Flexibility Provisions in Multilateral Environmental Treaties

In international politics, intergovernmental treaties provide the rules of the game. Similar to private law, treaty designers face a trade-off between flexibility to adjust to unforeseen contingencies and the danger that the binding nature of the treaty and hence, the level of commitment by treaty members, is being undermined if the treaty can be amended too easily. In this paper, we address this problem in the analytical framework of institutional economics, drawing in particular on the incomplete contracts literature. Furthermore, we derive preliminary hypotheses and operational concepts for the measurement of flexibility in international treaties. Based on 400 treaties and supplementary agreements from the field of international environmental law, we provide new insights into the combined application of rules for adoption and entry into force of amendments, as well as provisions for conflict resolution and interpretative development. Using correspondence analysis, we show that treaty provisions can be represented in a two-dimensional property space, where treaties can be arrayed according to the degree of institutionalisation as well as along a flexibility dimension. --

Political Disagreement and Delegation in a Multi-Level Governance Setting

A large share of delegation models takes into account the effect of political disagreement when explaining delegation. Yet, delegation models make sharply contrasting predictions on how political disagreement translates into the level of discretion delegated to agencies. Moreover, empirical findings are contradictory. The current paper addresses this puzzle by disentangling mechanisms driving the effect of political disagreement on delegation. Furthermore, we distinguish conditions interacting with the effect of political disagreement on discretion. We apply the conditions to the research context of the present paper: economic restructuring in the UK under New Labour, which took place in a multi-level governance setting. We derive hypotheses on the effect of political disagreement on discretion and explore our theoretical predictions with the use of a novel dataset on economic restructuring in the UK under New Labour (Bennett and Payne 2000). Our analysis show that political disagreement leads to lower levels of discretion delegated.

Quantifying European Legislative Research: using CELEX and PreLex in EU legislative studies

Research on European legislative decision-making has entered a stage of quantitative analysis. The quantitative approach promises to advance the current dialogue by allowing for the evaluation of competing approaches across multiple policy domains and over time. At the same time, the quantitative study of EU decision-making introduces a number of drawbacks: it is difficult to identify one definitive source for legislative information, and case-level data are not directly accessible in a machine-readable format. In order to identify the most crucial pitfalls and provide a reliable data source, we evaluate the most frequently cited, publicly available EU legislative database, CELEX, and compare it with a less publicized legislative database referred to as PreLex. We find that CELEX documents legislative events, whereas PreLex records inter-institutional activities in the legislative process. Unsurprisingly, each of these databases has particular advantages, and we discuss which of the two might be better suited for the analysis of specific research questions

Flexibility Provisions in Multilateral Environmental Treaties

In international politics, intergovernmental treaties provide the rules of the game. Similar to private law, treaty designers face a trade-off between flexibility to adjust to unforeseen contingencies and the danger that the binding nature of the treaty and hence, the level of commitment by treaty members, is being undermined if the treaty can be amended too easily. In this paper, we address this problem in the analytical framework of institutional economics, drawing in particular on the incomplete contracts literature. Furthermore, we derive preliminary hypotheses and operational concepts for the measurement of flexibility in international treaties. Based on 400 treaties and supplementary agreements from the field of international environmental law, we provide new insights into the combined application of rules for adoption and entry into force of amendments, as well as provisions for conflict resolution and interpretative development. Using correspondence analysis, we show that treaty provisions can be represented in a two-dimensional property space, where treaties can be arrayed according to the degree of institutionalisation as well as along a flexibility dimension

Identification of gene-gene interactions for Alzheimer's disease using co-operative game theory

