The effects of tags on the evolution of honest signaling

In the study described here we examine the importance of social tags in the emergence and maintenance of signaling, using the Sir Philip Sydney Game. We use tags in the calcu-lation of inclusive fitness for members in a finite population, and analyze their evolution under different population distri-butions. We support the claim that inclusive fitness theory may not be sufficient to explain the evolution of cooperation. While cooperativity through honest signaling is sometimes achieved with tag-based relatedness, we suggest that the im-portance of tag-based mechanisms may not simply be due to their role in kin selection

The Effects of Finite Populations and Selection on the Emergence of Signaling

In the research described here we examine the emergence of signaling from non-communicative origins, using the Sir Philip Sidney Game as a framework for our analysis. This game is known to exhibit a number of interesting dynamics. In our study, we quantify the difficulty of reaching multiple types of equilibria from initially non-communicative popula-tions with an infinite population model. We then compare the ability of finite populations with typical tournament selection to approximate the behaviors observed in infinite populations. Our findings suggest that honest signaling equilibria are diffi-cult to reach from non-communicative origins. In the second part of the paper, we show that the finite model fails to model dynamics that permit deceptive signaling under typical evolu-tionary conditions, where infinite populations exhibit spiral-ing behavior between honest and deceptive signaling