Public Opinion behind the Deterrence: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Study of the Israeli Policy towards Lebanon

Israel’s policies regarding Lebanon have been dependent on public opinion, which is very volatile. The citizens of Israel did not favor the occupation of the security zone in South Lebanon because of the Four Mothers movement, and it influenced the government to withdraw military forces unilaterally in May 2000. When Hizbollah attacked the Israel Defense Force (IDF) patrol and abducted two soldiers on the northern border, the Israeli citizens supported the government’s decision of waging a war in retaliation. This study aims to shed light on the causal mechanism of the influence of public opinion on the defense policy in the rational framework of deterrence strategy. I chose the evolutionary game theory approach as my research method. My study yielded the following result: the deterrence is not stable when the aggression level of the defenders is less than the level of the critical condition. The Israeli government made a decision to conduct unilateral withdrawal under the pressure of passive defenders among the people. However, the IDF could begin the operation in Lebanon because of a substantial number of supporters who hoped to restore the deterrence. This study concludes that the Israelis exhibited strong intension and an aggressive attitude toward the deterrence.Deterrence, Evolutionary Game Theory, Second Lebanon War, Israel, Hizbollah

Introduction to \u3cem\u3eThe Economics of Social Institutions\u3c/em\u3e

This volume includes thirty-six important contributions to the economics of social institutions by leading figures in the history of the field. Its nine Parts are: Early Contributions, Methodological and Conceptual Issues, Old Institutionalism, New Institutionalism, Social Costs, Growth and Development, Institutions and Change, Institutions and Organizations, and The Third Sphere of the Economy and Institutions. This set of topics provides a comprehensive review of the origins and development of the economics of social institutions. It addresses the main theoretical and policy concerns that have occupied contributors to the approach. The economics of social institutions has a been well-established research program for over a century, and continues to evolve and develop new areas of investigation. This collection provides researchers, scholars, and interested students and extensive review of the leading contributions to the subject. It can be used to advance future thinking about the economics of social institutions and as a key resource for university teaching and education

Economic Activity and Institutions

This paper is one of two working papers concerning the waste management sector transition project run from MERIT under the direction of René Kemp. This paper examines some of the numerous meanings and interpretations associated with the words “institution” and “institutions” and the different levels at which the two notions are employed. Institutionalism, institutionalization, institutional change and related terms are discussed followed by an examination of the links between “institutionalism” and the discipline of economics. The analytical, policy and political implications of the institutionalist approach are discussed and ways in which the institutionalist approach may be applied to changes in the economy during transitions are explored.Institutions, Institutional Analysis, Scale, Policy

Theoretical Perspectives on Work and the Employment Relationship

Developing a strong theoretical base for research and practice in industrial relations and human resource management has, to date, remained a largely unfulfilled challenge. This pioneering volume helps close the theory gap by presenting contributions from fifteen leading scholars that develop and extend theoretical perspectives on work and the employment relationship. Subject areas covered include theories of employment relations systems, varieties of capitalism, the labor process, new institutional economics, individual work motivation, strategic human resource management, a theory of transaction costs and employment contracts, efficiency versus equity, and comparative industrial relations

The Widening and Deepening of Innovation Policy: What Conditions Provide for Effective Governance?

In relation to the gradual and steady introduction of the systemic perspective and of new public management techniques in innovation policy-making during the past decade, many countries in the developed and developing world have been substantially widening and deepening their innovation policies. The introduction of new and more sophisticated policy instruments (deepening) has been accompanied by an expansion of the realm of action for innovation policy (widening). The main argument of this paper is that this remarkable governmental activism and experimentalism raises important analytical questions about the conditions under which innovation policy contributes to an effective governance of the innovation system. Hence, this paper has two main purposes. Firstly, it characterises in an unambiguous way the widening and deepening trends in innovation policy, problematising their possible effects on governance. And, secondly, it develops an analytical toolbox based on a series of theoretical assumptions about the political conditions for effective governance of innovation systems.Innovation Policy; Innovation System; Governmental Activism; Governmental Experimentalism

On the Truly Noncooperative Game of Island Life: Introducing a Unified Theory of Value & Evolutionarily Stable Island Economic Development Strategy

This discourse offers a solution to The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development on islands. This hypothesis offers a foundational, sub-game solution to The Island Survival Game, a counterintuitive, dominant economic development strategy for ‘islands’ (and relatively insular states). This discourse also tables conceptual building blocks, prerequisite analytical tools, and a guiding principle for The Earth Island Survival Game, a bounded delay supergame which models The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development at the global level. We begin our exploration with an introduction to The Principle of Relative Insularity, a postulate which informs ESS for ‘island’ and ‘continental’ players alike. Next, we model ‘island’ economic development with two bio-geo-politico-economic models and respective strategies: The Mustique Co. Development Plan, and The Prince Edward Island Federal-Provincial Program for Social and Economic Advancement. These diametrically opposed strategies offer an extraordinary comparative study. One island serves as a highly descriptive model for The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development; the other model informs ESS. The Island Survival Game serves as a remarkable learning tool, offering lessons which promote Darwinian fitness, resource holding power, self-sufficiency, and cooperative behaviour, by illuminating the illusive path toward sustainable economic development.Non-cooperative games, evolutionary game theory, relative insularity, islands, tragedy of the commons, sustainable economic development, resource holding power, evolutionarily stable strategy, long distance dispersal

Heuristic Schelling: economy of organized crime

This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author's scientific output. A context of conflicts that includes new expressions of violence and the relative failure of the paramilitary reintegration involves using new analytical models (argumentation, game theory and inconsistent information). The recent evolution of emerging gangs and their expansion into areas that were paramilitary camps requires monitoring not only of the government and the authorities, but those investigating the conflict in the present tense. The author provides heuristic research support from Schelling’s theory of strategy, recent contributions to the relationship between organized crime and drug cartels.Colombia, Government, Civil War, Latin America, Security, Protection Agencies.

Modeling the strategic trading of electricity assets

We analyze how strategic asset trading can be used to gain competitive advantage. In the case of electricity markets, companies seek to improve the value of their generating portfolios by acquiring, or selling, power plants. Accordingly, we derive the basic determinants of plant value, explaining how a particular productive asset may have different values for different firms. From this, we develop an evolutionary model to understand how market structure interacts with strategic asset trading to increase the competitive advantage of firms, and furthermore, how this depends upon the actual price-setting microstructure in the wholesale market itselfCompetitive advantage, computational learning, auctions, asset trading, simulation, electricity markets