2 research outputs found
Further Results on Stability-Preserving Mechanisms for School Choice
We build on the stability-preserving school choice model introduced and
studied recently in [MV18]. We settle several of their open problems and we
define and solve a couple of new ones.Comment: Removed placeholder sectio
Dynamically Stable Matching
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic
matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii)
matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition
addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available to
match at the same time, one must establish which agents are allowed to form
blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality
that is not present in static markets: an agent's payoff from remaining
unmatched cannot be defined independently of what other contemporaneous agents'
outcomes are. Dynamically stable matchings always exist. Dynamic stability is a
necessary condition to ensure timely participation in the economy by ensuring
that agents do not strategically delay the time at which they are available to
match