The spatial structure of unified consciousness

In this dissertation, I defend two theses: first, that experiences with spatial phenomenology represent space as single and unitary, and, second, that every experience has a spatial phenomenology. The two theses entail the conclusion that the unity of conscious spatial representation is necessary for the unity of consciousness. This means that unified consciousness has a (partially) spatial structure. In what follows, I adopt the mereological conception of unified consciousness according to which experiences are unified just in case they are parts of a subject’s total phenomenal state. I also assume that the unity relation is a relation among experiences. Most philosophers working on the unity of consciousness reject the conclusion that unity of consciousness requires the unity of spatial representation. But in my dissertation I show that there are compelling reasons to accept the two theses that jointly entail it. First, I argue that all spatial perceptual representations represent space as single and unitary. Then, I argue that non-perceptual spatial experiences: imagination experiences, recollective experiences, as well as experiences of afterimages and phosphenes have the kind of spatial content that relates the locations represented in these experiences to the locations represented in perception. In short, the locations represented in perceptual and non-perceptual experiences are represented as belonging to the same space. Secondly, I argue that experiences standardly taken not to possess spatial phenomenology, such as conscious thoughts and moods, either do in fact possess such phenomenology (thoughts), or wholly depend for their own phenomenology on spatially unified experiences (moods). When it comes to conscious thoughts, I argue that the view that they exhibit spatial phenomenology is dialectically privileged over its denial. This means that granting spatial phenomenology to conscious thoughts is a more reasonable default starting position. Considerations marshalled from the philosophical accounts concerning what it’s like to have conscious thoughts, as well as those marshalled from the literature on the pathologies of cognitive experience (especially schizophrenia) strongly suggest that what it’s like to have thoughts does involve awareness of the thoughts’ locations (typically in one’s head). When it comes to mood experiences, I argue that all it takes to account for the phenomenal character of such experiences are modifications to other, non-mood experiences. Such modifications are not, however, free-standing experiences for which the question of unity arises. This is because the unity relation is a relation between experiences, not between non-detachable aspects of a single, free-standing experience. Hence, the view that for the mood experience to obtain, other experiences must simply be modified in certain ways is compatible with the view that spatial unity is necessary for phenomenal unity. This is because the relation between an experience and its modification is not the phenomenal unity relation. The way mood experiences are unified with other experiences is wholly captured by the way in which a modification of an experience is unified with that experience. And this is not a phenomenal unity relation. On the other hand, the experiences that collectively give rise to the mood experience are spatially and phenomenally unified. Hence, mood experiences do not pose a special problem for my account. I conclude that unified consciousness requires unified conscious spatial representation. Consciousness has a spatial structure

What Empathy Can(not) Do. An Inquiry into the Epistemic Possibilities and Limits of Empathic Imagination.

In my dissertation, I am going to argue that empathy is a cognitive process through which we imagine another\u2019s first-person perspective in a given situation. Empathy aims at providing empathizers with an insight into \u201cwhat it feels like\u201d to be in somebody else\u2019s shoes. I call this phenomenon phenomenal insight. In light of this account, I am going to show some of empathy\u2019s major epistemic possibilities and limits. The dissertation is so structured. In Chapter I, I will engage with the literature devoted to the definition of empathy. From this debate, I extrapolate a pattern of basic features that are shared by most accounts. I then introduce the definition of empathy I will be dealing with throughout the present work. In Chapter II, I engage with the view that regards empathy as capable of providing us with an understanding of other people's reasons for action, where reasons are to be taken as constituted by a belief-desire couple. I criticize the belief-desire model and argue for the inclusion of emotions as full-right reason-giving states. I show how emotions' main source of motivation can be found in the way in which they are phenomenally experienced by subjects. I then argue for phenomenal insight as a way to grasp the reason-giving dimension of emotional states. Attached to this chapter I put an Appendix in which I explore more in detail how it is possible for us to first-personally imagine emotional states. In Chapter III, I argue that what can be empathically imagined is bound to the kind of individuals we are, i.e. to our preferences, values, dispositions, etc. When trying to imagine other people's perspectives, traces of our \u201cselves\u201d can be found in what and how we imagine. I use the case of \u201cimaginative resistance\u201d as a vivid example of this phenomenon. I further defend my claims by resorting to some relevant empirical work in social psychology and neuroscience. In Chapter IV, I engage with the debate on transformative experiences (TEs). TEs could, indeed, be interpreted as highlighting major limits of our imaginative capabilities due to the kind of selves we are. The stock of experiences we had constrains our capability to conjure up the relevant imaginings about experiences we did not personally undergo. At the same time, the kind of \u201cself\u201d we are impedes us to fully appreciate a different self\u2019s perspective. In Chapter V, I show how the challenges to empathy explored in the previous chapter can be counterbalanced. This allows me to show some surprising features of empathy that are seldom discussed in contemporary literature, namely the possibility to learn via empathy and the possibility to change via empathy. On the one hand, I show how empathy, by stretching our imagination, can provide us with phenomenal insight into experiences we did not actually undergo. On the other hand, I show how empathy, by exposing ourselves to new perspectives, can change us as individuals

