Collateralised loan obligations (CLOs) : a primer

The following descriptive paper surveys the various types of loan securitisation and provides a working definition of so-called collateralised loan obligations (CLOs). Free of the common rhetoric and slogans, which sometimes substitute for understanding of the complex nature of structured finance, this paper describes the theoretical foundations of this specialised form of loan securitisation. Not only the distinctive properties of CLOs, but also the information economics inherent in the transfer of credit risk will be considered, so that we can equally privilege the critical aspects of security design in the structuring of CLO transactions

The pricing puzzle : the default term structure of collateralised loan obligations

Ambivalence in the regulatory definition of capital adequacy for credit risk has recently stirred the financial services industry to collateral loan obligations (CLOs) as an important balance sheet management tool. CLOs represent a specialised form of Asset-Backed Securitisation (ABS), with investors acquiring a structured claim on the interest proceeds generated from a portfolio of bank loans in the form of tranches with different seniority. By way of modelling Merton-type risk-neutral asset returns of contingent claims on a multi-asset portfolio of corporate loans in a CLO transaction, we analyse the optimal design of loan securitisation from the perspective of credit risk in potential collateral default. We propose a pricing model that draws on a careful simulation of expected loan loss based on parametric bootstrapping through extreme value theory (EVT). The analysis illustrates the dichotomous effect of loss cascading, as the most junior tranche of CLO transactions exhibits a distinctly different default tolerance compared to the remaining tranches. By solving the puzzling question of properly pricing the risk premium for expected credit loss, we explain the rationale of first loss retention as credit risk cover on the basis of our simulation results for pricing purposes under the impact of asymmetric information. Klassifikation: C15, C22, D82, F34, G13, G18, G2

Asset pricing and investor risk in subordinated asset securitisation

As a sign of ambivalence in the regulatory definition of capital adequacy for credit risk and the quest for more efficient refinancing sources collateral loan obligations (CLOs) have become a prominent securitisation mechanism. This paper presents a loss-based asset pricing model for the valuation of constituent tranches within a CLO-style security design. The model specifically examines how tranche subordination translates securitised credit risk into investment risk of issued tranches as beneficial interests on a designated loan pool typically underlying a CLO transaction. We obtain a tranchespecific term structure from an intensity-based simulation of defaults under both robust statistical analysis and extreme value theory (EVT). Loss sharing between issuers and investors according to a simplified subordination mechanism allows issuers to decompose securitised credit risk exposures into a collection of default sensitive debt securities with divergent risk profiles and expected investor returns. Our estimation results suggest a dichotomous effect of loss cascading, with the default term structure of the most junior tranche of CLO transactions (“first loss position”) being distinctly different from that of the remaining, more senior “investor tranches”. The first loss position carries large expected loss (with high investor return) and low leverage, whereas all other tranches mainly suffer from loss volatility (unexpected loss). These findings might explain why issuers retain the most junior tranche as credit enhancement to attenuate asymmetric information between issuers and investors. At the same time, the issuer discretion in the configuration of loss subordination within particular security design might give rise to implicit investment risk in senior tranches in the event of systemic shocks. JEL Classifications: C15, C22, D82, F34, G13, G18, G2

Forecasting correlations during the late-2000s financial crisis: short-run component, long-run component, and structural breaks

We empirically investigate the predictive power of the various components affecting correlations that have been recently introduced in the literature. We focus on models allowing for a flexible specification of the short-run component of correlations as well as the long-run component. Moreover, we also allow the correlation dynamics to be subjected to regime-shift caused by threshold-based structural breaks of a different nature. Our results indicate that in some cases there may be a superimposition of the long- and short-term movements in correlations. Therefore, care is called for in interpretations when estimating the two components. Testing the forecasting accuracy of correlations during the late-2000s financial crisis yields mixed results. In general component models allowing for a richer correlation specification possess a (marginally) increased predictive accuracy. Economically speaking, no relevant gains are found by allowing for more flexibility in the correlation dynamics.Correlation forecasting; Component models; Threshold regime-switching models; Mixed data sampling; Performance evaluation

The CDO market Functioning and implications in terms of financial stability.

