State Capacity, Conflict and Development

We report on an on-going project, which asks a number of questions relevant to thestudy of state capacity. What are the main economic and political determinants ofthe state's capacity to raise revenue and support private markets? How do risks ofviolent conflict affect the incentives to invest in state building? Does it matterwhether conflicts are external or internal to the state? When are large statesassociated with higher income levels and growth rates than small states? Whatrelations should we expect between resource rents, civil wars and economicdevelopment? The paper is organized into three main sections: 1. The origins of statecapacity, 2. Sate capacity and the genius of taxation, and 3. State capacity and thestrategy of conflict. Each of these begins with a specific motivation. A simple modelis formulated to analyze the determinants of state capacity in the first section, andmodified to address the new issues that arise in subsequent sections. The theoreticalresults are summarized in a number of propositions. We discuss the implications ofthe theory, comment on its relation to existing literature, and briefly mention someempiric applications.state capacity, development

State capacity, manufacturing and civil conflict

In this note we empirically analyze the link between state capacity and civil conflict via the manufacturing sector, which is the source of wealth for emerging new elite interested in obtaining political representation, and is the outcome of a new political equilibrium more in tune with capital accumulation. This raises the cost of civil conflict, reducing its probability of occurrence. We find evidence in favor of our hypothesis in a panel of African countries.civil conflict, manufacturing, state capacity, fragile states, Africa.

State capacity and military conflict

In 1500, Europe was composed of hundreds of statelets and principalities, with weak central authority, no monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, and overlapping jurisdictions. By 1800, only a handful of powerful, centralized nation states remained. We build a model that explains both the emergence of capable states and growing divergence between European powers. We argue that the impact of war was crucial for state building, and depended on: i) the importance of financial resources for military success, and ii) a country's initial level of domestic political fragmentation. We emphasize the role of the "Military Revolution", which raised the cost of war. Initially, this caused more cohesive states to invest in state capacity, while more divided states rationally dropped out of the competition, causing divergence between European states. As the cost of war escalates further, all remaining states engaged in a race to the top, resulting in greater state building.state capacity, war, military revolution, taxation, political economy

Peace and War with Endogenous State Capacity

We explore how peace or war can occur in the presence of commitment problems. These problems can be reduced by institutions of good governance or, alternatively, state capacity which (i) can be considered a collective good and (ii) can be improved through investments. We show how the likelihood of a peace agreement depends on the level of state capacity and on investments in state capacity made by adversaries. In accordance with existing evidence but contrary to various theories of conflict, we find that income levels unambiguously increase the chance of peace. Among other issues, we discuss the critical role of external actors in encouraging or discouraging commitment and in developing good governance institutions.Institutions; Conflict; Governance

Privatization and State Capacity in Postcommunist Society

Economists have used cross-national regression analysis to argue that postcommunist economic failure is the result of inadequate adherence liberal economic policies. Sociologists have relied on case study data to show that postcommunist economic failure is the outcome of too close adherence to liberal policy recommendations, which has led to an erosion of state effectiveness, and thus produced poor economic performance. The present paper advances a version of this statist theory based on a quantitative analysis of mass privatization programs in the postcommunist world. We argue that rapid large-scale privatization creates severe supply and demand shocks for enterprises, thereby inducing firm failure. The resulting erosion of tax revenues leads to a fiscal crisis for the state, and severely weakens its capacity and bureaucratic character. This, in turn, reacts back on the enterprise sector, as the state can no longer support the institutions necessary for the effective functioning of a modern economy, thus resulting in deindustrialization. Using cross-national regression techniques we find that the implementation of mass privatization programs negatively impacts measures of economic growth, state capacity and the security of property rights.privatization, transition economies, state capacity, property rights, institutions, growth

Sustainable regional development, innovation and state capacity

The paper sketches the current ecological and economic context of sustainable regional development with focus on the imperative for change to a post carbon economy, the need for innovation within the learning system of public administration and policy challenges for securing system viability.Sustainable regional development, innovation, state capacity

