Applying for Entitlements: Employers and the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit

The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit is probably the most outstanding example of a generous entitlement program with very low participation rates. Only about 10 percent of eligible youth are claimed. The causes of the low participation rate were analyzed by estimating a poisson model of the number of TJTC eligibles hired and certified during 1980, 1981 and 1982. Information costs, both fixed and variable, were found to be key barriers to TJTC participation. The cost effectiveness of TJTC is low because the stigma and recruitment costs of hiring additional TJTC eligibles are very high. Employers find it relatively cheap to passively certify eligible new hires who would have been hired anyway so this mode of participating in TJTC predominates

Applying for Entitlements: Employers and the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit

The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) is probably the most outstanding example of a generous entitlement program with a very low participation rate. Only about 10 percent of eligible youth hired are claimed as a tax credit by their employers. The causes of the low participation rates are analyzed by estimating a Poisson model of the number of TJTC-eligibles hired and certified during 1980, 1981, and 1982. Information costs, both fixed and variable, are found to be key barriers to TJTC participation. The cost- effectiveness of TJTC is low because of the stigma attached and the very high recruitment costs of hiring additional TJTC-eligibles. Because employers find it relatively cheap to certify after the fact eligible new employees who would have been hired anyway, this passive mode of participating in TJTC predominates

Does the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit Create Jobs at Subsidized Firms?

This paper uses the results of a survey of more than 3,500 private employers to determine whether use of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) alters the level of a firm\u27s employment and/or whom the firm hires. We estimate that each subsidized hire generates between .13 and .3 new jobs at a participating firm. Use of the program also appears to induce employers to hire more young workers (age 25 and under). Our results suggest, however, that at least 70 percent of the tax credits granted employers are payments for workers who would have been hired even without the subsidy. Such payments represent mere transfers to employers

The Employment and Earnings Impacts of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit

The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) is intended to stimulate the employment of individuals who are members of certain groups of the labor force by providing a wage subsidy (in the form of a tax credit) to employers of recently-hired eligible workers. This intervention into the labor market has direct and indirect earnings and employment consequences for both eligible and ineligible individuals. The paper evaluates the impacts of TJTC by using a treatment and comparison group methodology. Corrections for nonrandom selection are undertaken. The primary sources of data are state quarterly wage record data from the Unemployment Insurance system and the Employment Service Automated Reporting System (ESARS). The results indicate that the availability and usage of TJTC enhances outcomes for nonwhite male youth (both eligible and ineligible), but is stigmatizing for eligible individuals from other race/sex groups, who appear to be slightly worse off because of the program than their ineligible counterparts. Obtaining a voucher increases employment and wages, but it appears as if selection effects are responsible. Importantly, the improved outcomes are not accompanied by displacement effects. Finally, being certified results in increased wages, but higher turnover and lower total employment.targeted, tax, job, credit, employment, earnings, Hollenbeck, Willke

The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) and the Welfare-to-Work (WtW) Tax Credit

The Work Opportunity Tax Credit and Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit are temporary provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Since their initiation in the mid-1990s, the Congress has allowed the credits to lapse four of the five times they were up for reauthorization. In each instance, they were reinstated retroactive to their expiration dates as part of large tax-related measures. The employment tax credits never have been addressed independently of broader legislation. This report describes the WOTC and WtW Tax Credit and outlines issues for members of Congress

The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC)

[Excerpt] The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) is meant to induce employers to hire members of families receiving benefits under the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program and other groups thought to experience employment problems regardless of general economic conditions (e.g., food stamp recipients and ex-felons). In 1997, Congress passed the Welfare-to- Work (WtW) tax credit to focus specifically on more disadvantaged TANF recipients. The 109th Congress folded the WtW credit into a revised WOTC as part of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006. This report contains a description of the WOTC and closes with a legislative history of the WOTC

Productivy Growth and Tenure: A Test of on-the-Job Training Theories of Wage and Productivy Growth

[Excerpt] Studies have found consistently that there is a strong positive correlation between a worker\u27s tenure with a firm and that individual\u27s wage rate. Becker\u27s (1975) on-the-job training (OJT) model is the most widely accepted explanation for this association. The OJT model posits that new employees receive training early in their tenure, which raises their productivity both in and outside the firm. Competition forces the employer to pay employees who have completed this training at least as much as they are worth outside the firm less transfer costs. Jobs that offer such training are more attractive than jobs that do not, so competition forces down the entry wage of jobs that provide training below the entry wage of jobs that offer no training. During the training period, the supervisors and other workers are spending time away from other activities, helping the new employee learn the job. The new employee may also spend time in learning activities instead of production activities. In order to offer training, the employer must be compensated for the resulting sacrifice in current output. When the training provides general skills, the only way such compensation can be provided is by a further lowering of the entry wage. Thus, there are two forces that cause wage rates of new employees to rise: the increase of the employee\u27s productivity and the decline of training expenses. When training is entirely specific, and therefore does not raise the worker\u27s productivity in other firms, the forces causing a rising wage profile are weaker. They do not disappear, however, for a rising wage profile reduces the quit rate of trained workers, and thus protects the firm\u27s investment in training