The result of relatively recent financial innovations, collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) are securities that represent a portfolio of bank loans and/or different financial instruments. Part securitisation instrument part credit derivative, these increasingly-popular structured finance products are used by financial institutions for various purposes, ranging from reducing their cost of financing to exploiting arbitrage opportunities or transferring credit risk. Irrespective of their form, CDOs are issued in different tranches that are tailored using securitisation techniques. The process of tranching allows credit risk and returns on their underlying portfolio to be redistributed to investors in an ad hoc fashion. CDOs are part of an ongoing trend of converting credit risk into a marketable commodity. This process started with securitisation, and was then sustained by the development of credit ratings and corporate bond markets and, more recently, by that of credit derivatives. While CDO issuance represents at most the equivalent of a sixth of that of corporate bonds, the influence of these products has a far greater significance because of the amount of credit risk they allow to be transferred. The sharp growth in synthetic structures backed by credit derivatives, especially in Europe, has heightened this trend. The rapid development of CDOs has improved non-bank investors’ access to credit markets and has enabled them to overcome the obstacles posed by the size and limited diversification of the corporate bond market, notably in Europe where bank intermediation remains predominant. Investors can now choose portfolios with specific risk-return profiles and take exposures to credit risk previously confined to banks’ balance sheets, such as SME loans. Given that CDOs are credit risk transfer instruments, they facilitate the redistribution of this risk within the financial and banking sector and even beyond, while increasing the degree of completeness of the credit market. They should therefore have a positive impact on financial stability. However, as is often the case with financial innovations, evaluating CDOs and the risks they entail, particularly in the case of Synthetic CDOs, requires the use of complex techniques that are not always sufficiently tried and tested. Both investors and market participants may thus be exposed to relatively high potential losses. At present, this risk does not appear to be of a systemic nature given the size and relative newness of the market. Nonetheless, if this market continues to grow at its current pace, attracting increasing numbers of investors, in particular in Europe where CDOs are predominantly synthetic, systemic risk may emerge. Moreover, growth in CDO issuance seems to have contributed to the marked narrowing of spreads over the past two years on all credit markets. This trend raises questions as to the links between the CDO market and the corporate bond and credit derivatives markets, and deserves particular attention with regard to the risk of the propagation and amplification of strains that may arise on the CDO market due to its still limited liquidity and transparency.

CDOs and systematic risk : why bond ratings are inadequate

This paper analyzes the risk properties of typical asset-backed securities (ABS), like CDOs or MBS, relying on a model with both macroeconomic and idiosyncratic components. The examined properties include expected loss, loss given default, and macro factor dependencies. Using a two-dimensional loss decomposition as a new metric, the risk properties of individual ABS tranches can directly be compared to those of corporate bonds, within and across rating classes. By applying Monte Carlo Simulation, we find that the risk properties of ABS differ significantly and systematically from those of straight bonds with the same rating. In particular, loss given default, the sensitivities to macroeconomic risk, and model risk differ greatly between instruments. Our findings have implications for understanding the credit crisis and for policy making. On an economic level, our analysis suggests a new explanation for the observed rating inflation in structured finance markets during the pre-crisis period 2004-2007. On a policy level, our findings call for a termination of the 'one-size-fits-all' approach to the rating methodology for fixed income instruments, requiring an own rating methodology for structured finance instruments. JEL Classification: G21, G2

Risk management by structured derivative product companies

In the early 1990s, some U.S. securities firms and foreign banks began creating subsidiary vehicles--known as structured derivative product companies (DPCs)--whose special risk management approaches enabled them to obtain triple-A credit ratings with the least amount of capital. At first, market observers expected credit-sensitive customers to turn increasingly to these DPCs. However, the authors find that structured DPCs--despite their superior ratings--have failed to live up to their initial promise and have yet to gain a competitive edge as intermediaries in the derivatives markets.Derivative securities ; Risk

The Crux of the Matter: Ratings and Credit Risk Valuation at the heart of the Structured Finance Crisis

The 2007/2008 global credit crisis was born out of opaque securitization transactions. Introducing structured products risk estimation techniques shows how the most basic investment analysis could not be done without detailed and updated knowledge on the assets of the pool. Access to such details was crucial for investors to perform an autonomous valuation, the lack of which led to a pervading acceptance of ratings at face value. The crisis brought numerous delusions to naïve users of these privately issued opinions. Coming back to the central role that investor played during the previous speculative episode and introducing a theoretical discussion on the dynamics of market finance, it is shown that trusting market discipline and due diligence was bound to end up being misguiding. Given that unprecedented rating volatility brought a share of the blame game to rating firms, strategies that would aim at securing an informed use of ratings are finally outlined.financial crisis, credit risk, rating agencies