The Reflection and Recommendations for Banking Capital Adequacy Regulation

On financial system, Bank is the most important financial intermediaries in economy. It has played a central role to the entire financial system. The bank’s capital also has played an important role on the bank risk management and governance. This study issued the function of the financial capital adequacy ratio on Bank supervision system. The article establish the multiple regression model analysis the relationship between various bank indicators and capital adequacy ratio, point out too high of capital adequacy ratio is negative to the bank’s operation and regulation. Through empirical study, we explored the effectiveness of the regulatory capital adequacy ratio

Basel II and the Capital Requirements Directive: Responding to the 2008/09 Financial Crisis

This paper addresses factors which have prompted the need for further revision of banking regulation, with particular reference to the Capital Requirements Directive. The Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), which comprises the 2006/48/EC Directive on the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and the 2006/49/EC Directive on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions, implemented the revised framework for the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II) within EU member states. Pro cyclicality has attracted a lot of attention – particularly with regards to the recent financial crisis, owing to concerns arising from increased sensitivity to credit risk under Basel II. This paper not only considers whether such concerns are well-founded, but also the beneficial and not so beneficial consequences emanating from Basel II’s increased sensitivity to credit risk (as illustrated by the Internal Ratings Based approaches). In so doing it considers the effects of Pillar 2 of Basel II, namely, supervisory review, with particular reference to buffer levels, and whether banks’ actual capital ratios can be expected to correspond with Basel capital requirements given the fact that they are expected to hold certain capital buffers under Pillar 2. Furthermore, it considers how regulators can respond to prevent systemic risks to the financial system during periods when firms which are highly leveraged become reluctant to lend. In deciding to cut back on lending activities, are the decisions of such firms justified in situations where such firms’ credit risk models are extremely and unduly sensitive - hence the level of capital being retained is actually much higher than minimum regulatory Basel capital requirements

Banking Fragility & Disclosure: International Evidence

Motivated by recent public policy debates on the role of market discipline in banking stability, the study examines the impact of greater bank disclosure in mitigating the likelihood of systemic banking crisis. In a cross sectional study of banking systems across forty-nine countries in the nineties, it finds evidence that banking crises are less likely in countries with regulatory regimes that require extensive bank disclosure and stringent auditing.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/57254/1/wp874 .pd

Studies On The Potential Impacts Of The New Basel Capital Accord

In April 2003, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published the third consultative paper (CP3) of the new Basel Capital Accord relating to the prudential regulation of banks, which was followed in July 2003 by the EU Commission’s draft directive with the same contents, but slightly different detailed rules (Capital Adequacy Directive, CAD3). During the consultative process both organisations expect comments from the players affected by the new capital regulation, thus from the central banks of each country as well. The significance of the new capital regulation is underlined by the fact that the Basel recommendation will soon be followed by the European Union’s directive (presumably in 2004), the implementation of which will be one of the largest regulative challenges for Hungary. Accordingly, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank pays special attention to preparing the implementation of the Basel II/CAD3 capital accords, laying the groundwork for the adaptation and carrying out the necessary background analyses. Our main objective in the first phase of this rather complex and far-reaching project was – through participation in the legislative process – to analyse the issues important and relevant for the MNB, as well as to assess the potential consequences of implementation in Hungary. During such analyses we focused on the macro-prudential consequences. Accordingly, we carried out a detailed assessment of five topics.Basel Capital Accord, Pro-cyclicality, Credit risk, Market Risk, Regulation, Corporate governance.

Financial Regulations in Developing Countries: Can they Effectively Limit the Impact of Capital Account Volatility?

This paper identifies two alternative forms of prudential regulation. The first set is formed by regulations that directly control financial aggregates, such as liquidity expansion and credit growth. An example is capital requirements as currently incorporated in internationally accepted standards; namely capital requirements with risk categories used in industrial countries. The second set, which can be identified as the “pricing-risk-right” approach, works by providing incentives to financial institutions to avoid excessive risk-taking activities. A key feature of this set of regulations is that they encourage financial institutions to internalize the costs associated with the particular risks of the environment where they operate. Regulations in this category include ex-ante risk-based provisioning rules and capital requirements that take into account the risk features particular to developing countries. This category also includes incentives for enhancing market discipline as a way to differentiate risk-taking behavior between financial institutions. The main finding of the paper is that the first set of regulations—the most commonly used in developing economies-- have had very limited usefulness in helping countries to contain the risks involved with more liberalized financial systems. The main reason for this disappointing result is that, by not taking into account the particular characteristics of financial markets in developing countries, these regulations cannot effectively control excessive risk taking by financial institutions. Moreover, the paper shows that, contrary to policy intentions, this set of prudential regulations can exacerbate rather than decrease financial sector fragility, especially in episodes of sudden reversal of capital flows. In contrast, the paper claims, the second set of prudential regulation can go a long way in helping developing countries achieving their goals. The paper advances suggestions for the sequencing of implementation of these regulations for different groups of countries.regulation, liquidity, credit growth, pricing-risk-right, financial institutions, capital flows, developing countries

