The Simulation of Financial Markets by Agent-Based Mix-Game Models

This paper studies the simulation of financial markets using an agent-based mix-game model which is a variant of the minority game (MG). It specifies the spectra of parameters of mix-game models that fit financial markets by investigating the dynamic behaviors of mix-game models under a wide range of parameters. The main findings are (a) in order to approach efficiency, agents in a real financial market must be heterogeneous, boundedly rational and subject to asymmetric information; (b) an active financial market must be dominated by agents who play a minority game; otherwise, the market would die; (c) the system could be stable if agents who play a majority game have a faster learning rate than those who play a minority game; otherwise, the system could be unstable. The paper then induces the rules for simulating financial markets with mix-game models and gives an example. Finally, the appendix of this paper presents background information about \'El Farol bar\', MG and mix-games.Financial Markets, Simulation, Minority Game, Mix-Game