Utilization of Income Tax Credits by Low-Income Individuals

The Internal Revenue Service-a sub-agency that exists to collect revenue-has the task of administering and enforcing a wide array of social policy: from subsidies for college and child care expenses, to creating jobs in depressed areas, and assisting welfare recipients with employment. While these new or expanded credits represent a new paradigm in the delivery of social policy, little is known about who uses these programs and, equally important, who does not use these programs. Understanding utilization is a key to understanding how effective this means of transferring income is and whether we are reaching the targeted populations. This paper provides a framework for thinking about utilization of tax credits among low-income individuals, supported by existing research on credit utilization. With the existing data, it appears that utilization is by far the largest for the EITC, possibly because it is the oldest of these programs, the only refundable program, and the best targeted at low-income individuals. Utilization is low among low-income individuals in some tax credits because low-income individuals are not eligible. A redesign, including reducing complexity and administrative burdens or making these programs refundable, would result in the programs reaching those that they are ostensibly targeted towards. Conditional on being eligible, one common factor associated with increasing participation in many of these programs is a high benefit to cost ratio and sophistication with the tax system, whether that be through the use of a paid preparer, higher education levels, or experience with the tax system. Policymakers should think creatively about reducing filing burdens to increase participation, such as through wider use of electronic filing

Is Welfare Reform Succeeding?

Welfare Reform and the Earned Income Tax Credit have apparently caused a dramatic increase in the labor force participation rates of single parents. Between the first quarters of 1994 and 1998, labor force participation rates rose 25.4 percent for never-married women caring for children, rose 15.5 percent for mothers separated from their spouse and rose 4.9 percent for divorced single mothers. By contrast, unmarried individuals and separated and divorced women who were not caring for children lowered their rates of participation in the labor market. The rise in the labor force participation rates of single parents between 1994 and 1998 increased the labor force by 1,111,000. The total increase in the labor force due to changes in participation rates was 1,178,000. Thus, single parents, who accounted for only 6.2 percent of the labor force in 1994, were responsible for almost all of the increase in the overall labor force participation rate between 1994 and 1998. This unanticipated increase in labor supply may be one of the reasons why wage inflation has been so moderate since 1992. The EITC and welfare reform have increased the level of output that is consistent with non-accelerating inflation and may have even shifted the NAIRU, though probably not by much

Business Investment and Employment Tax Incentives to Stimulate the Economy

[Excerpt] According to the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the U.S. economy has been in recession since December 2007. Congress passed and the President signed an economic stimulus package, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), in February 2009. The $787 billion package included$286 billion in tax cuts to help stimulate the economy. Among the tax reductions, many were tax incentives directed to business. The preliminary estimate of third quarter real gross domestic product (GDP) growth is 2.8%; the unemployment rate, a lagging indicator, averaged 9.6% in the third quarter and 10.0% in the fourth quarter of 2009. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke expects the economy to continue growing at a modest pace, but predicts that bank lending will remain constrained and the job market will remain weak into at least 2010. To further assist unemployed workers, help business, and stimulate housing markets, Congress passed the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-92). The Obama Administration has advocated further business tax incentives to spur investment and employment, especially for small business. The two most common measures to provide business tax incentives for new investment are investment tax credits and accelerated deductions for depreciation. The evidence, however, suggests that a business tax subsidy may not necessarily be the best choice for fiscal stimulus, largely because of the uncertainty of its success in stimulating aggregate demand. If such subsidies are used, however, the most effective short-run policy is probably a temporary investment subsidy. Permanent investment subsidies may distort the allocation of investment in the long run. Employment and wage subsidies are designed to increase employment directly by reducing a firm’s wage bill. The tax system is a frequently used means for providing employment subsidies. Most of the business tax incentives for hiring currently under discussion are modeled partially on the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) from 1977 and 1978. Evidence provided in various studies suggests that incremental tax credits have the potential of increasing employment, but in practice may not be as effective in increasing employment as desired. There are several reasons why this may be the case. First, jobs tax credits are often complex and many employers, especially small businesses, may not want to incur the necessary record-keeping costs. Second, since eligibility for the tax credit is determined when the firm files the annual tax return, firms do not know if they are eligible for the credit at the time hiring decisions are made. Third, many firms may not even be aware of the availability of the tax credit until it is time to file a tax return. Lastly, product demand appears to be the primary determinant of hiring