Modeling the perceptual component of conceptual learning—A coordination perspective

Although a picture may be worth a thousand words, modeling diagrams as propositions and modeling visual processing as search through a database of verbal descriptions obscures what is problematic for the learner. Cognitive modeling of language learning and geometry has obscured the learner's problem of knowing where to look—what spaces, markings, and orientations constitute the objects of interest? Today we are launching into widespread use of multimedia instructional technology, without an adequate theory to relate perceptual processes to conceptual learning. Does this matter? In this article, I review the symbolic approach to modeling perceptual processing and show its limitations for explaining difficulties children encounter in interpreting a graphic display. I present an alternative analysis by which perceptual categorization is coupled to behavior sequences, where gesturing and emotional changes are essential for resolving impasses and breaking out of loops. I conclude by asking what kind of cognitive theory we need to exploit communication technology. Have we been correct to assume that pedagogy must be grounded in an accurate psychological model of knowledge, memory, and learning

The inverted dead of Britain’s Bronze Age barrows: a perspective from Conceptual Metaphor Theory

Barrows are a prominent feature of Britain’s Bronze Age. While they originated as burial monuments, they also appear to have acquired other roles. However, British prehistorians have been hampered in their interpretations, as they are wary of speculating how Bronze Age people conceptualised their dead. Here were suggest that a recurrent pattern of inversion is significant. We use Conceptual Metaphor Theory to argue that Bronze Age people saw their dead inhabiting an inverted underworld directly beneath the surface of the earth. This would help explain not only burial practices, but also barrows’ other apparent functions.No external funding source

Is conceptual vagueness an asset? Resilience research from the perspective of philosophy of science

I analyze the research on social-ecological resilience from the perspective of philosophy of science in three steps. First, I explore to what degree resilience research exhibits conceptual vagueness. I find a wide spectrum of research, ranging from approaches relying on a concise conceptual framework to the perspective of “resilience thinking”, which builds on a cluster of vague concepts. Second, I set out the methodological arguments in favor and against conceptual vagueness. Merging both strands of reasoning in the third step, I conclude that a trade-off between vagueness and precision exists, which is to be solved differently depending on the context of resilience research. In some contexts, resilience research benefits from conceptual vagueness while in others it depends on precision. Specifically, I argue that in “resilience thinking” the trade-off might be enhanced by a coherent restructuring of the conceptual framework.vagueness, philosophy of science, precision, resilience thinking, socialecological systems

Semantics as a gateway to language

This paper presents an account of semantics as a system that integrates conceptual representations into language. I define the semantic system as an interface level of the conceptual system CS that translates conceptual representations into a format that is accessible by language. The analysis I put forward does not treat the make up of this level as idiosyncratic, but subsumes it under a unified notion of linguistic interfaces. This allows us to understand core aspects of the linguistic-conceptual interface as an instance of a general pattern underlying the correlation of linguistic and non-linguistic structures. By doing so, the model aims to provide a broader perspective onto the distinction between and interaction of conceptual and linguistic processes and the correlation of semantic and syntactic structures

Living Knowledge

Diversity, especially manifested in language and knowledge, is a function of local goals, needs, competences, beliefs, culture, opinions and personal experience. The Living Knowledge project considers diversity as an asset rather than a problem. With the project, foundational ideas emerged from the synergic contribution of different disciplines, methodologies (with which many partners were previously unfamiliar) and technologies flowed in concrete diversity-aware applications such as the Future Predictor and the Media Content Analyser providing users with better structured information while coping with Web scale complexities. The key notions of diversity, fact, opinion and bias have been defined in relation to three methodologies: Media Content Analysis (MCA) which operates from a social sciences perspective; Multimodal Genre Analysis (MGA) which operates from a semiotic perspective and Facet Analysis (FA) which operates from a knowledge representation and organization perspective. A conceptual architecture that pulls all of them together has become the core of the tools for automatic extraction and the way they interact. In particular, the conceptual architecture has been implemented with the Media Content Analyser application. The scientific and technological results obtained are described in the following

Heterogeneous Proxytypes Extended: Integrating Theory-like Representations and Mechanisms with Prototypes and Exemplars

The paper introduces an extension of the proposal according to which conceptual representations in cognitive agents should be intended as heterogeneous proxytypes. The main contribution of this paper is in that it details how to reconcile, under a heterogeneous representational perspective, different theories of typicality about conceptual representation and reasoning. In particular, it provides a novel theoretical hypothesis - as well as a novel categorization algorithm called DELTA - showing how to integrate the representational and reasoning assumptions of the theory-theory of concepts with the those ascribed to the prototype and exemplars-based theories

Conceptual evaluation: epistemic

On a view implicitly endorsed by many, a concept is epistemically better than another if and because it does a better job at ‘carving at the joints', or if the property corresponding to it is ‘more natural' than the one corresponding to another. This chapter offers an argument against this seemingly plausible thought, starting from three key observations about the way we use and evaluate concepts from en epistemic perspective: that we look for concepts that play a role in explanations of things that cry out for explanation; that we evaluate not only ‘empirical' concepts, but also mathematical and perhaps moral concepts from an epistemic perspective; and that there is much more complexity to the concept/property relation than the natural thought seems to presuppose. These observations, it is argued, rule out giving a theory of conceptual evaluation that is a corollary of a metaphysical ranking of the relevant properties. conceptual ethics, explanation, naturalness, epistemic value, concept/property, semantic internalis