Strict Liability versus Negligence in a Market Setting

This paper formally analyzes strict liability and negligence in a market setting. The discussion emphasizes the impact of the rules on the market price and on the number of firms in the industry. For simplicity, the damage caused by each firm is assumed to be determined only by that firm's "care" (and not also by the firm's output or the victim's behavior).

A fundamental theorem of asset pricing for continuous time large financial markets in a two filtration setting

We present a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing (FTAP) for continuous time large financial markets with two filtrations in an $L^p$-setting for $1 \leq p < \infty$. This extends the results of Yuri Kabanov and Christophe Stricker \cite{KS:06} to continuous time and to a large financial market setting, however, still preserving the simplicity of the discrete time setting. On the other hand it generalizes Stricker's $L^p$-version of FTAP \cite{S:90} towards a setting with two filtrations. We do neither assume that price processes are semi-martigales, (and it does not follow due to trading with respect to the \emph{smaller} filtration) nor that price processes have any path properties, neither any other particular property of the two filtrations in question, nor admissibility of portfolio wealth processes, but we rather go for a completely general (and realistic) result, where trading strategies are just predictable with respect to a smaller filtration than the one generated by the price processes. Applications range from modeling trading with delayed information, trading on different time grids, dealing with inaccurate price information, and randomization approaches to uncertainty

Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions

Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and specifically seek mechanisms that guarantee good outcomes under both complete and incomplete information. A variant of the generalized first-price mechanism with multi-dimensional bids turns out to be the only standard mechanism able to achieve this goal, even when types are one-dimensional. The fact that expressiveness beyond the type space is both necessary and sufficient for this kind of robustness provides an interesting counterpoint to previous work on position auctions that has highlighted the benefits of simplicity. From a technical perspective our results are interesting because they establish equilibrium existence for a multi-dimensional bid space, where standard techniques break down. The structure of the equilibrium bids moreover provides an intuitive explanation for why first-price payments may be able to support equilibria in a wider range of circumstances than second-price payments

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer

We consider a monopolist seller with $n$ heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) distributions, and her value for a set of items is additive. The seller aims to maximize his revenue. We suggest using the a-priori better of two simple pricing methods: selling the items separately, each at its optimal price, and bundling together, in which the entire set of items is sold as one bundle at its optimal price. We show that for any distribution, this mechanism achieves a constant-factor approximation to the optimal revenue. Beyond its simplicity, this is the first computationally tractable mechanism to obtain a constant-factor approximation for this multi-parameter problem. We additionally discuss extensions to multiple buyers and to valuations that are correlated across items