Competition in Social Networks: Emergence of a Scale-free Leadership Structure and Collective Efficiency

Using the minority game as a model for competition dynamics, we investigate the effects of inter-agent communications on the global evolution of the dynamics of a society characterized by competition for limited resources. The agents communicate across a social network with small-world character that forms the static substrate of a second network, the influence network, which is dynamically coupled to the evolution of the game. The influence network is a directed network, defined by the inter-agent communication links on the substrate along which communicated information is acted upon. We show that the influence network spontaneously develops hubs with a broad distribution of in-degrees, defining a robust leadership structure that is scale-free. Furthermore, in realistic parameter ranges, facilitated by information exchange on the network, agents can generate a high degree of cooperation making the collective almost maximally efficient.Comment: 4 pages, 2 postscript figures include

Self-organized Networks of Competing Boolean Agents

A model of Boolean agents competing in a market is presented where each agent bases his action on information obtained from a small group of other agents. The agents play a competitive game that rewards those in the minority. After a long time interval, the poorest player's strategy is changed randomly, and the process is repeated. Eventually the network evolves to a stationary but intermittent state where random mutation of the worst strategy can change the behavior of the entire network, often causing a switch in the dynamics between attractors of vastly different lengths.Comment: 4 pages, 3 included figures. Some text revision and one new figure added. To appear in PR

Fashion, Cooperation, and Social Interactions

Fashion plays such a crucial rule in the evolution of culture and society that it is regarded as a second nature to the human being. Also, its impact on economy is quite nontrivial. On what is fashionable, interestingly, there are two viewpoints that are both extremely widespread but almost opposite: conformists think that what is popular is fashionable, while rebels believe that being different is the essence. Fashion color is fashionable in the first sense, and Lady Gaga in the second. We investigate a model where the population consists of the afore-mentioned two groups of people that are located on social networks (a spatial cellular automata network and small-world networks). This model captures two fundamental kinds of social interactions (coordination and anti-coordination) simultaneously, and also has its own interest to game theory: it is a hybrid model of pure competition and pure cooperation. This is true because when a conformist meets a rebel, they play the zero sum matching pennies game, which is pure competition. When two conformists (rebels) meet, they play the (anti-) coordination game, which is pure cooperation. Simulation shows that simple social interactions greatly promote cooperation: in most cases people can reach an extraordinarily high level of cooperation, through a selfish, myopic, naive, and local interacting dynamic (the best response dynamic). We find that degree of synchronization also plays a critical role, but mostly on the negative side. Four indices, namely cooperation degree, average satisfaction degree, equilibrium ratio and complete ratio, are defined and applied to measure people's cooperation levels from various angles. Phase transition, as well as emergence of many interesting geographic patterns in the cellular automata network, is also observed.Comment: 21 pages, 12 figure

Adaptive Boolean Networks and Minority Games with Time--Dependent Capacities

In this paper we consider a network of boolean agents that compete for a limited resource. The agents play the so called Generalized Minority Game where the capacity level is allowed to vary externally. We study the properties of such a system for different values of the mean connectivity $K$ of the network, and show that the system with K=2 shows a high degree of coordination for relatively large variations of the capacity level.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure

Multi-Choice Minority Game

The generalization of the problem of adaptive competition, known as the minority game, to the case of $K$ possible choices for each player is addressed, and applied to a system of interacting perceptrons with input and output units of the type of $K$-states Potts-spins. An optimal solution of this minority game as well as the dynamic evolution of the adaptive strategies of the players are solved analytically for a general $K$ and compared with numerical simulations.Comment: 5 pages, 2 figures, reorganized and clarifie