Technical Efficiency and Adoption of Soil Conservation in El Salvador and Honduras

A household-level switching regression model is implemented to examine potential selectivity bias for rural households under high and low levels of investments in soil conservation in El Salvador and Honduras. In the presence of selectivity bias, separate stochastic production frontiers are estimated for low and high adopters. The main results indicate that households with higher levels of investments in soil conservation show higher average TE than those with a lower level of investments. Constrains in the rural land and credit markets are likely explanations for these differences. The results also indicate that for farms with lower levels of investments in soil conservation access to credit is a significant factor explaining the sources of inefficiency. Conversely, households with higher levels of investments have the highest partial output elasticity for land, the highest levels of TE and the smallest farms. These results are consistent with the presence of a failure in the land market which would limit access to land to the more efficient producers.Stochastic Frontiers, Technical Efficiency, Switching Regression, Central America, Soil Conservation, Land Economics/Use, d24, q12, o13, c21,

The optimal length of contracts with application to outsourcing

This paper resolves three empirical puzzles in outsourcing by formalizing the adaptation cost of long-term performance contracts. Side-trading with a new partner alongside a long- term contract (to exploit an adaptation-requiring investment) is usually less effective than switching to the new partner when the contract expires. So long-term contracts that prevent holdup of specific investments may induce holdup of adaptation investments. Contract length therefore trades of specific and adaptation investments. Length should increase with the importance and specificity of self-investments, and decrease with the importance of adaptation investments for which side-trading is ineffective. My general model also shows how optimal length falls with cross-investments and wasteful investments.Contract length, market forces, incomplete contracts, holdup

Coexistence of service- and facility-based competition: The relevance of access prices for "make-or-buy"-decisions

This paper models competition between two firms, which provide broadband Internet access in regional markets with different population densities. The firms, an incumbent and an entrant, differ in two ways. First, consumers bear costs when switching to the entrant. Second, the entrant faces a make-or-buy decision in each region and can choose between service-based and facility-based entry. The usual trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency does not apply in the sense that higher access fees might yield both, lower retail prices and higher total coverage. This holds despite a strategic effect in the entrant's investment decision. While investment lowers marginal costs in regions with facility-based entry, it intensifies competition in all regions. We show that the cost-reducing potential of investments dominates the strategic effect: Higher access fees increase facility-based competition, decrease retail prices and increase total demand. --Broadband access markets,facility- and service-based entry,investments,economies of density,switching costs

Coexistence of Service- and Facility-Based Competition: The Relevance of Access Prices for "Make-or-Buy"-Decisions

This paper models competition between two firms, which provide broadband Internet access in regional markets with different population densities. The firms, an incumbent and an entrant, differ in two ways. First, consumers bear costs when switching to the entrant. Second, the entrant faces a make-or-buy decision in each region and can choose between service-based and facility-based entry. The usual trade-off between static and dynamic eficiency does not apply in the sense that higher access fees might yield both, lower retail prices and higher total coverage. This holds despite a strategic effect in the entrant's investment decision. While investment lowers marginal costs in regions with facility-based entry, it intensifies competition in all regions. We show that the cost-reducing potential of investments dominates the strategic effect: Higher access fees increase facility-based competition, decrease retail prices and increase total demand.Broadband access markets, facility- and service-based entry, investments, economies of density, switching costs

Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy

We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be taxed. Conversely, any positive investment tax is suboptimally high if the public information is sufficiently unfavorable.We also show that an investment tax may increase overall investment activity

Declining Discount Rates: Evidence from the UK

We estimate schedules of declining discount rates for cost benefit analysis in the UK. We highlight the importance of model selection for this task and hence for the evaluation of long-term investments, namely climate change prevention and nuclear build.long-run discounting, state-space models,regime-switching models, climate change policy,nuclear build

THE EFFECT OF SOIL CONSERVATION ON TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY: EVIDENCE FROM CENTRAL AMERICA

This study evaluates technical efficiency (TE) levels for rural households under high and low levels of investments in soil conservation in El Salvador and Honduras. To correct for potential self-selectivity bias a household-level switching regression framework is implemented to estimate separate stochastic production frontiers for the two groups of households under analysis. The main results indicate that a systematic difference exists between the two studied groups. Specifically, households with higher levels of investments in soil conservation show higher average TE than those with a lower level of investments. Constrains in the rural land and credit markets appear to be the reason behind these differences. Our estimations indicate that for farms with lower levels of investments in soil conservation access to credit is a significant factor explaining the sources of inefficiency. Conversely, households with higher levels of investments in soil conservation present the highest partial output elasticity for land, the highest levels of TE and the smallest farms. This result could suggest the presence of a market failure in the land market which is denying access to land to the more efficient producers.Land Economics/Use,

Causes, consequences, and cures of myopic loss aversion - An experimental investigation

Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been established as one prominent explanation for the equity premium puzzle. In this paper we address two issues related to the effects of MLA on risky investment decisions. First, we assess the relative impact of feedback frequency and investment flexibility (via the investment horizon) on risky investments. Second, given that we observe higher investments with a longer investment horizon, we examine conditions under which investors might endogenously opt for a longer investment horizon in order to avoid the negative effects of MLA on investments. We find in our experimental study that investment flexibility seems to be at least as relevant as feedback frequency for the effects of myopic loss aversion. When subjects are given the choice to opt for a long or short investment horizon, there is no clear preference for either. Yet, if subjects face a default horizon (either long or short), there is rather little switching from the one to the other horizon, showing that a default might work to attenuate the effects of MLA. However, if subjects switch, they are more often willing to switch from the long to the short horizon than vice versa, suggesting a preference for higher investment flexibility

Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy

We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be taxed. Conversely, any positive investment tax is suboptimally high if the public information is sufficiently unfavorable.We also show that an investment tax may increase overall investment activity.Information Externality; Strategic Waiting; Delay; Information Cascade; Investment Boom; Optimal Taxation