7 research outputs found
The Boomerang Attacks on BLAKE and BLAKE2
n this paper, we study the security margins of hash functions BLAKE and BLAKE2 against the boomerang attack. We launch boomerang attacks on all four members of BLAKE and BLAKE2, and compare their complexities. We propose 8.5-round boomerang attacks on both BLAKE-512 and BLAKE2b with complexities and respectively. We also propose 8-round attacks on BLAKE-256 with complexity and 7.5-round attacks on BLAKE2s with complexity . We verify the correctness of our analysis by giving practical 6.5-round Type I boomerang quartets for each member of BLAKE and BLAKE2.
According to our analysis, some tweaks introduced by BLAKE2 have increased its resistance against boomerang attacks to a certain extent.
But on the whole, BLAKE still has higher a secure margin than BLAKE2
OSHA: A General-purpose and Next Generation One-way Secure Hash Algorithm
Secure hash functions are widely used in cryptographic algorithms to secure against diverse attacks. A one-way secure hash function is used in the various research fields to secure, for instance, blockchain. Notably, most of the hash functions provide security based on static parameters and publicly known operations. Consequently, it becomes easier to attack by the attackers because all parameters and operations are predefined. The publicly known parameters and predefined operations make the oracle regenerate the key even though it is a one-way secure hash function. Moreover, the sensitive data is mixed with the predefined constant where an oracle may find a way to discover the key. To address the above issues, we propose a novel one-way secure hash algorithm, OSHA for short, to protect sensitive data against attackers. OSHA depends on a pseudo-random number generator to generate a hash value. Particularly, OSHA mixes multiple pseudo-random numbers to produce a secure hash value. Furthermore, OSHA uses dynamic parameters, which is difficult for adversaries to guess. Unlike conventional secure hash algorithms, OSHA does not depend on fixed constants. It replaces the fixed constant with the pseudo-random numbers. Also, the input message is not mixed with the pseudo-random numbers; hence, there is no way to recover and reverse the process for the adversaries
Open Sesame: The Password Hashing Competition and Argon2
In this document we present an overview of the background to and goals of the Password Hashing Competition (PHC) as well as the design of its winner, Argon2, and its security requirements and properties
Too Much Crypto
We show that many symmetric cryptography primitives would not be less safe with significantly fewer rounds. To support this claim, we review the cryptanalysis progress in the last 20 years, examine the reasons behind the current number of rounds, and analyze the risk of doing fewer rounds. Advocating a rational and scientific approach to round numbers selection, we propose revised number of rounds for AES, BLAKE2, ChaCha, and SHA-3, which offer more consistent security margins across primitives and make them much faster, without increasing the security risk
Approximate Modeling of Signed Difference and Digraph based Bit Condition Deduction: New Boomerang Attacks on BLAKE
The signed difference is a powerful tool for analyzing the Addition, XOR, Rotation (ARX) cryptographic primitives. Currently, solving the accurate model for the signed difference propagation is infeasible.
We propose an approximate MILP modeling method capturing the propagation rules of signed differences. Unlike the accurate signed difference model, the approximate model only focuses on active bits and ignores the possible bit conditions on inactive bits.
To overcome the negative effect of a lower accuracy arising from ignoring bit conditions on inactive bits, we propose an additional tool for deducing all bit conditions automatically.
Such a tool is based on a directed-graph capturing the whole computation process of ARX primitives by drawing links among intermediate words and operations.
The digraph is also applicable in the MILP model construction process:
it enables us to identify the parameters upper bounding the number of bit conditions so as to define the objective function; it is further used to connect the boomerang top and bottom signed differential paths by introducing proper constraints to avoid incompatible intersections.
Benefiting from the approximate model and the directed-graph based tool, the solving time of the new MILP model is significantly reduced,
enabling us to deduce signed differential paths efficiently and accurately.
To show the utility of our method, we propose boomerang attacks on the keyed permutations of three ARX hash functions of BLAKE.
For the first time we mount an attack on the full 7 rounds of BLAKE3, with the complexity as low as .
Our best attack on BLAKE2s can improve the previously best result by 0.5 rounds but with lower complexity.
The attacks on BLAKE-256 cover the same 8 rounds with the previous best result but with complexity times lower.
All our results are verified practically with round-reduced boomerang quartets
The Boomerang Attacks on BLAKE and BLAKE2
Abstract. In this paper, we study the security margins of hash functions BLAKE and BLAKE2 against the boomerang attack. We launch boomerang attacks on all four members of BLAKE and BLAKE2, and compare their complexities. We propose 8.5-round boomerang attacks on both BLAKE-512 and BLAKE2b with complexities 2464 and 2474 respectively. We also propose 8-round attacks on BLAKE-256 with complexity 2198 and 7.5-round attacks on BLAKE2s with complexity 2184. We verify the correctness of our analysis by giving practical 6.5-round Type I boomerang quartets for each member of BLAKE and BLAKE2. According to our analysis, some tweaks introduced by BLAKE2 have increased its resistance against boomerang attacks to a certain extent. But on the whole, BLAKE still has higher a secure margin than BLAKE2.