Banking Fragility and Disclosure: International Evidence

Motivated by recent public policy debates on the role of market discipline in banking stability, I examine the impact of greater bank disclosure in mitigating the likelihood of systemic banking crisis. In a cross sectional study of banking systems across 49 countries in the 90s, I find that banking crises are less likely in countries with financial reporting regimes characterized by (i) comprehensive disclosure (ii) informative disclosure, (iii) timely disclosure and (iv) more stringent auditing.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40134/3/wp748.pd

The impact of the capital requirements for operational risk in the Hungarian banking system

The capital adequacy regulation which came into force on 1 January 2008 for the Hungarian banking sector, in line with the Basel II directives and generally applied in the European Union, brought the novelty of distinct management of operational risk. Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, personnel and systems or from external events, which, similarly to financial risk, may result in substantial losses. The regulation allows for various methods of calculating the capital requirement. Financial institutions may opt for simpler approaches based on income indicators, or for more complex ones based on actual measures of risk. Based on the past oneyear period, it appears that the Hungarian banking system’s operational risk capital charge is significant compared to the total capital charge, with the operational risk capital charge for 2009 Q1 amounting to HUF 120 billion, equivalent to nearly 8% of the total capital requirements. The reported realised losses are lower than the capital requirement (approximately HUF 13 billion in 2008), but the capital charge must provide a buffer in extreme, unexpected situations, and conclusions on extreme values cannot be drawn based merely on one year of observation, therefore this discrepancy could be completely justified. Regarding institutions’ choice of approach, it can be established that larger institutions prefer more complex methods in both foreign and Hungarian practice. This is due to the fact that the introduction of more advanced approaches comes with a higher fixed cost, which larger institutions can absorb more easily over the short term, and moreover, they can take better advantage of the benefits offered. Overall, the conscious management of operational risk and application of more developed methods aimed at managing such risks can contribute to the stability of the financial system.operational risk, Basel II, capital requirements, CRD, Hungarian banking sector.

The trajectory of regulatory reform in the UK in the wake of the financial crisis

There has been much talk about regulatory reform around the world in the wake of the financial crisis but relatively little action. As a major international financial centre, the UK is very much at the heart of the debate and has a particular interest in the ultimate outcome. The financial crisis has exposed the weaknesses of ‘light touch’ regulation and ‘principles-based’ regulation, which characterised the UK system in the pre-crisis phase. Changes to the institutional structure of regulation recently announced by the new coalition government, combined with changes to regulatory style, are likely to have far-reaching consequences for the practice and intensity of regulation in the UK. This article reviews and assesses recent and proposed regulatory changes and considers the relationship between corporate governance and regulation. It evaluates the impact on the UK system of initiatives undertaken at international and EC levels as well as various interests and incentives within the UK that are likely to be influential in shaping the regulatory regime in years to come

New financial order : recommendations by the Issing Committee ; preparing G-20 – London, April 2, 2009

Content A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, INCLUDING MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS B. COMPLETE REPORT 1. INTRODUCTION 2. RISK MAP 2.1 Why a Risk Map is needed, and for what purpose 2.1.1 Creating a unified data base 2.1.2 Assessing systemic risk 2.1.3 Allowing for coordinated policy action 2.2 Recommendations 3. GLOBAL REGISTER FOR LOANS (CREDIT REGISTER) AND BONDS (SECURITIES REGISTER) 3.1 Objectives of a credit register 3.2 Credit registers in Europe (and beyond) 3.3 Suggestions for a supra-national Credit Register 3.4 Integrating a supra-national Securities Register 3.5 Recommendations 4. HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 4.1 What are hedge funds (activities, location, size, regulation)? 4.2 What are the risks posed by hedge funds (systematic risks, interaction with prime brokers)? 4.3 Routes to better regulation (direct, indirect) 4.4 Recommendations 5. RATING AGENCIES: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 5.1 The role of ratings in bond and structured finance markets, past and present 5.2 Elements of rating integrity (independence, compensation and incentives, transparency) 5.3 Recommendations (registration, transparency, annual report on rating performance) 6. PROCYCLICALITY: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 6.1 What is meant by “procyclicality” and why is it a problem? 6.2 The roots of procyclicality and the lessons it suggests for policymakers 6.2.1 Underpinnings of the phenomenon 6.2.2 Lessons to be learned 6.3 Characteristics of a macrofinancial stability framework 6.4 Recommendations 7. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND FORA, IN PARTICULAR THE IMF, BIS AND FSF 7.1 Legitimacy 7.2 Re-focusing the work 7.3 Recommendation