Perceptual Experience

This book offers an account of perceptual experience—its intrinsic nature, its engagement with the world, its relations to mental states of other kinds, and its role in epistemic norms. One of the book’s main claims is that perceptual experience constitutively involves representations of worldly items. A second claim is that the relevant form of representation can be explained in broadly biological terms. After defending these foundational doctrines, the book proceeds to give an account of perceptual appearances and how they are related to the objective world. Appearances turn out to be relational, viewpoint dependent properties of external objects. There is also a complementary account of how the objects that possess these properties are represented. Another major concern is the phenomenological dimension of perception. The book maintains that perceptual phenomenology can be explained reductively in terms of the representational contents of experiences, and it uses this doctrine to undercut the traditional arguments for dualism. This treatment of perceptual phenomenology is then expanded to encompass cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenology of moods and emotions, and the phenomenology of pain. The next topic is the various forms of consciousness that perceptual experience can possess. A principal aim is to show that phenomenology is metaphysically independent of these forms of consciousness, and another is to de-mystify the form known as phenomenal consciousness. The book concludes by discussing the relations of various kinds that perceptual experiences bear to higher level cognitive states, including relations of format, content, and justification or support

Perceptual Experience

This book offers an account of perceptual experience—its intrinsic nature, its engagement with the world, its relations to mental states of other kinds, and its role in epistemic norms. One of the book’s main claims is that perceptual experience constitutively involves representations of worldly items. A second claim is that the relevant form of representation can be explained in broadly biological terms. After defending these foundational doctrines, the book proceeds to give an account of perceptual appearances and how they are related to the objective world. Appearances turn out to be relational, viewpoint dependent properties of external objects. There is also a complementary account of how the objects that possess these properties are represented. Another major concern is the phenomenological dimension of perception. The book maintains that perceptual phenomenology can be explained reductively in terms of the representational contents of experiences, and it uses this doctrine to undercut the traditional arguments for dualism. This treatment of perceptual phenomenology is then expanded to encompass cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenology of moods and emotions, and the phenomenology of pain. The next topic is the various forms of consciousness that perceptual experience can possess. A principal aim is to show that phenomenology is metaphysically independent of these forms of consciousness, and another is to de-mystify the form known as phenomenal consciousness. The book concludes by discussing the relations of various kinds that perceptual experiences bear to higher level cognitive states, including relations of format, content, and justification or support

Post-Agonistics: Pluralism, Realism and the Image

This thesis is situated at the crossroads between philosophy, political theory, and art. It proceeds from an enquiry into various philosophical discourses on ‘the real’ – in particular the Lacanian conceptualization of the real as impossible and the Guattari-Deleuze formulation of the real as artificial. It examines what these discourses engender in political theory and in the fields of art and activism. It looks at their investment in constructing ‘a people’ and seeks to understand this as an enterprise that involves images and their configuration. From this angle, the project is interested in exploring the discussion on ‘democracy and art’ and engages in advocating a shift in current positions on their relation. After critiquing Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism, it is suggested that provoking such a shift might be achieved by outlining a model similar to the way that Mouffe develops a model or ‘democratic design’. Mouffe’s model is structured on Lacan’s ‘impossible real’. Accordingly, this dissertation points towards a design for pluralism based on ‘a real’ grounded in Wilfrid Sellars’ conceptualization of a stereoscopic fusion between what he termed the manifest and scientific images of man-in-the-world. The project suggests that images can be sites in which such models or ‘designs’ are put into conceptual shape. Sellars’ characterization of science as being rational, not because it has foundation, but rather because it is a self-correcting venture that can put any claim into jeopardy, is drawn on as the basis for the ‘construction of a people’ established on the Sellarsian real. Furthermore, the project engages with the work of a number of post-Sellarsian thinkers to lay the grounds for an argument for ‘reasoning’ as a distinct position that can be taken up in the context of the structural reality of democracy and its relation to art. The term post-agonistics (or postagonistics) indicates this shift to reasoning and how it might contribute to the expanded field of art

