The Impact of Pooling on Throughput Time in Discretionary Work Settings: An Empirical Investigation of Emergency Department Length of Stay

We conduct an empirical investigation on the impact of pooling tasks and resources on throughput times in a discretionary work setting. We use an Emergency Department’s (ED) patient-level data (N = 234,334) from 2007 to 2010 to test our hypotheses. We find that when the ED’s work system had pooled tasks and resources, patients’ lengths of stay were longer than when the ED converted to having dedicated tasks and resources. More specifically, we find that dedicated systems resulted in a 9 percent overall decrease in length of stay, which corresponds to a 25-minute reduction in length of stay for an average patient of medium severity in this ED. We propose that the improved performance comes from a reduction in social loafing and a more distributed utilization of shared resources. These benefits outweigh the expected efficiency gains from pooling, which are commonly predicted by queuing theory

Corporate Governance Roles of Information Quality and Corporate Takeovers

We examine the corporate governance roles of information quality and the takeover market with asymmetric information regarding the value of the target firm. Increasing information quality improves the takeover efficiency however, a highly efficient takeover market also discourages the manager from exerting effort. We find that perfect information quality is not optimal for either current shareholders’ expected payoff maximization or expected firm value maximization. Furthermore, current shareholders prefer a lower level of information quality than the level that maximizes expected firm value, because of a misalignment between current shareholders’ value and total firm value. We also analyze the impact of antitakeover laws, and find that the passage of antitakeover laws may induce current shareholders to choose a higher level of information quality and thus increase expected firm value

ESSAYS ON BUSINESS GROUPS AND THE JUDICIARY IN SOUTH KOREA

The first chapter explores how the size of a corporation undermines a court’s willingness to mete out tough sentences to corporate criminals, employing a unique dataset of Korean white-collar offenders. I find that the Korean judiciary displays a strong bias towards chaebols, family business groups: the likelihood that convicted chaebol-related defendants receive suspended jail sentences rises compared to that of convicted non-chaebol counterparts. The finding further shows that a greater bias can be observed for the top 10 business groups than for any of the lower ranking chaebols. Finally, I show that controlling for the in-group transactions, the bias is significantly diminished, which is consistent with the claim that a civil-law allows substantial expropriation of minority shareholders by weighing business group’s interests. The second chapter empirically investigates whether connections influence judicial decisions. Using data on Korean white-collar criminals, I investigate whether the judiciary favors newly retired senior judge attorneys (called “Revolving door attorneys") by giving their clients light criminal sanctions. I find that convicted white-collar offenders defended by Revolving door attorneys are more likely to receive suspended jail terms than those represented by ordinary attorneys. I find that the impact is discontinuous after the first year of departure from the judiciary: former senior judge attorneys who represent cases more than one-year after retirement do not alter the likelihood of leniency for clients. Lastly, I find that observed leniency disappears when cases become subject to media scrutiny, which suggest causal linkage between connections and lenient criminal penalties. The final chapter presents a CEOs' career-concerns model for the formation of business groups by focusing how different corporate structures induce CEOs to signal their talent to markets. The paper shows that with better legal protection of investors and an efficient monitoring system for firms' performance, CEOs can increase rents by choosing business groups. Why? Since they manage the subsidiaries of business groups, they have multiple channels (i.e., each firm in the groups) where they signal their ability to other shareholders relative to a large firm with multi-divisions. This leads CEOs to be less responsive to market pressure

Steuerung arbeitsmarktbasierter Anreize zur Gewinnmanipulation mittels Unternehmenspublizität und Anreizsystemen

Die vorliegende Arbeit identifiziert im Rahmen eines LEN-Modells arbeitsmarktbasierte (implizite) Anreize als Ursache für die Durchführung von Gewinnmanipulationen (Earnings Management). Manager, deren Talent unbekannt ist, manipulieren zu veröffentlichende Berichte, um ihre Reputation auf dem Arbeitsmarkt zu steigern (Career Concerns). Explizite Anreizsysteme wie z.B. Gewinnbeteiligungen etc. sind demnach nicht die einzige Ursache für die Durchführung manipulativer Handlungen. Die Analyse liefert somit eine Begründung für empirisch beobachtbare manipulative Handlungen (z.B. das „Big Bath“), welche nicht oder nur eingeschränkt auf Fehlanreize expliziter Anreizsysteme zurückgeführt werden können. Die Arbeit zeigt zudem, dass Unternehmenseigner explizite Anreizsysteme nutzen, um implizite Anreize zu Manipulationen und die damit verbundenen negativen Auswirkungen steuern zu können. Aus diesem Grund stellen sich Unternehmenseigner durch die Nutzung expliziter Anreizsysteme besser. Eine Regulierung von Anreizsystemen, wie sie gegenwärtig in der politischen Debatte verlangt wird, würde zu einer Einschränkung der Steuerungsmöglichkeiten führen. In der Arbeit wird des Weiteren die Unternehmenspublizität als Instrument zur Lenkung impliziter Arbeitsanreize untersucht. Diese spielt insbesondere bei nicht kontrahierbaren Informationen eine zentrale Rolle. So kann es für die Unternehmenseigner bei bestehender Veröffentlichungspflicht von Vorteil sein, nicht kontrahierbare Berichte (z.B. den Lagebericht) zu veröffentlichen, die möglichst unpräzise sind. Dadurch können die Eigner die an den Manager zu zahlende Talentrisikoprämie reduzieren. Zudem führen sie hierdurch eine Reduktion der impliziten Anreize zur Manipulation herbei. Im Rahmen der Analyse werden Bedingungen identifiziert, bei denen sich die Veröffentlichung verzerrter Berichte für die Eigner lohnt

