13,211 research outputs found
Game-theoretic Resource Allocation Methods for Device-to-Device (D2D) Communication
Device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular networks allows
mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets to use the licensed spectrum
allocated to cellular services for direct peer-to-peer transmission. D2D
communication can use either one-hop transmission (i.e., in D2D direct
communication) or multi-hop cluster-based transmission (i.e., in D2D local area
networks). The D2D devices can compete or cooperate with each other to reuse
the radio resources in D2D networks. Therefore, resource allocation and access
for D2D communication can be treated as games. The theories behind these games
provide a variety of mathematical tools to effectively model and analyze the
individual or group behaviors of D2D users. In addition, game models can
provide distributed solutions to the resource allocation problems for D2D
communication. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the applications of
game-theoretic models to study the radio resource allocation issues in D2D
communication. The article also outlines several key open research directions.Comment: Accepted. IEEE Wireless Comms Mag. 201
MIMO-OFDM Based Energy Harvesting Cooperative Communications Using Coalitional Game Algorithm
This document is the Accepted Manuscript version. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.In this paper, we consider the problem of cooperative communication between relays and base station in an advanced MIMO-OFDM framework, under the assumption that the relays are supplied by electric power drawn from energy harvesting (EH) sources. In particular, we focus on the relay selection, with the goal to guarantee the required performance in terms of capacity. In order to maximize the data throughput under the EH constraint, we model the transmission scheme as a non-transferable coalition formation game, with characteristic function based on an approximated capacity expression. Then, we introduce a powerful mathematical tool inherent to coalitional game theory, namely: the Shapley value (Sv) to provide a reliable solution concept to the game. The selected relays will form a virtual dynamically-configuredMIMO network that is able to transmit data to destination using efficient space-time coding techniques. Numerical results, obtained by simulating the EH-powered cooperativeMIMO-OFDMtransmission with Algebraic Space-Time Coding (ASTC), prove that the proposed coalitional game-based relay selection allows to achieve performance very close to that obtained by the same system operated by guaranteed power supply. The proposed methodology is finally compared with some recent related state-of-the-art techniques showing clear advantages in terms of link performance and goodput.Peer reviewe
Coalitional Games in MISO Interference Channels: Epsilon-Core and Coalition Structure Stable Set
The multiple-input single-output interference channel is considered. Each
transmitter is assumed to know the channels between itself and all receivers
perfectly and the receivers are assumed to treat interference as additive
noise. In this setting, noncooperative transmission does not take into account
the interference generated at other receivers which generally leads to
inefficient performance of the links. To improve this situation, we study
cooperation between the links using coalitional games. The players (links) in a
coalition either perform zero forcing transmission or Wiener filter precoding
to each other. The -core is a solution concept for coalitional games
which takes into account the overhead required in coalition deviation. We
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the strong and weak
-core of our coalitional game not to be empty with zero forcing
transmission. Since, the -core only considers the possibility of
joint cooperation of all links, we study coalitional games in partition form in
which several distinct coalitions can form. We propose a polynomial time
distributed coalition formation algorithm based on coalition merging and prove
that its solution lies in the coalition structure stable set of our coalition
formation game. Simulation results reveal the cooperation gains for different
coalition formation complexities and deviation overhead models.Comment: to appear in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 14 pages, 14
figures, 3 table
The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence
This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.public goods, coalition formation, inequality aversion, participation requirement, experiments
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Balancing risks and rewards: the logic of violence
Violence is widespread throughout the natural world, prominent examples being predatory violence between species, seasonal violent competition for mating rights and territories within species and food competition both within and between species. These interactions are generally between unrelated individuals with no social connection. There are, however, examples of violent behaviour which occurs within groups of individuals who otherwise cooperate to live, have significant social bonds and may also be related, and that is the primary focus of this paper. Examples are in the establishment and maintenance of dominance hierarchies, or in infanticide, where (usually) incoming males attempt to kill existing infants in a group. Such violence can seem paradoxical, but in fact is often perfectly logical for the individual perpetrating the violence, as distinct from the group as a whole. We discuss such situations from the perspective of evolutionary game theory, and also consider wider questions of interspecific violence
Oceanic Games: Centralization Risks and Incentives in Blockchain Mining
To participate in the distributed consensus of permissionless blockchains,
prospective nodes -- or miners -- provide proof of designated, costly
resources. However, in contrast to the intended decentralization, current data
on blockchain mining unveils increased concentration of these resources in a
few major entities, typically mining pools. To study strategic considerations
in this setting, we employ the concept of Oceanic Games, Milnor and Shapley
(1978). Oceanic Games have been used to analyze decision making in corporate
settings with small numbers of dominant players (shareholders) and large
numbers of individually insignificant players, the ocean. Unlike standard
equilibrium models, they focus on measuring the value (or power) per entity and
per unit of resource} in a given distribution of resources. These values are
viewed as strategic components in coalition formations, mergers and resource
acquisitions. Considering such issues relevant to blockchain governance and
long-term sustainability, we adapt oceanic games to blockchain mining and
illustrate the defined concepts via examples. The application of existing
results reveals incentives for individual miners to merge in order to increase
the value of their resources. This offers an alternative perspective to the
observed centralization and concentration of mining power. Beyond numerical
simulations, we use the model to identify issues relevant to the design of
future cryptocurrencies and formulate prospective research questions.Comment: [Best Paper Award] at the International Conference on Mathematical
Research for Blockchain Economy (MARBLE 2019
The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence
This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players. Key Words:
A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality NTU-Coalition Games
We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non-cooperative approach has conceptual advantages in the context of economic problems with externalities. Therefore, we derive a non-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive externality NTU-games. First, in the spirit of Hart/Kurz (1983), we develop a game that we call ?-game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to ?- and ?-core stable coalition structures. Second, as a by-product of the definition of the ?-game, we develop an extension called an ?-game. Finally, we compare equilibria in the ?- and ?-game with those in the ?- and ?-game of Hart and Kurz (1983).Core-stability, non-cooperative game theory, positive externality games
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