The Net of Jewels: An exploration and shape-based guitar pedagogy for songwriters

This article offers an informal, summary description of the Net of Jewels (NOJ) method, a guitar pedagogy specifically targeted to songwriters writing songs on guitar. The core of the NOJ approach is a progressive sequence of activities that incorporate shape-directed exploration of the guitar fingerboard as an integral aspect, supporting insights about harmony and theory, advancement of guitar skills and technique, and innovative creative work. The article outlines NOJ\u27s core concepts and teaching principles, describes NOJ\u27s pedagogical sequence of topics and supporting exercises and other activities, and provides background on the method\u27s origin and evolution. This description reflects the author\u27s perspective as the developer of NOJ, based on two decades of experience in teaching and refining the method, including the design of two levels of NOJ-based courses, incorporated into the songwriting curriculum at Berklee College of Music

Hearing Waves: A Philosophy of Sound and Auditory Perception

This dissertation aims to revive wave theory in the philosophy of sound. Wave theory identifies sounds with compression waves. Despite its wide acceptance in the scientific community as the default position, many philosophers have rejected wave theory and opted for different versions of distal theory instead. According to this current majority view, a sound has its stationary location at its source. I argue against this and other alternative philosophical theories of sound and develop wave theory into a more defensible form. Philosophers of sound tend to emphasise how sounds are experienced to be in their arguments. Most often, it is assumed that that which appears to be a distally located bearer of auditory properties in an auditory experience is a sound. Chapter 1 argues that if this distal entity is the sound source instead, many of the existing theories of sound will be severely affected. Chapter 2 discusses auditory perception and criticises the common assumption that we hear non-sound entities in virtue of hearing sounds. I show that this assumption begs the question against certain theories of sound and that the contrary view that sound sources can be directly heard is more plausible. If sound sources can be directly heard, then features commonly attributed to sounds based on auditory experiences might rather be features of sound sources. I examine eight of such features in Chapter 3. Only four of them survive. Chapters 4 and 5 review the existing theories of sound. After a taxonomy of existing theories of sound, each theory is criticised one-by-one. Some of them are problematic precisely because they rely on the implausible assumption that that which appears to be distally located in an auditory experience is a sound rather than a sound source. Lastly, Chapter 6 focuses on wave theory. It begins with two positive arguments for wave theory in general, followed by my replies to two common objections in the literature. I then move on to develop my version of wave theory. There are two core aspects of my view. The first one is a metaphysics of compression waves; the second is an account of what it is to hear compression waves. After comparing my view with a similar theory, I demonstrate the explanatory power of my view in two steps. First, the eight commonly accepted features of sounds examined in Chapter 3 are revisited. It turns out that my view can accommodate all of them. Second, explanations for four special sound-related phenomena are offered at the end of the chapter. I conclude in the last chapter with the suggestion that, as a philosopher, the best way to defend wave theory is to offer a better understanding of auditory perception which explains how compression waves are experienced

Deliberative Democracy and Complex Diversity. From Discourse Ethics to the Theory of Argumentation.

362 p.Can democracy accommodate contemporary diverse and complex societies? Is deliberation an appropiate means for these ends? Even in the face of violent conflict? What is the role of citizens? The central objetive of this thesis is to critically analyse the relationsship between complex diversity (Tully 2008, Kraus 2012) and deliberatibe democracy /Habermas 1996) from a systemic perspective (Masnbrige and Parkinson 2012). Thinking identity as complex diversity detaches identity from dichotomous categorisations either as public of private, civic or ethnic and, moral or political