6 research outputs found
A Taxonomy of Virtualization Security Issues in Cloud Computing Environments
Objectives: To identify the main challenges and security issues of virtualization in cloud computing environments. It reviews the alleviation techniques for improving the security of cloud virtualization systems. Methods/ Statistical Analysis: Virtualization is a fundamental technology for cloud computing, and for this reason, any cloud vulnerabilities and threats affect virtualization. In this study, the systematic literature review is performed to find out the vulnerabilities and risks of virtualization in cloud computing and to identify threats, and attacks result from those vulnerabilities. Furthermore, we discover and analyze the effective mitigation techniques that are used to protect, secure, and manage virtualization environments. Findings: Thirty vulnerabilities are identified, explained, and classified into six proposed classes. Furthermore, fifteen main virtualization threats and attacks ar defined according to exploited
vulnerabilities in a cloud environment. Application/Improvements: A set of common mitigation solutions are recognized and discovered to alleviate the virtualization security risks. These reviewed techniques are analyzed and evaluated according to five specified security criteria
ANALYTICAL MODELS FOR THE INTERACTION BETWEEN BOTMASTERS AND HONEYPOTS
Honeypots are traps designed to resemble easy-to-compromise computer systems in order to tempt attackers to invade them. When attackers target a honeypot, all their actions, tools and techniques are recorded and analyzed in order to help security professionals in their conflict against the attackers and the botmasters. However, botmasters might be able to detect honeypots. In particular, they can command compromised machines to perform illicit actions in which the targeted victims work as sensors that measure the machine's willingness to perform these actions. If honeypots were designed to completely ignore these commands, then they can be easily detected by botmasters. On the other hand, full participation by honeypots in such activities has its associated costs and may lead to legal liabilities. This raises the need for finding the optimal response strategy needed by honeypots in order to prolong their stay within botnets without exposing them to liability.
In this work, we show that current honeypot architectures and operation limitations may allow botmasters to uncover honeypots in their botnet. In particular, we show how botmasters can systematically collect, combine and analyze evidence about the true nature of the machines they compromise using Dempster-Shafer theory.
To determine the currently available optimal response for honeypots,
we provide a Bayesian game theoretic framework that models the interaction between honeypots and botmasters as a non-zero-sum noncooperative game with uncertainty.
However, the solution of the game shows that botmasters always have the upper hand in the conflict with honeypots since botmasters can update their belief about the true nature of the opponents and consequently act optimally based on the new belief value.
This motivated us to investigate a better strategy that enables honeypots to maximize their outcome by optimally responding to the probes of the botmasters. In particular, we provide a Markov Decision Processes model that helps security professionals to determine the optimal strategy that enables the honeypots to prolong their stay in the botnets while minimizing the cost of possible legal liability.
Throughout this thesis, we also provide different scenarios that illustrate and support our proposed analysis and solutions
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Design and Analysis of Decoy Systems for Computer Security
This dissertation is aimed at defending against a range of internal threats, including eaves-dropping on network taps, placement of malware to capture sensitive information, and general insider threats to exfiltrate sensitive information. Although the threats and adversaries may vary, in each context where a system is threatened, decoys can be used to deny critical information to adversaries making it harder for them to achieve their target goal. The approach leverages deception and the use of decoy technologies to deceive adversaries and trap nefarious acts. This dissertation proposes a novel set of properties for decoys to serve as design goals in the development of decoy-based infrastructures. To demonstrate their applicability, we designed and prototyped network and host-based decoy systems. These systems are used to evaluate the hypothesis that network and host decoys can be used to detect inside attackers and malware. We introduce a novel, large-scale automated creation and management system for deploying decoys. Decoys may be created in various forms including bogus documents with embedded beacons, credentials for various web and email accounts, and bogus financial in- formation that is monitored for misuse. The decoy management system supplies decoys for the network and host-based decoy systems. We conjecture that the utility of the decoys depends on the believability of the bogus information; we demonstrate the believability through experimentation with human judges. For the network decoys, we developed a novel trap-based architecture