicable to HAIFA hash functions).
Our algorithms exploit properties of random mappings generated by fixing the message block input to the compression functions of and . Such random mappings have been widely used in cryptanalysis, but we exploit them in new ways to attack hash function combiners
Improving Generic Attacks Using Exceptional Functions
Over the past ten years, there have been many attacks on symmetric constructions using the statistical properties of random functions. Initially, these attacks targeted iterated hash constructions and their combiners, developing a wide array of methods based on internal collisions and on the average behavior of iterated random functions. More recently, Gilbert et al. (EUROCRYPT 2023) introduced a forgery attack on so-called duplex-based Authenticated Encryption modes which was based on exceptional random functions, i.e., functions whose graph admits a large component with an exceptionally small cycle.
In this paper, we expand the use of such functions in generic cryptanalysis with several new attacks. First, we improve the attack of Gilbert et al. from to , where is the capacity. This new attack uses a nested pair of functions with exceptional behavior, where the second function is defined over the cycle of the first one. Next, we introduce several new generic attacks against hash combiners, notably using small cycles to improve the complexities of the best existing attacks on the XOR combiner, Zipper Hash and Hash-Twice.
Last but not least, we propose the first quantum second preimage attack against Hash-Twice, reaching a quantum complexity
Quantum Attacks on Hash Constructions with Low Quantum Random Access Memory
At ASIACRYPT 2022, Benedikt, Fischlin, and Huppert proposed the quantum herding attacks on iterative hash functions for the first time. Their attack needs exponential quantum random access memory (qRAM), more precisely {} quantum accessible classical memory (QRACM). As the existence of large qRAM is questionable, Benedikt et al. leave an open question on building low-qRAM quantum herding attacks.
In this paper, we answer this open question by building a quantum herding attack, where the time complexity is slightly increased from Benedikt et al.\u27s to ours , but {it does not need qRAM anymore (abbreviated as no-qRAM)}. Besides, we also introduce various low-qRAM {or no-qRAM} quantum attacks on hash concatenation combiner, hash XOR combiner, Hash-Twice, and Zipper hash functions
Combiners for Backdoored Random Oracles
International audienceWe formulate and study the security of cryptographic hash functions in the backdoored random-oracle (BRO) model, whereby a big brother designs a "good" hash function, but can also see arbitrary functions of its table via backdoor capabilities. This model captures intentional (and unintentional) weaknesses due to the existence of collision-finding or inversion algorithms, but goes well beyond them by allowing, for example, to search for structured preimages. The latter can easily break constructions that are secure under random inversions. BROs make the task of bootstrapping cryptographic hardness somewhat challenging. Indeed, with only a single arbitrarily backdoored function no hardness can be bootstrapped as any construction can be inverted. However, when two (or more) independent hash functions are available, hardness emerges even with unrestricted and adaptive access to all backdoor oracles. At the core of our results lie new reductions from cryptographic problems to the communication complexities of various two-party tasks. Along the way we establish a communication complexity lower bound for set-intersection for cryptographically relevant ranges of parameters and distributions and where set-disjointness can be easy