4 research outputs found
Belief change in branching time: AGM-consistency and iterated revision
We study belief change branching-time structures. First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent to AGM-consistency, which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full belief revision function that satisfies the AGM postulates. Second, we provide a set of modal axioms that characterize the class of AGM-consistent frames within the modal logic introduced in [Bonanno, Axiomatic characterization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic, Artificial Intelligence, 2007]. Third, we introduce a generalization of AGM belief revision functions that allows a clear statement of principles of iterated belief revision and discuss iterated revision both semantically and syntactically.iterated belief revision, branching time, information, belief, modal logic, AGM belief revision
Preservation, Commutativity and Modus Ponens: Two Recent Triviality Results
In a recent pair of publications, Richard Bradley has offered two novel no-go theorems involving the principle of Preservation for conditionals, which guarantees that oneās prior conditional beliefs will exhibit a certain degree of inertia in the face of a change in oneās non-conditional beliefs. We first note that Bradleyās original discussions of these resultsāin which he finds motivation for rejecting Preservation, first in a principle of Commutativity, then in a doxastic analogue of the rule of modus ponens āare problematic in a significant number of respects. We then turn to a recent U-turn on his part, in which he winds up rescinding his commitment to modus ponens, on the grounds of a tension with the rule of Import-Export for conditionals. Here we offer an important positive contribution to the literature, settling the following crucial question that Bradley leaves unanswered: assuming that one gives up on full-blown modus ponens on the grounds of its incompatibility with Import-Export, what weakened version of the principle should one be settling for instead? Our discussion of the issue turns out to unearth an interesting connection between epistemic undermining and the apparent failures of modus ponens in McGeeās famous counterexamples
Towards a logic for ābecauseā
This paper explores the connective ābecauseā, based on the idea that āC because Aā implies the acceptance/truth of the antecedent A as well as of the consequent C, and additionally that the antecedent makes a difference for the consequent. To capture this idea of difference-making a ārelevantizedā version of the Ramsey Test for conditionals is employed that takes the antecedent to be relevant to the consequent in the following sense: a conditional is true/accepted in a state Ļ just in case (i) the consequent is true/accepted when Ļ is revised by the antecedent and (ii) the consequent fails to be true/accepted when Ļ is revised by the antecedentās negation. To extend this to a semantics for ābecauseā, we add that (iii) the antecedent and (iv) the consequent are accepted/true in the state Ļ. We get metaphysical or doxastic interpretations of these clauses, depending on what we mean by a model and a state. We introduce several semantics known from suppositional conditionals, which we reinterpret for difference-making conditionals and ābecauseā. We present a minimal logic for ābecauseā sentences and show how it can be extended in ways that parallel the hierarchy of extensions of the logic of suppositional conditionals. We establish correspondence results between axioms for ābecauseā and properties of states, and prove that the specified logics are sound with respect to the semantics