5,483 research outputs found
Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice
Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model
strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these
theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they
provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand,
people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these
strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and
psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether
strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated
agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated
agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation
settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory
based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based
argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games
and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729
Learning the Structure and Parameters of Large-Population Graphical Games from Behavioral Data
We consider learning, from strictly behavioral data, the structure and
parameters of linear influence games (LIGs), a class of parametric graphical
games introduced by Irfan and Ortiz (2014). LIGs facilitate causal strategic
inference (CSI): Making inferences from causal interventions on stable behavior
in strategic settings. Applications include the identification of the most
influential individuals in large (social) networks. Such tasks can also support
policy-making analysis. Motivated by the computational work on LIGs, we cast
the learning problem as maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) of a generative
model defined by pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). Our simple formulation
uncovers the fundamental interplay between goodness-of-fit and model
complexity: good models capture equilibrium behavior within the data while
controlling the true number of equilibria, including those unobserved. We
provide a generalization bound establishing the sample complexity for MLE in
our framework. We propose several algorithms including convex loss minimization
(CLM) and sigmoidal approximations. We prove that the number of exact PSNE in
LIGs is small, with high probability; thus, CLM is sound. We illustrate our
approach on synthetic data and real-world U.S. congressional voting records. We
briefly discuss our learning framework's generality and potential applicability
to general graphical games.Comment: Journal of Machine Learning Research. (accepted, pending
publication.) Last conference version: submitted March 30, 2012 to UAI 2012.
First conference version: entitled, Learning Influence Games, initially
submitted on June 1, 2010 to NIPS 201
Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games
Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of
game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been
proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's
payoffs, typically by gathering information from the leader's interaction with
the follower. Unfortunately, these approaches rely crucially on the assumption
that the follower will not strategically exploit this information asymmetry,
i.e., the follower behaves truthfully during the interaction according to their
actual payoffs. As we show in this paper, the follower may have strong
incentives to deceitfully imitate the behavior of a different follower type
and, in doing this, benefit significantly from inducing the leader into
choosing a highly suboptimal strategy. This raises a fundamental question: how
to design a leader strategy in the presence of a deceitful follower? To answer
this question, we put forward a basic model of Stackelberg games with
(imitative) follower deception and show that the leader is indeed able to
reduce the loss due to follower deception with carefully designed policies. We
then provide a systematic study of the problem of computing the optimal leader
policy and draw a relatively complete picture of the complexity landscape;
essentially matching positive and negative complexity results are provided for
natural variants of the model. Our intractability results are in sharp contrast
to the situation with no deception, where the leader's optimal strategy can be
computed in polynomial time, and thus illustrate the intrinsic difficulty of
handling follower deception. Through simulations we also examine the benefit of
considering follower deception in randomly generated games
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