574 research outputs found
The Many Faces of Rationalizability
The rationalizability concept was introduced in \cite{Ber84} and
\cite{Pea84} to assess what can be inferred by rational players in a
non-cooperative game in the presence of common knowledge. However, this notion
can be defined in a number of ways that differ in seemingly unimportant minor
details. We shed light on these differences, explain their impact, and clarify
for which games these definitions coincide. Then we apply the same analysis to
explain the differences and similarities between various ways the iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies was defined in the literature.
This allows us to clarify the results of \cite{DS02} and \cite{CLL05} and
improve upon them. We also consider the extension of these results to strict
dominance by a mixed strategy. Our approach is based on a general study of the
operators on complete lattices. We allow transfinite iterations of the
considered operators and clarify the need for them. The advantage of such a
general approach is that a number of results, including order independence for
some of the notions of rationalizability and strict dominance, come for free.Comment: 39 pages, appeared in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol.
7 : Iss. 1 (Topics), Article 18. Available at:
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol7/iss1/art1
Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics
We characterize the smallest faces of the polyhedron of strategy profiles that could possibly be made asymptotically stable under some reasonable deterministic dynamics. These faces are Kalai and Samet's (1984) persistent retracts and are spanned by Basu and Weibull's (1991) CURB sets based on a natural (and, in a well-defined sense, minimal) refinement of the best-reply correspondence. We show that such a correspondence satisfying basic properties such as existence, upper hemi-continuity, and convex-valuedness exists and is unique in most games. We introduce a notion of rationalizability based on this correspondence and its relation to other such concepts. We study its fixed-points and their relations to equilibrium refinements. We find, for instance, that a fixed point of the refined best reply correspondence in the agent normal form of any extensive form game constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which is weak perfect Bayesian in every subgame. Finally, we study the index of its fixed point components.Evolutionary game theory, best response dynamics, CURB sets, persistent retracts, asymptotic stability, Nash equilibrium refinements, learning
External Norms and Rationality of Choice
Ever since Sen (1993) criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms. We introduce a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and show that external norms can be made compatible with the methods underlying the rationalizability approach. This claim is substantiated by characterizing norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitably modified revealed preference axioms in the theory of rational choice on general domains due to Richter (1966; 1971) and Hansson (1968).
Supermodularity and preferences
We uncover the complete ordinal implications of supermodularity on finite lattices under the assumption of weak monotonicity. In this environment, we show that supermodularity is ordinally equivalent to the notion of quasisupermodularity introduced by Milgrom and Shannon. We conclude that supermodularity is a weak property, in the sense that many preferences have a supermodular representation
Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets
We provide here an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on
the possibility correspondences. Such an analysis calls for the use of
transfinite iterations of the corresponding operators. Our approach is based on
Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem and applies both to the notions of rationalizability
and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.Comment: 8 pages Proc. of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of
Rationality and Knowledge (TARK XI), 2007. To appea
Capabilities and Equality of Health II: Capabilities as Options
The concept of capabilities, introduced originally by Sen, has inspired many researchers but has not found any simple formal representation which might be instrumental in the construction of a comprehensive theory of equality. In a previous paper (Keiding, 2005), we investigated whether preferences over capabilities as sets of functionings can be rationalized by maximization of a suitable utility function over the set of functionings. Such a rationalization turned out to be possible only in cases which must be considered exceptional and which do not allowfor interesting applications of the capability approach to questions of health or equality. In the present paper we extend the notion of rationalizing orderings of capabilities to a dynamical context, in the sense that the utility function is not yet revealed to the individual at the time when the capabilities are ordered. It turns out that orderings which are in accordance with such probabilistic utility assignments can be characterized by a smaller set of the axioms previously considered.Capabilities; characteristics; equality of health
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