63,577 research outputs found
FPGA based remote code integrity verification of programs in distributed embedded systems
The explosive growth of networked embedded systems has made ubiquitous and pervasive computing a reality. However, there are still a number of new challenges to its widespread adoption that include scalability, availability, and, especially, security of software. Among the different challenges in software security, the problem of remote-code integrity verification is still waiting for efficient solutions. This paper proposes the use of reconfigurable computing to build a consistent architecture for generation of attestations (proofs) of code integrity for an executing program as well as to deliver them to the designated verification entity. Remote dynamic update of reconfigurable devices is also exploited to increase the complexity of mounting attacks in a real-word environment. The proposed solution perfectly fits embedded devices that are nowadays commonly equipped with reconfigurable hardware components that are exploited to solve different computational problems
An Iterative and Toolchain-Based Approach to Automate Scanning and Mapping Computer Networks
As today's organizational computer networks are ever evolving and becoming
more and more complex, finding potential vulnerabilities and conducting
security audits has become a crucial element in securing these networks. The
first step in auditing a network is reconnaissance by mapping it to get a
comprehensive overview over its structure. The growing complexity, however,
makes this task increasingly effortful, even more as mapping (instead of plain
scanning), presently, still involves a lot of manual work. Therefore, the
concept proposed in this paper automates the scanning and mapping of unknown
and non-cooperative computer networks in order to find security weaknesses or
verify access controls. It further helps to conduct audits by allowing
comparing documented with actual networks and finding unauthorized network
devices, as well as evaluating access control methods by conducting delta
scans. It uses a novel approach of augmenting data from iteratively chained
existing scanning tools with context, using genuine analytics modules to allow
assessing a network's topology instead of just generating a list of scanned
devices. It further contains a visualization model that provides a clear, lucid
topology map and a special graph for comparative analysis. The goal is to
provide maximum insight with a minimum of a priori knowledge.Comment: 7 pages, 6 figure
Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack
EMV, also known as "Chip and PIN", is the leading system for card payments
worldwide. It is used throughout Europe and much of Asia, and is starting to be
introduced in North America too. Payment cards contain a chip so they can
execute an authentication protocol. This protocol requires point-of-sale (POS)
terminals or ATMs to generate a nonce, called the unpredictable number, for
each transaction to ensure it is fresh. We have discovered that some EMV
implementers have merely used counters, timestamps or home-grown algorithms to
supply this number. This exposes them to a "pre-play" attack which is
indistinguishable from card cloning from the standpoint of the logs available
to the card-issuing bank, and can be carried out even if it is impossible to
clone a card physically (in the sense of extracting the key material and
loading it into another card). Card cloning is the very type of fraud that EMV
was supposed to prevent. We describe how we detected the vulnerability, a
survey methodology we developed to chart the scope of the weakness, evidence
from ATM and terminal experiments in the field, and our implementation of
proof-of-concept attacks. We found flaws in widely-used ATMs from the largest
manufacturers. We can now explain at least some of the increasing number of
frauds in which victims are refused refunds by banks which claim that EMV cards
cannot be cloned and that a customer involved in a dispute must therefore be
mistaken or complicit. Pre-play attacks may also be carried out by malware in
an ATM or POS terminal, or by a man-in-the-middle between the terminal and the
acquirer. We explore the design and implementation mistakes that enabled the
flaw to evade detection until now: shortcomings of the EMV specification, of
the EMV kernel certification process, of implementation testing, formal
analysis, or monitoring customer complaints. Finally we discuss
countermeasures
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