Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Trade Obligations: A Theoretical Analysis of the Doha Proposal

The Doha declaration on trade and environment proposed to clarify the relationship between multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) trade obligations and WTO rules by only guaranteeing economic integration upon ratification of certain MEAs. In other words, it pushed to authorize the use of trade measures against non-compliance, denying a non-signatory of its WTO rights to exercise countervailing tariffs. This paper demonstrates that the Doha proposal can be effective when environmental policy and its trade obligations are endogenous. Under plausible circumstances, ratification by a non-signatory to the MEA along with free trade as a reward is the unique equilibrium outcome. Delocation to pollution havens does not occur, as optimal tariffs are positive if standards are not adopted. Tariffs however only work as a credible threat and do not emerge in equilibrium. Results are consistent with broad empirical evidence that opposes the pollution haven hypothesis and suggests capital movements to be non-pollution related.Environmental policy, WTO, Location of firms, Green tariffs, Multilateral environmental agreements, Doha declaration

Water Consumption and Long-Run Urban Development: The Case of Milan

Analyses of long run consumption series are rare in literature. We study the evolution of water consumption in Milan in the twentieth century. The objective is twofold: on one side, the univariate analysis tries both to assess the impact of relevant socio-economic and environmental changes on water consumption in Milan and verify if consumers have deeply rooted consumption habits. On the other side, the multivariate analysis is used to identify the socio-economic factors that are relevant in explaining consumption evolution. Results indicate both that water users have well entrenched consumption habits and that population, climate and economic structure behave more similarly, in Euclidean terms, to water consumption than to other economic and social variables.Urban consumption, Long-run, Development, Environmental changes

Identification of Options and Policy Instruments for the Internalisation of External Costs of Electricity Generation. Dissemination of External Costs of Electricity Supply Making Electricity External Costs Known to Policy-Makers MAXIMA

In the present paper, after reviewing the results of the ExternE project and its follow-up stages in the estimation of the external costs of electricity production, we look at the policy instruments for the internalisation of such costs. Emphasis is given to subsidies, such as feed-in tariffs, competitive bidding processes and tradable green certificates to stimulate the use of renewables in the production of electricity. When policy-makers are asked to choose the instrument(s) to internalise the externalities in the electricity production, they have to find a solution that gives the best outcome in terms of efficiency, cost minimisation, impact on the job market, security of energy supply, equity of the instrument, technological innovation, certainty of the level of the internalisation, and feasibility. The choice of the instrument will require some trade-offs among these criteria. Conjoint choice analysis can help in investigating how stakeholders and policy makers trade off the criteria when choosing a policy for the internalisation of the externalities. In this paper we present the first results of a questionnaire that employs conjoint choice questions to find out how policy makers and stakeholders of the electricity market trade off some socio-economic aspects in the selection of the policy instruments for the internalisation of the externalities. The results of this first set of interviews will be useful for further research.Policy instruments, ExternE, External costs, Electricity, Conjoint choice analysis

Regulation of Access to the Telecommunications Network of New Zealand: A Review of the Literature

The rapid widespread technological change and concomitant deregulation of network industries has engendered a burgeoning demand for connection between technologically like as well as technologically unlike networks. The processes by which contracts are reached and the nature of these contracts is important for the performance of these industries.This is a review of the state of the economic literature about interconnection. While its focus is on telecommunications the principles it reviews are more or less relevant to other networks depending upon their particular characteristics. The review considers only the pricing element of an interconnection contract leaving other issues such as risk sharing transactions costs and technological agreement aside. It does not consider the direct or political economy costs of regulation. Even so it reveals that the pricing issues have not been solved.It is apparent from the review that interconnection pricing can only be appraised in the wider context of the regulation and competition of the market as a whole. For example the properties of the now-famous Baumol-Willig (ECPR) rule are different when there is a retail price cap than without it. It is critical for the special treatment of interconnection contracts that there are natural monopoly elements in the network. Where these are absent or bypass is economically viable interconnection contracts will generally not pose special competition concerns.The survey reviews the conceptual basis of proposed regulatory schema andmeasurement issues that arise in their use. In particular it considers various price-cap mechanisms. It does not systematically review the literature on industry and regulatory performance under the different regulatory regimes.Where there are natural monopoly elements the review suggests that for one-way access the two leading approaches to regulation appear to be price caps or access price caps combined with deregulated retail tariffs. These approaches would include a form of the Baumol-Willig rule. The review emphasises that two-way access is characterised by both potential exclusion and potential collusion. It suggests that a regulatory approach would seek to concentrate on keeping access charges low. Lighthanded regulation would then come in the form of deregulated retail tariffs. Taken together this suggests that in a system with both one-way and two-way access theremight be access price caps possibly with two baskets one for one-way access and one for two-way access charges. At the same time retail would be deregulated. In New Zealand the regulatory price cap has been on household access.The literature surveyed on private negotiations is quite thin. It suggests that where regulators can step in as backups if private negotiations fail it would allow regulators to concentrate on contentious issues while the "technical" issues would be resolved privately. In such circumstances regulatory determination can become the common mechanism by default

