The inheritance of dynamic and deontic integrity constraints or: Does the boss have more rights?

In [18,23], we presented a language for the specification of static, dynamic and deontic integrity constraints (IC's) for conceptual models (CM's). An important problem not discussed in that paper is how IC's are inherited in a taxonomic network of types. For example, if students are permitted to perform certain actions under certain preconditions, must we repeat these preconditions when specializing this action for the subtype of graduate students, or are they inherited, and if so, how? For static constraints, this problem is relatively trivial, but for dynamic and deontic constraints, it will turn out that it contains numerous pitfalls, caused by the fact that common sense supplies presuppositions about the structure of IC inheritance that are not warranted by logic. In this paper, we unravel some of these presuppositions and show how to avoid the pitfalls. We first formulate a number of general theorems about the inheritance of necessary and/or sufficient conditions and show that for upward inheritance, a closure assumption is needed. We apply this to dynamic and deontic IC's, where conditions arepreconditions of actions, and show that our common sense is sometimes mistaken about the logical implications of what we have specified. We also show the connection of necessary and sufficient preconditions of actions with the specification of weakest preconditions in programming logic. Finally, we argue that information analysts usually assume constraint completion in the specification of (pre)conditions analogous to predicate completion in Prolog and circumscription in non-monotonic logic. The results are illustrated with numerous examples and compared with other approaches in the literature

Temporalized logics and automata for time granularity

Suitable extensions of the monadic second-order theory of k successors have been proposed in the literature to capture the notion of time granularity. In this paper, we provide the monadic second-order theories of downward unbounded layered structures, which are infinitely refinable structures consisting of a coarsest domain and an infinite number of finer and finer domains, and of upward unbounded layered structures, which consist of a finest domain and an infinite number of coarser and coarser domains, with expressively complete and elementarily decidable temporal logic counterparts. We obtain such a result in two steps. First, we define a new class of combined automata, called temporalized automata, which can be proved to be the automata-theoretic counterpart of temporalized logics, and show that relevant properties, such as closure under Boolean operations, decidability, and expressive equivalence with respect to temporal logics, transfer from component automata to temporalized ones. Then, we exploit the correspondence between temporalized logics and automata to reduce the task of finding the temporal logic counterparts of the given theories of time granularity to the easier one of finding temporalized automata counterparts of them.Comment: Journal: Theory and Practice of Logic Programming Journal Acronym: TPLP Category: Paper for Special Issue (Verification and Computational Logic) Submitted: 18 March 2002, revised: 14 Januari 2003, accepted: 5 September 200

A Passage Theory of Time

This paper proposes a view of time that takes passage to be the most basic temporal notion, instead of the usual A-theoretic and B-theoretic notions, and explores how we should think of a world that exhibits such a genuine temporal passage. It will be argued that an objective passage of time can only be made sense of from an atemporal point of view and only when it is able to constitute a genuine change of objects across time. This requires that passage can flip one fact into a contrary fact, even though neither side of the temporal passage is privileged over the other. We can make sense of this if the world is inherently perspectival. Such an inherently perspectival world is characterized by fragmentalism, a view that has been introduced by Fine in his ‘Tense and Reality’ (2005). Unlike Fine's tense-theoretic fragmentalism though, the proposed view will be a fragmentalist view based in a primitive notion of passage

Answer Set Programming Modulo `Space-Time'

We present ASP Modulo `Space-Time', a declarative representational and computational framework to perform commonsense reasoning about regions with both spatial and temporal components. Supported are capabilities for mixed qualitative-quantitative reasoning, consistency checking, and inferring compositions of space-time relations; these capabilities combine and synergise for applications in a range of AI application areas where the processing and interpretation of spatio-temporal data is crucial. The framework and resulting system is the only general KR-based method for declaratively reasoning about the dynamics of `space-time' regions as first-class objects. We present an empirical evaluation (with scalability and robustness results), and include diverse application examples involving interpretation and control tasks

The Qualification Problem: A solution to the problem of anomalous models

AbstractIntelligent agents in open environments inevitably face the Qualification Problem: The executability of an action can never be predicted with absolute certainty; unexpected circumstances, albeit unlikely, may at any time prevent the successful performance of an action. Reasoning agents in real-world environments rely on a solution to the Qualification Problem in order to make useful predictions but also to explain and recover from unexpected action failures. Yet the main theoretical result known today in this context is a negative one: While a solution to the Qualification Problem requires to assume away by default abnormal qualifications of actions, straightforward minimization of abnormality falls prey to the production of anomalous models. We present an approach to the Qualification Problem which resolves this anomaly. Anomalous models are shown to arise from ignoring causality, and they are avoided by appealing to just this concept. Our theory builds on the established predicate logic formalism of the Fluent Calculus as a solution to the Frame Problem and to the Ramification Problem in reasoning about actions. The monotonic Fluent Calculus is enhanced by a default theory in order to obtain the nonmonotonic approach called for by the Qualification Problem. The approach has been implemented in an action programming language based on the Fluent Calculus and successfully applied to the high-level control of robots

A general approach to temporal reasoning about action and change

Reasoning about actions and change based on common sense knowledge is one of the most important and difficult tasks in the artificial intelligence research area. A series of such tasks are identified which motivate the consideration and application of reasoning formalisms. There follows a discussion of the broad issues involved in modelling time and constructing a logical language. In general, worlds change over time. To model the dynamic world, the ability to predict what the state of the world will be after the execution of a particular sequence of actions, which take time and to explain how some given state change came about, i.e. the causality are basic requirements of any autonomous rational agent. The research work presented herein addresses some of the fundamental concepts and the relative issues in formal reasoning about actions and change. In this thesis, we employ a new time structure, which helps to deal with the so-called intermingling problem and the dividing instant problem. Also, the issue of how to treat the relationship between a time duration and its relative time entity is examined. In addition, some key terms for representing and reasoning about actions and change, such as states, situations, actions and events are formulated. Furthermore, a new formalism for reasoning about change over time is presented. It allows more flexible temporal causal relationships than do other formalisms for reasoning about causal change, such as the situation calculus and the event calculus. It includes effects that start during, immediately after, or some time after their causes, and which end before, simultaneously with, or after their causes. The presented formalism allows the expression of common-sense causal laws at high level. Also, it is shown how these laws can be used to deduce state change over time at low level. Finally, we show that the approach provided here is expressive