Construction subcontracts: for what we are about to receive

This paper is from a study on specialist and trade contracting in the construction industry. The research was commissioned by CIRIA and undertaken by the University of Reading in conjunction with Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners Ltd. The purpose of the work was to provide guidance for effective and equitable practice in the management of projects where much of the work is executed, and possibly designed, by specialist and trade contractors (STCs). As part of this study, a preliminary investigation into the nature and origins of specialist contracting was undertaken, in conjunction with a survey of the problems confronting STCs. This paper presents that phase of the project

A License to Grow: Ending State, Local, and Some Federal Barriers to Innovation and Growth in Key Sectors of the U.S. Economy

Outlines price and entry controls that impede innovations that could lead to more efficient business models and growth in the legal, health, drug, education, and finance sectors. Surveys options for removing barriers, including state experimentation

Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery

Drug discovery is stagnating. Government agencies, industry analysts, and industry scientists have all noted that, despite significant increases in pharmaceutical R&D funding, the production of fundamentally new drugs - particularly drugs that work on new biological pathways and proteins - remains disappointingly low. To some extent, pharmaceutical firms are already embracing the prescription of new, more collaborative R&D organizational models suggested by industry analysts. In this Article, we build on collaborative strategies that firms are already employing by proposing a novel public-private collaboration that would help move upstream academic research across the valley of death that separates upstream research from downstream drug candidates. By exchanging trade secrecy for contract-based collaboration, our proposal would both protect intellectual property rights and enable many more researchers to search for potential drug candidates

Hybrid laws: constitutionalizing private governance networks

s.a.: Das Recht hybrider Netzwerke. Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht 165, 2001, 550-575.. Italienische Fassung: Diritti ibridi: la costituzionalizzazione delle reti private di governance. In: Gunther Teubner, Costituzionalismo societario. Armando, Roma 2004 (im Erscheinen)

Governance of stakeholder relationships: The German and Dutch experience

Countries' governance institutions to a varying degree support stakeholders to invest in relationship-specific assets. The function of governance institutions is to strengthen the commitment of parties to keep to an initial agreement. Thus, international differences in governance institutions affect relationship-specific investments. Two stylized models of stakeholder relationships can be distinguished, the Anglo-American model and the German model. Market orientation and competition characterize the Anglo-American model. Long-term relationships and cooperation are distinctive features of the German model. Strong elements of the Anglo-American model are fast reallocation of financial, physical and human capital through the market. Short-run flexibility facilitates a shift of resources towards innovative emerging technologies, in particular towards start-up firms. The German model is strong with respect to the development of long-term commitment, investments in relationship-specific physical and human capital, and cooperation between companies. This model promotes technological progress and re-allocation of resources within established enterprises. The position of Dutch corporate governance institutions, which govern the relationships between management and financiers, does not stand out as favourable compared to both the German and the Anglo-American models of corporate governance. In the Netherlands, share ownership is dispersed, so that monitoring by block shareholders is largely absent. In this respect the situation in the Netherlands is comparable to that in the United States and the United Kingdom. However, in contrast to the Anglo-American model the market for corporate control is virtually absent in the Netherlands. Cooption of members of the supervisory board and extensive use of juridical anti-takeover defence mechanisms substantially restrict the influence of shareholders on management. Therefore, Dutch corporate governance institutions neither strongly encourage investments in relationship-specific assets, nor strongly enhance flexible reallocation of capital or risk-sharing finance. Recent policy changes will probably lead to a moderate shift to the German model. Dutch work governance institutions, which concern the governance of relationships between management and employees, more closely resemble those in Germany. This implies that worker influence enhances the performance within large established firms, but that external allocation through the labour market is less efficient compared to the functioning of markets in the Anglo-American model. Future policy changes that strengthen Dutch worker influence will be beneficial for performance in established firms, and are in accordance with the gradual shift towards German governance structures.

Governance Reform of German food safety regulation: Cosmetic or real?

Discussion of institutional changes made by the German government in response to the emergence of the first cases of BSE in Germany in 2000. Due to the establishment of a large-scale private sector quality assurance scheme, regulation moved away from publicly mandated food safety regulations toward industry-led initiatives (so-called QS system). The paper discusses whether changes in regulation, administration, and liability standards have improved the effectiveness and the allocative efficiency of German food safety regulation.standards, contested governance, quality assurance, liability, food safety regulation, QS system, regulation, Germany

Auditor Independence-Its Importance to the External Auditor's Role in Banking Regulation and Supervision

The role of the external auditor in the supervisory process requires standards such as independence,objectivity and integrity to be achieved. Even though the regulator and external auditor perform similar functions, namely the verification of financial statements, they serve particular interests. The regulator works towards safeguarding financial stability and investor interests. On the other hand, the external auditor serves the private interests of the shareholders of a company. The financial audit remains an important aspect of corporate governance that makes management accountable to shareholders for its stewardship of a company2. The external auditor may however, have a commercial interest too. The debate surrounding the role of external auditors focusses in particular on auditor independence. A survey by the magazine “Financial Director” shows that the fees derived from audit clients in terms of non-audit services are significant in comparison with fees generated through auditing.3 Accounting firms sometimes engage in a practice called “low balling” whereby they set audit fees at less than the market rate and make up for the deficit by providing non audit services. As a result, some audit firms have commercial interests to protect too. There is concern that the auditor's interests to protect shareholders of a company and his commercial interests do not conflict with each other. Sufficient measures need to be in place to ensure that the external auditor's independence is not affected. Brussels proposed a new directive for auditors to try to prevent further scandals such as those of Enron and Parmalat.4 The new directive states that all firms listed on the stock market must have independent audit committees which will recommend an auditor for shareholder approval.5 It also states that auditors or audit partners must be rotated but does not mention the separation of auditors from consultancy work despite protests that there is a link to compromising the independence of auditors.6 However this may be because Brussels also shares the view that there is no evidence confirming correlation between levels of non-audit fees and audit failures and that as a result, sufficient safeguards are in place.7 This paper aims to consider the importance of auditor independence in the external auditor's role in banking regulation and supervision. In doing so, it also considers factors which may threaten independence and efforts which have been introduced to act as safeguards to the auditor's independence. It will also support the claim that auditor independence is indeed central to the auditor's role in banking regulation and supervision