Functionally referential signals: a promising paradigm whose time has passed

Finding the evolutionary origins of human language in the communication systems of our closest living relatives has, for the last several decades, been a major goal of many in the field of animal communication generally and primate communication specifically.1–4 The so-called “functionally referential” signals have long been considered promising in this regard, with apparent parallels with the semantic communication that characterizes language. The once-prominent idea that functionally referential signals are word-like, in that they are arbitrary sounds that refer to phenomena external to the caller, has largely been abandoned.5 However, the idea that these signals may offer the strongest link between primate communication and human language remains widespread, primarily due to the fact the behavior of receivers indicates that such signals enable them to make very specific inferences about their physical or social environment. Here we review the concept of functional reference and discuss modern perspectives that indicate that, although the sophistication of receivers provides some continuity between nonhuman primate and human cognition, this continuity is not unique to functionally referential signals. In fact, because functionally referential signals are, by definition, produced only in specific contexts, receivers are less dependent on the integration of contextual cues with signal features to determine an appropriate response. The processing of functionally referential signals is therefore likely to entail simpler cognitive operations than does that of less context-specific signals. While studies of functional reference have been important in highlighting the relatively sophisticated processes that underlie receiver behavior, we believe that the continued focus on context-specific calls detracts from the potentially more complex processes underlying responses to more unspecific calls. In this sense, we argue that the concept of functional reference, while historically important for the field, has outlived its usefulness and become a red herring in the pursuit of the links between primate communication and human language

Animal moral psychologies

Observations of animals engaging in apparently moral behavior have led academics and the public alike to ask whether morality is shared between humans and other animals. Some philosophers explicitly argue that morality is unique to humans, because moral agency requires capacities that are only demonstrated in our species. Other philosophers argue that some animals can participate in morality because they possess these capacities in a rudimentary form. Scientists have also joined the discussion, and their views are just as varied as the philosophers’. Some research programs examine whether animals countenance specific human norms, such as fairness. Other research programs investigate the cognitive and affective capacities thought to be necessary for morality. There are two sets of concerns that can be raised by these debates. They sometimes suffer from there being no agreed upon theory of morality and no clear account of whether there is a demarcation between moral and social behavior; that is, they lack a proper philosophical foundation. They also sometimes suffer from there being disagreement about the psychological capacities evident in animals. Of these two sets of concerns—the nature of the moral and the scope of psychological capacities—we aim to take on only the second. In this chapter we defend the claim that animals have three sets of capacities that, on some views, are taken as necessary and foundational for moral judgment and action. These are capacities of care, capacities of autonomy, and normative capacities. Care, we argue, is widely found among social animals. Autonomy and normativity are more recent topics of empirical investigation, so while there is less evidence of these capacities at this point in our developing scientific knowledge, the current data is strongly suggestive

Misinformation, Misrepresentation, and Misuse of Human Behavioral Genetics Research

Kaplan discusses the limitations of human behavioral genetics studies, highlighting the research limitations inherent in studying humans and the narrow policy and legal applicability of results arising from behavioral genetics studies

Adaptationism for Human Cognition: Strong, Spurious or Weak?

Strong adaptationists explore complex organic design as task-specific adaptations to ancestral environments. Its strategy seems best when there is evidence of homology. Weak adaptationists don't assume that complex organic (including cognitive and linguistic) functioning necessarily or primarily represents task-specific adaptation. Its approach to cognition resembles physicists' attempts to deductively explain the most facts with fewest hypotheses. For certain domain-specific competencies (folkbiology) strong adaptationism is useful but not necessary to research. With group-level belief systems (religion) strong adaptationism degenerates into spurious notions of social function and cultural selection. In other cases (language, especially universal grammar) weak adaptationism's “minimalist” approach seems productive

Psychological and physiological adaptations to sperm competition in humans

Postcopulatory competition between males, in the form of sperm competition, is a widespread phenomenon in many animal species. The extent to which sperm competition has been an important selective pressure during human evolution remains controversial, however. The authors review critically the evidence that human males and females have psychological, behavioral, and physiological adaptations that evolved in response to selection pressures associated with sperm competition. The authors consider, using evidence from contemporary societies, whether sperm competition is likely to have been a significant adaptive problem for ancestral humans and examine the evidence suggesting that human males have physiological and psychological mechanisms that allow for “prudent” sperm allocation in response to variations in the risk of sperm competition

“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life

The Coexistence of Natural and Supernatural Explanations Across Cultures and Development

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/91141/1/j.1467-8624.2012.01743.x.pd

Variation in Decision Making

publication-status: PublishedVariation in how organisms allocate their behavior over their lifetimes is key to determining Darwinian fitness, and thus the evolution of human and non-human decision making. In this chapter, we explore how decision making varies across biologically and societally significant scales and what role such variation plays when trying to understand decision making from an evolutionary perspective. In the process, we highlight the importance of explicitly considering variation both when attempting to predict economically and socially important patterns of behavior, and to obtain a deeper understanding of the fundamental biological processes involved. We conclude by identifying key elements of a framework for incorporating variation into a general theory of Darwinian decision making

‘The uses of ethnography in the science of cultural evolution’. Commentary on Mesoudi, A., Whiten, A. and K. Laland ‘Toward a unified science of cultural evolution’

There is considerable scope for developing a more explicit role for ethnography within the research program proposed in the article. Ethnographic studies of cultural micro-evolution would complement experimental approaches by providing insights into the “natural” settings in which cultural behaviours occur. Ethnography can also contribute to the study of cultural macro-evolution by shedding light on the conditions that generate and maintain cultural lineages