1 research outputs found
Stable Secretaries
We define and study a new variant of the secretary problem. Whereas in the
classic setting multiple secretaries compete for a single position, we study
the case where the secretaries arrive one at a time and are assigned, in an
on-line fashion, to one of multiple positions. Secretaries are ranked according
to talent, as in the original formulation, and in addition positions are ranked
according to attractiveness. To evaluate an online matching mechanism, we use
the notion of blocking pairs from stable matching theory: our goal is to
maximize the number of positions (or secretaries) that do not take part in a
blocking pair. This is compared with a stable matching in which no blocking
pair exists. We consider the case where secretaries arrive randomly, as well as
that of an adversarial arrival order, and provide corresponding upper and lower
bounds.Comment: Accepted for presentation at the 18th ACM conference on Economics and
Computation (EC 2017