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston UniversityThe multifactorial nature of Alzheimer's Disease suggests that complex gene-gene interactions are present in AD pathways. Contemporary approaches to detect such interactions in genome-wide data are mathematically and computationally challenging. We investigated gene-gene interactions for AD using a novel algorithm based on cooperative game theory in 15 genome-wide association study (GWAS) datasets comprising of a total of 11,840 AD cases and 10,931 cognitively normal elderly controls from the Alzheimer Disease Genetics Consortium (ADGC). We adapted this approach, which was developed originally for solving multi-dimensional problems in economics and social sciences, to compute a Shapely value statistic to identify genetic markers that contribute most to coalitions of SNPs in predicting AD risk. Treating each GWAS dataset as independent discovery, markers were ranked according to their contribution to coalitions formed with other markers. Using a backward elimination strategy, markers with low Shapley values were eliminated and the statistic was recalculated iteratively. We tested all two-way interactions between top Shapley markers in regression models which included the two SNPs (main effects) and a term for their interaction. Models yielding a p-value<0.05 for the interaction term were evaluated in each of the other datasets and the results from all datasets were combined by meta-analysis. Statistically significant interactions were observed with multiple marker combinations in the APOE regions. My analyses also revealed statistically strong interactions between markers in 6 regions; CTNNA3-ATP11A (p=4.1E-07), CSMD1-PRKCQ (p=3.5E-08), DCC-UNC5CL (p=5.9e-8), CNTNAP2-RFC3 (p=1.16e-07), AACS-TSHZ3 (p=2.64e-07) and CAMK4-MMD (p=3.3e-07). The Shapley value algorithm outperformed Chi-Square and ReliefF in detecting known interactions between APOE and GAB2 in a previously published GWAS dataset. It was also more accurate than competing filtering methods in identifying simulated epistastic SNPs that are additive in nature, but its accuracy was low in identifying non-linear interactions. The game theory algorithm revealed strong interactions between markers in novel genes with weak main effects, which would have been overlooked if only markers with strong marginal association with AD were tested. This method will be a valuable tool for identifying gene-gene interactions for complex diseases and other traits

Political Risk and Sovereign Debt Contracts

Default on sovereign debt is a form of political risk. Issuers and creditors have responded to this risk both by strengthening the terms in sovereign debt contracts that enable creditors to enforce their debts judicially and by creating terms that enable sovereigns to restructure their debts. These apparently contradictory approaches reflect attempts to solve an incomplete contracting problem in which debtors need to be forced to repay debts in good states of the world; debtors need to be granted partial relief from debt payments in bad states; debtors may attempt to exploit divisions among creditors in order to opportunistically reduce their debt burden; and debtors and creditors may attempt to externalize costs on the taxpayers of other countries. We support this argument with an empirical overview of the development of sovereign bond terms from 1960 to the present

The Minority Game Unpacked: Coordination and Competition in a Team-based Experiment

In minority games, players in a group must decide at each round which of two available options to choose, knowing that only subjects who picked the minority op- tion obtain a positive reward. Previous experiments on the minority and similar congestion games have shown that players interacting repeatedly are remarkably able to coordinate eciently, despite not conforming to Nash equilibrium behavior. We conduct an experiment on a minority-of-three game in which each player is a team composed by three subjects. Each team can freely discuss its strategies in the game and decisions must be made via a majority rule. Team discussions are recorded and their content analyzed to detect evidence of strategy co-evolution among teams playing together. Our main results of team discussion analysis show no evidence sup- porting the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution, and support a low-rationality, backward-looking approach to model behavior in the game, more consistent with reinforcement learning models than with belief-based models. Showing level-2 ratio- nality (i.e., reasoning about others' beliefs) is positively and signicantly correlated with higher than average earnings in the game, showing that a mildly sophisticated approach pays off. In addition, teams that are more successful tend to become more egocentric over time, paying more attention to their own past successes than to the behavior of other teams. Finally, we nd evidence of mutual adaptation over time, as teams that are more strategic (i.e., they pay more attention to other teams' moves) induce competing teams to be more egocentric instead. Our results contribute to the understanding of coordination dynamics resting on heterogeneity and co-evolution of decision rules rather than on conformity to equilibrium behavior. In addition, they provide support at the decision process level to the validity of modeling behavior using low-rationality reinforcement learning models.coordination, minority game, market eciency, information, self-organization, reinforcement learning s