for enterprise networks that detects "silent" attackers who are eavesdropping network traffic. The primary contributions of this system is the ease of injecting, automatically, large amounts of believable bait, and the integration of various detection mechanisms in the back-end. We demonstrate our methodology in a prototype platform that uses our decoy injection API to dynamically create and dispense network traps on a subset of our campus wireless network. We present results of a user study that demonstrates the believability of our automatically generated decoy traffic. We present results from a statistical and information theoretic analysis to show the believability of the traffic when automated tools are used. For host-based decoys, we introduce BotSwindler, a novel host-based bait injection sys- tem designed to delude and detect crimeware by forcing it to reveal itself during the ex- ploitation of monitored information. Our implementation of BotSwindler relies upon an out-of-host software agent to drive user-like interactions in a virtual machine, seeking to convince malware residing within the guest OS that it has captured legitimate credentials. To aid in the accuracy and realism of the simulations, we introduce a novel, low overhead approach, called virtual machine verification, for verifying whether the guest OS is in one of a predefined set of states. We provide empirical evidence to show that BotSwindler can be used to induce malware into performing observable actions and demonstrate how this approach is superior to that used in other tools. We present results from a user to study to illustrate the believability of the simulations and show that financial bait infor- mation can be used to effectively detect compromises through experimentation with real credential-collecting malware. We present results from a statistical and information theo- retic analysis to show the believability of simulated keystrokes when automated tools are used to distinguish them. Finally, we introduce and demonstrate an expanded role for decoys in educating users and measuring organizational security through experiments with approximately 4000 university students and staff
Insider threat : memory confidentiality and integrity in the cloud
PhD ThesisThe advantages of always available services, such as remote device backup or data storage,
have helped the widespread adoption of cloud computing. However, cloud computing services
challenge the traditional boundary between trusted inside and untrusted outside. A
consumer’s data and applications are no longer in premises, fundamentally changing the
scope of an insider threat.
This thesis looks at the security risks associated with an insider threat. Specifically, we
look into the critical challenge of assuring data confidentiality and integrity for the execution
of arbitrary software in a consumer’s virtual machine. The problem arises from having
multiple virtual machines sharing hardware resources in the same physical host, while an
administrator is granted elevated privileges over such host.
We used an empirical approach to collect evidence of the existence of this security problem
and implemented a prototype of a novel prevention mechanism for such a problem.
Finally, we propose a trustworthy cloud architecture which uses the security properties our
prevention mechanism guarantees as a building block.
To collect the evidence required to demonstrate how an insider threat can become a
security problem to a cloud computing infrastructure, we performed a set of attacks targeting
the three most commonly used virtualization software solutions. These attacks attempt to
compromise data confidentiality and integrity of cloud consumers’ data. The prototype to
evaluate our novel prevention mechanism was implemented in the Xen hypervisor and tested
against known attacks.
The prototype we implemented focuses on applying restrictions to the permissive memory
access model currently in use in the most relevant virtualization software solutions. We
envision the use of a mandatory memory access control model in the virtualization software.
This model enforces the principle of least privilege to memory access, which means
cloud administrators are assigned with only enough privileges to successfully perform their
administrative tasks.
Although the changes we suggest to the virtualization layer make it more restrictive, our
solution is versatile enough to port all the functionality available in current virtualization
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solutions. Therefore, our trustworthy cloud architecture guarantees data confidentiality and
integrity and achieves a more transparent trustworthy cloud ecosystem while preserving
functionality.
Our results show that a malicious insider can compromise security sensitive data in the
three most important commercial virtualization software solutions. These virtualization solutions
are publicly available and the number of cloud servers using these solutions accounts
for the majority of the virtualization market. The prevention mechanism prototype we designed
and implemented guarantees data confidentiality and integrity against such attacks
and reduces the trusted computing base of the virtualization layer. These results indicate
how current virtualization solutions need to reconsider their view on insider threats