Consumer behavioural biases in competition: A survey

This is a survey of studies that examine competition in the presence of behaviourally biased or boundedly rational consumers. It will tackle questions such as: How does competition and pricing change when consumers are biased? Can inefficiencies that arise from consumer behavioural biases be mitigated by lowering barriers to entry? Do biased consumers make rational ones better or worse off? And will biased consumer behaviour be overcome through learning or education?Behavioural Economics, Industrial Organization, Biased Consumers

Bargaining Coalitions in the Agricultural Negotiations of the Doha Round: Similarity of Interests or Strategic Choices? An Empirical Assessment

The paper aims at understanding the structural features of the bargaining coalitions in the Doha Round of the WTO. We provide an empirical assessment of the preferences of each negotiating actor looking at general economics indicators, development levels, structure of the agricultural sectors, and trade policies for agricultural products. Bargaining coalitions are analyzed by grouping countries through a cluster analysis procedure. The clusters are compared with existing coalitions, in order to assess their degree of internal homogeneity as well as their common interests. Such a comparison allows the detection of possible “defectors”, i.e. countries that according to their economic conditions and policies seem to be relatively less committed to the positions of the coalition they join.Agricultural trade negotiations, Bargaining coalitions, WTO, Cluster analysis

The Economics of Competition Policy: Recent Developments and Cautionary Notes in Antitrust and Regulation

Competition policy has become more prominent while the thinking underlying those policies has undergone substantial revision. We survey advances in antitrust economics and the economics of regulation. Increasing reliance on non-cooperative game theory as a foundation for antitrust has led to rethinking conventional approaches. We review some of these contributions in the context of mergers, vertical restraints, and competition in "network industries." Turning to regulation, we review standard rationales and identify some major contemporary refinements, with examples of the motives behind them and their application. After brief thoughts on privatization, we conclude with suggestions on design and implementation, with some observations on whether these developments are as valuable in the corridors of policy as they may be in the halls of academe.

Tourism Immiserization: Fact or Fiction?

Tourism plays a major part in the development strategies of both developing and developed countries because of the alleged potential of generating foreign exchange, economic growth and welfare enhancement (Sinclair and Stabler, 1997; Sinclair, 1988). Consequently, in several countries a considerable amount of resources is allocated to further promote the tourism sector in a hope of reaping more economic benefits. However, it is still debatable whether tourism is beneficial for the tourist-receiving country or not. While empirical studies (Adams and Parmenter, 1994; Zhou et al., 1996, Baaijens et al., 1998; Blake, 2000; Blake et. al., 2003; Dwyer et al., 2003), argue that tourism expansion is beneficial to the economy, theoretical studies (Copeland, 1991; Chen and Devereux, 1999; Hazari and Nowak, 2003; Hazari et al., 2003; Nowak et al., 2003) posit that tourism expansion can be immiserizing. This paper critically reviews the theoretical and empirical literature to identify the sources via which tourism expansion can benefit or harm the economy. The issues are then empirically investigated using a CGE model for Mauritius to identify the conditions under which tourism expansion can be immiserizing.Tourism, Immiserization, Welfare, Economic growth

The Evolution of Enterprise Reform in Africa: From State-owned Enterprises to Private Participation in Infrastructure — and Back?

Many African state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly those in infrastructure, have a long history of poor performance. From the outset, SOE financial and economic performance generally failed to meet the expectations of their creators and funders. By the late 1970s, the situation was alarming, and by early 1980s, critical. The poor financial performance of SOEs became so burdensome to government budgets that it attracted the attention of the international financial institutions, or IFIs. In response, in the 1980s, the World Bank approved SOE reforms that could be summed up in the term “commercialization”. By the mid-1990s, however, the idea of making SOEs function efficiently and effectively under government management was largely abandoned by the IFIs and privatization and private participation in infrastructure, or PPI became the order of the day. Once more, however, the results were disappointing. PPI has not been as widely adopted as anticipated, nor has it generated the massive resources and changes hoped for, nor has it been widely accepted as beneficial by the African public. The findings of recent studies in Africa suggest that PPI should not be jettisoned, and that the more productive path is to recognize the limitations of the approach, and to work harder at creating the conditions needed to make it function effectively. This will entail, as many have recognized, an end to the view that public and private infrastructure provision is a dichotomy – a case of either-or, one or the other – and a better appreciation of the extent to which the performance of each is dependent on the competence of the other. In other words, for the private sector to perform well, public sector capacity must be enhanced. Moreover, proposed tactics of reform should fit more closely with the expectations and sentiments of the affected government, consumer base, and general population. This broader approach implies, probably, a reduction in the scope and, certainly, a reduction in the planned speed of operations. Improving infrastructure performance is a long-term matter.Africa, Enterprise reform, State-owned enterprises, Privatization