18,613 research outputs found
Representing Counterparts
This paper presents a counterpart theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic based on a fleshed out account of Lewis's notion of a 'possibility'. According to the account a possibility consists of a world and some haecceitistic information about how each possible individual gets represented de re. Following Hazen, a semantics for quantified model logic based on evaluating formulae at possibilities is developed. It is shown that this framework naturally accommodates an actuality operator, addressing recent objections to counterpart theory, and is equivalent to the more familiar Kripke semantics for quantied modal logic with an actuality operator
Multiple actualities and ontically vague identity
Gareth Evans's argument against ontically vague identity has been picked over on many occasions. But extant proposals for blocking the argument do not meet well-motivated general constraints on a successful solution. Moreover, the pivotal position that defending ontically vague identity occupies vis a vis ontic vagueness more generally has not yet been fully appreciated. This paper advocates a way of resisting the Evans argument meeting all the mentioned constraints: if we can find referential indeterminacy in virtue of ontic vagueness, we can get out of the Evans argument while still preserving genuinely ontically vague identity. To show how this approach can vindicate particular cases of ontically vague identity, I develop a framework for describing ontic vagueness in general in terms of multiple actualities. The effect, overall, is to provide a principled and attractive approach to ontically vague identity that is immune from Evansian worries
Moderate Modal Skepticism
This paper examines "moderate modal skepticism", a form of skepticism about
metaphysical modality defended by Peter van Inwagen in order to blunt the force of certain modal
arguments in the philosophy of religion. Van Inwagenâs argument for moderate modal skepticism
assumes Yablo's (1993) influential world-based epistemology of possibility. We raise two problems
for this epistemology of possibility, which undermine van Inwagen's argument. We then consider how one might motivate moderate modal skepticism by relying on a different epistemology of possibility, which does not face these problems: Williamsonâs (2007: ch. 5) counterfactual-based epistemology. Two ways of motivating moderate modal skepticism within that framework are found unpromising. Nevertheless, we also find a way of vindicating an epistemological thesis that, while weaker than moderate modal skepticism, is strong enough to support the methodological moral van Inwagen wishes to draw
Probabilistic Knowledge as Objective Knowledge in Quantum Mechanics: Potential Powers Instead of Actual Properties
In classical physics, probabilistic or statistical knowledge has been always
related to ignorance or inaccurate subjective knowledge about an actual state
of affairs. This idea has been extended to quantum mechanics through a
completely incoherent interpretation of the Fermi-Dirac and Bose-Einstein
statistics in terms of "strange" quantum particles. This interpretation,
naturalized through a widespread "way of speaking" in the physics community,
contradicts Born's physical account of {\Psi} as a "probability wave" which
provides statistical information about outcomes that, in fact, cannot be
interpreted in terms of 'ignorance about an actual state of affairs'. In the
present paper we discuss how the metaphysics of actuality has played an
essential role in limiting the possibilities of understating things
differently. We propose instead a metaphysical scheme in terms of powers with
definite potentia which allows us to consider quantum probability in a new
light, namely, as providing objective knowledge about a potential state of
affairs.Comment: 35 pages, no figures. To be published in Probing the Meaning of
Quantum Mechanics, D. Aerts, C. de Ronde, H. Freytes and R. Giuntini (Eds.),
World Scientific, Singapore, forthcoming. More comments welcome
On Conceiving the Inconsistent
This work has been developed within the 2013â15 ahrc project The Metaphysical Basis of Logic: The Law of Non-Contradiction as Basic Knowledge (grant ref. ah/k001698/1). A version of the paper was presented in September 2013 at the Modal Metaphysics Workshop in Bratislava. I am grateful to the audiences there and at the Aristotelian Society meeting for many helpful comments and remarks.Peer reviewedPostprin
The Coat Problem. Counterfactuals, Truth-makers, and Temporal specification
Standard semantic treatments of counterfactuals appeal to a relation of similarity between possible worlds. Similarity, however, is a vague notion. Lewis suggests reducing the vagueness of similarity by adopting a principle known as 'late departure' (LD): the more the past two worlds share, the more they are similar. LD has several virtues. However, as Bennett points out, a standard semantics based on LD suffers from the so-called coat problem. In a nutshell, we are led to assign counterintuitive truth-values to counterfactuals whose antecedent time is left underspecified. In the present paper, we argue that the coat problem may be solved by defining a time-sensitive notion of similarity. To illustrate, we assume a Priorean, tensed language, interpreted on branching-time frames in the usual, 'Ockhamist' way, and we enrich it with a counterfactual connective. Within this framework, we define a time-sensitive relation of similarity, based on Yablo's work on truth-makers and partial truth. In the resulting semantics, which has independent interest, the coat problem does not arise
Modality
A survey of the connection between grounding and modality, in
particular supervenience. The survey explores three possible connections
between grounding and supervenience: (1) supervenience can be analyzed
in terms of grounding, (2) grounded facts supervene on their grounds, and
(3) grounding and supervenience overlap in their theoretical roles
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