Sustainable regional development, innovation and state capacity

The paper sketches the current ecological and economic context of sustainable regional development with focus on the imperative for change to a post carbon economy, the need for innovation within the learning system of public administration and policy challenges for securing system viability.Sustainable regional development, innovation, state capacity

State capacity, manufacturing and civil conflict

In this note we empirically analyze the link between state capacity and civil conflict via the manufacturing sector, which is the source of wealth for an emerging new elite interested in obtaining political representation, and is the outcome of a new political equilibrium more in tune with capital accumulation. This raises the cost of civil conflict, reducing its probability of occurrence. We find evidence in favor of our hypothesis in a panel of African countries.civil conflict, manufacturing, state capacity, fragile states, Africa

State Capacity and Non-state Service Provision in Fragile and Conflict-affected States

How can governments effectively engage with non-state providers (NSPs) of basic services where capacity is weak? This paper examines whether and how fragile and conflict affected states can co-ordinate, finance, and set and apply standards for the provision of basic services by NSPs. It explores ways of incrementally engaging the state, beginning with activities that are least likely to do harm to non-state provision. Through the ‘indirect’ roles of setting the policy environment and engaging in policy dialogue, regulating and facilitating, contracting, and entering into mutual and informal agreements with NSPs, the state can in principle assume responsibility for the provision of basic services without necessarily being involved in direct provision. But government capacity to perform these roles is constrained by the state’s weak legitimacy, coverage and competence, lack of basic information about the non-state sector, and lack of basic organisational capacity to form and maintain relationships with NSPs. The experience of the exercise of the indirect roles in fragile settings suggests: * Governments may be more willing to engage with NSPs where there is recognition that government cannot alone deliver all services, where public and private services are not in competition, and where there is evidence that successful collaboration is possible (demonstrated through small-scale pilots). * The extent to which engagements are ‘pro-service’may be influenced by government motives for engagement and the extent to which the providers that are most important to poor people are engaged. * Formal policy dialogue between government and NSPs may be imperfect, unrepresentative and at times unhelpful in fragile settings. Informal dialogue - at the operational level - could more likely be where synergies can be found. * Regulation is more likely to be ‘pro-service’ where it offers incentives for compliance, and where it focuses on standards in terms of outputs and outcomes rather than inputs and entry controls. * Wide scale, performance-based contracting has been successful in delivering services in some cases, but the sustainability of this approach is often questioned. Some successful contractual agreements have a strong informal, relational element and grow out of earlier informal connections. * Informal and mutual agreements can avoid the capacity problems and tensions implicit in formal contracting but may present problems of non-transparency and exclusion of competition. Paradoxically, the need for large-scale approaches and quick co-ordination of services in fragile and conflict-affected settings may require ‘prematurely high’ levels of state-NSP engagement, before the development of the underlying institutional structures that would support them. When considering strategies to support the capacity of government to engagement with NSPs, donors should: * Recognise non-state service provision and adopt the ‘do no harm’ principle: It would be wrong to set the ambition of 'managing ‘ non-state provision in its entirety, and it can be very harmful for low-capacity states to seek to regulate all NSP or to draw it into clumsy contracts. * Beware of generalisation: Non-state provision takes many forms in response to different histories and to political and economic change. The possibilities and case for state engagement have to be assessed not assumed. The particular identities of NGOs and enterprises should be considered. * Recognise that state building can occur through any of the types of engagement with NSPs: Types of engagement should therefore be selected on the basis of their likely effectiveness in improving service delivery. * Begin with less risky/small scale forms of engagement where possible: State interventions that imply a direct controlling role for the state and which impose obligations on NSPs (i.e. contracting and regulation) require greater capacity (on both sides) and present greater risk of harm if performed badly than the roles of policy dialogue and entering into mutual agreements. * Adopt mixed approaches: The choice between forms of engagement does not have to be absolute. Rather than adopting a uniform plan of engagement in a particular country, it may be better to try different approaches in different regions or sectors