The Benefits of Aggregate Performance Metrics in the Presence of Career Concerns

This paper considers the desirability of aggregate performance measures in light of the fact that many individuals ' performance incentives are driven by a desire to shape external perceptions (and thus pay). In contrast to the case of explicit contracts, we find that when individuals ' actions are driven by implicit career incentives, aggregate (summary) measures can sometimes alleviate moral hazard concerns and improve efficiency. Summarization intermingles performance measures which are differentially affected by skill and effort. Such entanglement increases the prospect that the market will attribute effort-driven successes to the agent's innate skill rather than to his effort, rewarding him accordingly going forward. This possibility encourages the employee to exert higher effort as a means of posturing to the external market. The incentive benefit of aggregation is weighed against the incentive cost due to information loss. Information loss from aggregation can reduce the market's reliance on the measure and, thus, diminish the agent's desire to influence it by exerting effort

The Benefits of Aggregate Performance Metrics in the Presence of Career Concerns

This paper considers the desirability of aggregate performance measures in light of the fact that many individuals' performance incentives are driven by a desire to shape external perceptions (and thus future pay). In contrast to the case of explicit incentive contracts, we find that when individuals' actions are driven by career incentives, an aggregate measure (e.g., group or team output) can sometimes alleviate moral hazard concerns and improve efficiency. Aggregation intermingles performance measures that may be differentially affected by skill and effort of many agents. When such entanglement increases the prospect that the external market will attribute an employee's effort-driven contribution to transferable skills, the employee exerts higher effort as a means of posturing to the market. The incentive benefit of aggregation is weighed against the incentive cost because of information loss. Information loss from aggregation can reduce the market's reliance on the measure and thus diminish agents' desire to undertake effort to influence the measure. This paper was accepted by Stefan Reichelstein, accounting.aggregation, career concerns, group performance measures

The Benefits of Aggregate Performance Metrics in the Presence of Career Concerns

This paper considers the desirability of aggregate performance measures in light of the fact that many individuals' performance incentives are driven by a desire to shape external perceptions (and thus pay). In contrast to the case of explicit contracts, we find that when individuals' actions are driven by implicit career incentives, aggregate (summary) measures can sometimes alleviate moral hazard concerns and improve efficiency. Summarization intermingles performance measures which are differentially affected by skill and effort. Such entanglement increases the prospect that the market will attribute effort-driven successes to the agent's innate skill rather than to his effort, rewarding him accordingly going forward. This possibility encourages the employee to exert higher effort as a means of posturing to the external market. The incentive benefit of aggregation is weighed against the incentive cost due to information loss. Information loss from aggregation can reduce the market's reliance on the measure and, thus, diminish the agent's desire to influence it by exerting effort.Aggregation, Career concerns, Implicit incentives

İK2018 17th Internationally Participated Business Congress, 26-28 April 2018, Çeşme, İzmir

Çevrimiçi (XLV, 2055 sayfa )26-28 Nisan 2018 tarihlerinde Çeşme’de düzenlenen, 17. Uluslararası Katılımlı işletmecilik Kongresi’nin İzmir Katip Çelebi Üniversitesi, iktisadi ve idari Bilimler Fakültesi, işletme Bölümü ev sahipliğinde gerçekleştirilmesinden dolayı büyük bir mutluluk ve onur duyduk. Türkiye’de işletmecilik alanında uzun süredir başarıyla gerçekleştirilen ‘İşletmecilik Kongresi’ 17. Oturumunda uluslararası bir nitelik kazandırılarak gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu vesile ile kongrenin 17. Oturumu ‘Uluslararası Katılımlı İşletmecilik Kongresi’ olarak tanımlanmıştır. Kongrenin bu niteliği kazanmasında katkıları olan herkese teşekkür ederiz. Umut ederiz ki bu kıymetli kongrenin ileriki oturumlarının da bu nitelikte gerçekleşmesidir. 17. Uluslararası İşletmecilik Kongresi’ne akademi, iş dünyası, sivil toplum kuruluşları ve bireysel olarak yaklaşık 700 katılımcı ilgi göstermiştir. Kongrede sunulmak üzere 400’den fazla çalışma tarafımıza ulaşmıştır. Bu çalışmalardan kongrede sunumu yapılan 236 tane tebliğ bu kitapta yer almaktadır. Kongrenin düzenlenmesi sırasında her zaman desteklerini hissettiğimiz Danışma Kurulu değerli üyelerine, bildiri tam metin ve özetlerini dikkatle ve özenle değerlendiren Bilim Kurulu üyelerine ve kongre sponsorlarına çok teşekkür ederiz. Prof.Dr. Hayrettin USUL 17. Uluslararası Katılımlı İşletmecilik Kongresi Dönem Başkan