Essays on Economics and Computer Science

146 pagesThis dissertation considers a number of problems in pure and applied game theory. The first chapter considers the problem of how the introduction of fines and monitoring affects welfare in a routing game. I characterize equilibria of the game and discuss network topologies in which the introduction of fines can harm those agents which are not subject to them. The second, and primary, chapter considers the computational aspects of tenable strategy sets. I characterize these set-valued solution concepts using the more familiar framework of perturbed strategies, introduce strong alternatives to the problems of verifying whether a strategy block satisfies the conditions of tenability, and provide some hardness results regarding the verification of fine tenability. Additionally, I show an inclusion relation between the concept of coarse tenability and the notion of stability introduced by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Finally, I show how the methods developed for tenability provide an alternative characterization for proper equilibria in bimatrix games. This characterization gives a bound on the perturbations required in the definition of proper equilibria, though such bounds cannot be computed efficiently in general. The third, and final, chapter develops a model of contracting for content creation in an oligopolistic environment of attention intermediaries. I characterize symmetric equilibria in single-homing (exclusive) and multi-homing regimes. The focus is on the trade-off between reductions in incentives offered by intermediaries and the benefits of access to additional content for consumers. I show that when the extent of multi-homing is exogenous in the absence of exclusivity clauses, consumer surplus is always higher with multi-homing than under exclusivity, despite weaker incentives offered by platforms to content creators